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Buddhist Theory of Meaning and Literary Analysis



Rajnish Kumar Mishra

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and
Literary Analysis

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प्रमाणभूताय ज
-गद्धितैषिणे प्रण
-म्य शास्त्रे सुगता
-य तायिने ।
कुतर्कसम्भ्रान्त-
-जनानुकम्पया प्र
-माणसिद्धिर्वि-
-धिवद् विधी
-यते ॥*
[प्रमाणसमुच्
-चय १.१]

विधूतकल्पना
जालगम्भीरो
-दार मूर्तये ।
नमः समन्त
-भद्राय समन्
-त स्फरणत्
-विषे ॥
[प्रमाणवा
-र्त्तिकम् १.१
]

॥ नमः श्री लो
कनाथाय ॥
[अपोहसिद्धि]



Dedicated to the debt of sages

(ṛṣi ṛṇa)

"Words are neither different nor not-different from meaning and that meaning stands in the same relation to words. If Mahāmati, meaning is different from words, it will not be made manifest by means of words; but meaning enters into (by means of) words as things (are made manifest) by a lamp."

[*LS*, III.33.]

Preface

The central issue in the philosophy of language is the relationship that holds between language, thought and reality. In India and also in the West, philosophers and scholars have noted both the symmetry and the asymmetry between language and reality. This amounts to questioning whether language represents reality or shapes/constructs it through a mediation of the mind. This also leads to the question whether linguistic meaning is directly referential or a mental construct/image of a pre-existing object. The viewpoint that language refers to the given reality directly (as the Realists hold) is problematic because if it is so then what is the meaning of expressions like — 'the horned tiger', 'sky-flower', 'the barren woman's son' or 'he/she piles fire in the sky' and 'he/she irrigates with fire'. Linguistic expressions are far more complex than being just direct or indirect references. Language, as a cognitive act, constitutes many permutations and combinations of the given world or reality. This is not only a means of perception and expression of ideas and experience but is also an ontological entity (*vāk*). In the form of the modes of mind (*vṛtti*), this is knowledge itself and the meaning, whether it be ideational or referential, direct or indirect, positive or negative/differential, is ultimately the manifestation of the same multifoliated reality (*mahāsattā*).

All Indian theories of meaning examine and frame their responses to these and a number of other associated issues and assumptions from their respective philosophical standpoints. In the Indian intellectual traditions the multiplicity of viewpoints is always accorded great prestige (*vide SDS* of Śrī Mādhavācārya). The same is also evident in the rich debate that constitutes the vast literature on the theories of meaning. All the major Indian

philosophical systems like—Jainism, Buddhism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa (the school of Grammarians) and Śaivism expound their own approaches to the nature, type and limits of the word-meaning relationship.

Buddhist theory of meaning has a distinct place in this world of competing theories. The well-defined theory of meaning it offers has become very popular among the Indian intellectuals who are enthusiastic about carrying out comparative studies of *apoha* and the Saussurean linguistics in general and 'deconstruction' of Jacques Derrida in particular. But such studies have not made much headway. A truly scholarly research in this area is still awaited.

Even in the direction of comparative studies, the first step would be to achieve a complete understanding of Buddhist theory of meaning on the basis of the source texts and to explore its applicability for the analysis of contemporary discourses. The present work is a small contribution in this direction and almost the first of its kind.

The Buddhist concept of linguistic sign stems from the classification of the basic elements of our world which have been uniquely designated and defined as *dharma*. The *apoha* theory of meaning is embedded in the Buddhist epistemological-philosophical texts, particularly the works of Ācārya Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇa-samuccaya* and *Pramāṇa-vārttika*). We have examined the theory as expounded by them in two contexts — that of the tradition of lingusitic thought in India (i.e., Grammar, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina), and that of the current issues in language, literary theory and philosophy. Our exposition shows that the *apoha* theory of meaning is a part of the wider Buddhist philosophy and world-view and has been subjected to systematic critiques by other schools of thought as well, particularly Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā. The Buddhist logicians and philosophers have, as is the way in the Indian tradition, rejoined and refuted these critiques and the theory has evolved in the process of disputation.

We have also validated the empirical value of the Buddhist theory of meaning and cognition by abstracting an analytical model

from this theory and applying it to Wordsworth's celebrated poem 'Tintern Abbey'. Such an analysis, we note, adds to our appreciation of the poem by enabling a number of new insights such as how the poet's self uniquely structures and reinterprets the impressions and thoughts that nature inscribes on his self. Now, language centred studies have often been criticised for ignoring the 'socio-political' realities and for paying too much attention to the play of the signifiers. However, the present study examines literary language as evidence of the poet's experience in a social context and as such captures the multivalent reality — be it of the text or of the context, social or historical, or of the relationship between the two.

This study, like all such studies, foregrounds the question of using the complex conceptual terms *as they are* in Sanskrit or in their English equivalents. However, the translation of specific expressions and technical-philosophical terms poses a severe challenge, and it is almost impossible to translate them. It is painful to translate *śūnya* as 'void', *kliṣṭamana* as 'defiled or marked mind' and *dharma* (mostly misinterpreted) as 'religion' or 'basic elements'. To prevent such 'mis-constructions' a cross-referential glossary of conceptual Sanskrit terms has been appended to define, annotate and explain these terms as they are understood in different systems of thought and as employed by the Buddhist theoreticians. Such translations and explanations of Indian conceptual terms require consistent, painstaking group work. With this purpose in mind sixteen research students coordinated by Prof. Kapil Kapoor have joined together to form **Śāstra Group** of which I am also a member. Prof. Kapoor has kindly offered the Introduction to the **Śāstra Group** at Jawaharlal Nehru University in the following pages. I am thankful to the members of the Śāstra Group for their active support, constructive criticism and creative suggestions both during its writing and during the preparation of the manuscript of this book.

I consider myself fortunate to have had so much significant advice and criticism from many excellent sources. Above all, I express my deep sense of gratitude and regards to my teacher and research guide Prof. Kapil Kapoor who has always been a source of

inspiration and encouragement. Through his courses he has created among the students an abiding interest in the studies related to Indian linguistic and literary theories and philosophical systems. This study has been carried out under his supervision.

I take this opportunity to express my regards to my teachers at the Centre of Linguistics & English whose discussions have helped me to give a prespective to my work to examine it from various points of view. Dr. Piyushkant Dixit of Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth helped me to read the Buddhist epistemological texts. Dr. R.P. Singh, a UGC research scientist, helped me to bring forth the common issues in the Indian and the contemporary Western philosophy. I am thankful to them.

I thank all my friends — Sushant, Gaurhari, Nabanita, Arunim, Atanu, Dharmendra, Purna, Ravi, Pradeep and Nishant who have helped me so much through the different stages of the completion of this book. Nishant has made a significant contribution to this book by designing the dedication page.

My special regards and affection to my brothers Kaushal Kishor Mishra and Rakesh Kumar Mishra who have always encouraged me in my pursuit of higher studies. I hope this publication will bring them much joy.

On this occasion, I seek blessings from my parents and my revered Guruji Acharya Shri Janaki Vallabha Shastri.

I am grateful to Shri Susheel K. Mittal, Director, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd. for taking so much interest in the work and for the care he has taken in the publication of this book.

Rajnish Kumar Mishra

The Śāstra Group at Jawaharlal Nehru University — An Introduction —

At the Centre of Linguistics and English, Jawaharlal Nehru university, beginning in 1978, a conscious decision was taken to introduce courses in the Indian intellectual traditions in grammar, literary theory and philosophy so that the young post-graduates and research students who come to J.N.U., who are among the brightest minds in the country, are in a position to interact meaningfully with the western thought and on level ground. This intellectual tradition, we know, had three main contending schools of thought — the Brahmin (also called the Grammarians), the Buddhist and the Jaina. The Grammarians, were divided into *āstika* (theistic) and *nāstika* (atheistic) schools. These three traditions are enshrined mainly in Sanskrit and also in Pāli (Buddhist) and Prākṛt (Jaina). All the streams composed their major texts in Sanskrit which for more than 3000 years has continued to be the language of learning and scholarship in India. These three traditions, contrary to the popular perception, continue to be living traditions though through exigencies of history they have become relatively restricted to some traditional centres and institutes of learning. But the tradition is alive — this tradition of knowledge may be compared to a river, the *Gaṅgā pravāha*, which sometimes and/or at some places becomes narrow and elsewhere and at another time is a broad free flowing stream.

The task is to make this learning a part of the main-stream education, to establish a bridge between the wealth of scholarship in this tradition and the new centres of learning, the Indian

universities. How is this to be achieved?

It can be achieved by making the seminal texts of the Indian intellectual traditions widely and inexpensively available. For this, we have —

1. to prepare editions of seminal intellectual texts *in different scripts*,
2. to translate/re-translate the seminal texts into English and into major Indian languages (and into major European languages), and prepare careful modern translations in contemporary idiom,
3. to expound the important theoretical frameworks in a modern idiom to bring out their contemporary relevance.

In this perspective, and with this end in view, the Centre of Linguistics and English, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, had introduced courses first in the Indian intellectual traditions in grammar, literary theory and philosophy and then courses in the seminal texts — the grammar of Pāṇini, *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is studied as a primary modeling device of knowledge; *Nāṭyaśāstra* is studied as a text of communication; *Vākyapadīya* is unrivaled as a text of philosophy of language; and, *Yogasūtra* is a text of cognition and cognitive processes. This, over the years, then led in due time to considerable expositional and comparative research by a growing body of brilliant young boys and girls who, with their minds engaged by the powerful texts, became deeply involved in and committed to the Indian traditions of thought and became convinced that the theoretical frameworks of this tradition can be meaningfully related to both the contemporary Indian realities and the modern western thought.

These young scholars have decided to form a group devoted to the task of opening out the Indian thought by (i) translating the seminal texts, (ii) writing expository commentaries on those texts, and (iii) applying the Indian theoretical frameworks to modern Indian and Western texts to show the power, validity and in-built

development potential of these frameworks. This group, called **The Śāstra Group**, coordinated by me, has these founding members:

1. Ananya Vajpeyi
2. Anuradha Ghosh
3. Atanu Bhattacarya
4. Debashish Chatterji
5. Gaurhari Behera
6. Mayurika Chakravarti
7. Nabanita Banerji
8. Nitoo Das
9. Sadhana Parashar
10. Saugatha Bhaduri
11. Sunita Murmu
12. Sushant Kumar Mishra
13. Shankaranarayanan
14. Shruti Pant
15. Swati Mustafi
16. Rajnish Kumar Mishra

Objectives of Śāstra Group

1. to prepare inexpensive script variants of principal intellectual texts in the major Indian scripts,
2. to prepare modern translations of these texts in major Indian languages and produce both inexpensive student editions of each and multilingual CD texts,
3. to apply the Indian theoretical frameworks contemporary Indian texts and texts of other cultures,
4. to explore the possibility of producing reference bibliography of Sanskrit studies around the globe,
5. to prepare multi-lingual glossaries of intellectual terms in grammar, literary theory and philosophy, and
6. to start a *Journal of Indic Studies.*

The following texts have been identified in the first instance:

I. Grammar and Phonetics

1. Aṣṭādhyāyī
2. Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya
3. Pāṇinīya Śikṣā
4. 1st Āhnika of Mahābhāṣya

II. Literary Theory

5. Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra
6. Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṁkāra
7. Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa
8. Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka
9. Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamīmāṁsā

10. Anandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka
11. Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabhāratī
12. Visvanātha's Sāhityadarpaṇa
13. Pt. Jagannātha's Rasagaṅgādhara

III. Philosophy

14. Mīmāṁsāsūtra
15. Nyāyasūtra
16. Sāṁkhyasūtra
17. Vaiśeṣikasūtra
18. Yogasūtra
19. Vedāntasūtra
20. Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha
21. Tattvārthasūtra
22. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika
23. Jagadīśa's Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā

Some texts have already been translated — those at serial nos. 5, 6, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. Those at no. 9 and 18 are under publication. Other are awaiting finalisation for publication. Besides, several research studies have been completed that expound the Indian theoretical frameworks and apply them to modern texts in a significant reversal of the existing data-theory relationship.

Rajnish Kumar Mishra's exposition of *Buddhist Theory of Meaning* is the first **Śāstra Group** research belonging to the 3rd part of the Objectives to be published in the ŚĀSTRA GROUP SERIES. I feel extremely happy, and have a sense of fulfilment, at the publication of this work.

Prof. Kapil Kapoor
Professor of English
Dean, School of Language, Literature and Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110 067

Contents

Transliteration Chart

a	ā	i	ī	u	ū	e	ai	o	au
अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ	ए	ऐ	ओ	औ

m	ḥ	ṛ
अं	अः	ऋ

k	kh	g	gh	ṅ
क्	ख्	ग्	घ्	ङ्
c	ch	j	jh	ñ
च्	छ्	ज्	झ्	ञ्
ṭ	ṭh	ḍ	ḍh	ṇ
ट्	ठ्	ड्	ढ्	ण्
t	th	d	dh	n
त्	थ्	द्	ध्	न्
p	ph	b	bh	m
प्	फ्	ब्	भ्	म्

y	r	l	v
य्	र्	ल्	व्
ś	ṣ	s	h
श्	ष्	स्	ह्

kṣ	tr	jñ
क्ष्	त्र्	ज्ञ्

Abbreviations

AK (B)	-	*Abhidharma Kośa (Bhāṣya)*
AS	-	*Apohasiddhiḥ*
Aṣṭ	-	*Aṣṭādhyāyī*
BCA	-	*Boddhicaryāvatāra*
BDKVKI	-	*Baudha Darśana Ke Vikās Kā Itihāsa*
BDM	-	*Baudha Darśana Mīmāṁsā*
BHT	-	*Bhāmatī Ṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra
BL (1)	-	*Buddhist Logic* Vol. 1
BL (2)	-	*Buddhist Logic* Vol. 2
BPUF	-	*Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*
BṛUp	-	*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
BSSB	-	*Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya*
CCB	-	*The Central Conception of Buddhism*
Cours	-	*A Course in General Linguistics*
ITM	-	*Indian Theories of Meaning*
ĪśaUp	-	*Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*
KL	-	*Kāvyālaṁkāra.*
LB	-	*Lyrical Ballads*
LS	-	*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*
MuUp	-	*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*
MBh	-	*Mahābhāṣya*
MMK	-	*Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā*
MSL	-	*Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṁkāra*

MV	-	*Mahāvagga*
NM	-	*Nyāya Mañjarī*
NS	-	*Nyāya Sūtra*
NVTT	-	*Nyāya Vārtika Tātparya Ṭīkā*
OG	-	*Of Grammatology*
P	-	*Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī*
POKYB	-	*Problems of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism*
POUIP	-	*Problems of Universal in Indian Philosophy*
PPMS	-	*Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*
PS (v)	-	*Pramāṇa Samuccaya (vṛtti)*
PV	-	*Pramāṇa Vārttika*
ṚV	-	*Ṛgveda*
Sau	-	Saussure
SBA	-	*Svabhāṣālaṁkāra*
SDS	-	*Sarva Darśana Saṁgraha*
SK	-	*Sāṁkhya Kārikā*
SR	-	*Ṣaḍa Darśana Rahasya*
SVI	-	*Sabdārtha Vimarśa*
SV	-	*Śloka Vārttika*
TaiUp	-	*Taittirīyopaniṣad*
TS	-	*Tattvasaṁgraha*
TSP	-	*Tattvasaṁgraha Pañjikā*
TSn	-	*Tarkasaṁgraha*
TTS	-	*Tattvārtha Sūtra*
VC	-	*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*
VP	-	*Vākyapadīya*
VV	-	*Vigraha Vyāvarttanī*
VMS	-	*Vijñapati Mātratā Siddhiḥ*
YV	-	*Yajurveda*

Introduction

THE Buddhist theoretical standpoints regarding language and meaning have always been in debate and discussion in the Indian linguistic and philosophical traditions. Almost similar theoretical positions introduced by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure brought about a sea-change in the modern mindscape. His ideas that have impinged upon the western intellectual discourse, have a close affinity with the Buddhist linguistic thought developed in complete harmony with their philosophical premises.

The objective of the present work was an incisive and in-depth study of the Buddhist theory of meaning and to explore those aspects which can help us in the analysis of literary discourses. One of the expectations of this work has been to reach a considerable understanding of the Buddhist theory *apohavāda* on the basis of primary source materials which include Buddhist philosophical — epistemological texts in Sanskrit. But it is also true that such understanding cannot be achieved unless we examine the concerned topic in its proper context. Such context is constituted of two sources. First the tradition of linguistic thought in India and second, the current issues and assumptions in language, literature and thought. The first source includes the theory of meaning which originated from the source of Grammarians, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Jaina. The study of Buddhist theory of meaning in comparison with this system reveals many new dimensions. So far as our second source is concerned, it is essential to control the temptation of false impositions and anarchical analogy. This is what we do very often in order to establish the relevance of an age-old competent theory. This is a wrong assumption that some antique theory is relevant today only because it has been expounded

by some modern philosophers also. A theory transcends the barriers of time and space with its own strength. Buddhist theory of meaning is competent in itself and cannot be reduced to the fragmentary remarks of Saussure and intellectual puzzling of Derridean thought. In modern times we have seen some very enthusiastic studies based on the comparative estimates of *apoha* and 'deconstruction'.[1] Such comparative method is of course appreciable but when superimposition fabricated by the scholar's own intellect takes place it causes much harm to both the sides. *Apoha* is not 'deconstruction' because it does not involve *clôture* of 'deconstruction'. *Apoha* theory of meaning evolves from a comprehensive system of thought and does not take any extreme position like complete determination or complete indetermination. Such extreme views, according to Buddhist doctrine, are always unreal and add more suffering to our life. Keeping in view all these problems, a very limited space has been given to expound the relevance of the theory in this context of comparison.

An attempt has been made to get a convincing answer as regards the differential nature of linguistic sign and also through what successive phases these linguistic signs have evolved in the Buddhist tradition of thought.

The existing research in this area is plentiful (as the footnotes and bibliography will show) but remarkably insufficient for our purpose. These researches have their own orientation in philosophy. They examine *apoha* theory of meaning from various philosophical standpoints but its linguistic and literary aspects have not been much studied. This has also been an expectation from this theory of meaning to provide a cognitive, epistemological and a linguistic model to analyse a literary text.

Chapter one discusses the Indian theories of meaning with their respective philosophical assumptions. Chapter two provides a prologue to the Buddhist theory of meaning — how it evolved from the classification of basic element (*dharma*) maintaining consistency

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1. See Harold Coward, *Derrida and Indian Philosophy*, New York: 1990.

with all four Buddhist philosophical schools. The third chapter exclusively deals with the Buddhist theory of meaning on the basis of the primary source materials and the rich debate available in the tradition. The last chapter explores its practical aspects and studies Wordsworth's celebrated poem 'Tintern Abbey' in the model of Buddhist theory of meaning and cognition.

The study of word and meaning has been greatly valued in the Indian intellectual tradition and merits sustained and deep study. I here wish to conclude the introduction with two quotes from the *Holy Bible*. First is from the Gospel of St. John and the next from the first book of the *Holy Bible* (Genesis):

> In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God; all things were made through Him and without Him was not anything made that was made.[2]

The text contains all those elements in the seed-form which have been the major concerns of the study of language. One of the many aspects of language is its creative and manifesting powers. It is true that it cannot construct the physical form as the carpenter makes the couch by cutting and arranging the logs[3] — but it deals with the forms created conceptually and in this process an approach to Reality evolves. Both word and world/creation are almost in cause and effect relationship. So in 'Genesis' God states, "Let there be light, and there was light." This cognition of light or light of cognition originates with the Words.

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2. *The Holy Bible,* Rev. Standard version, Collins: Bangalore, 1973.
3. Plato, *The Republic,* Chapter X.

1

Philosophy of Language and Competing Indian Theories of Meaning

THE intellectual discourse of our century involves many language-related issues and problems. These speculations have achieved such a considerable distinctness and prominence in the last six-seven decades that Wittgenstein claims, "All philosophy is a critique of language . . ."[1] and Gilbert Ryle comments upon this phenomenon as "occupational disease"[2] of twentieth century philosophy. This 'linguistic turn' became more explicit in 1930s and thereafter it has maintained its cardinal position in the intellectual discussion down the decades. Bloomfield's own classic *Language* (1935) contributes much to this ontological shift where he observes and records the contemporary academic curriculum, ". . . language has no place in our educational programme or in the speculations of our philosophers."[3] This monumental work along with other invaluable contemporary publications sets new parameters in the history of study of language.[4] In the current trends in linguistics and philosophy, especially in the West, one may observe that the study of forms, structures and functions of language has been left to the

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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, London: 1974, 4.0031.
2. Gilbert Ryle, *Selected Papers II*, London: 1973, p. 150.
3. Leonard Bloomfield (1935), *Language*, Delhi: reprint 1985, p. 3.
4. (a) Otto Jesperson, *Philosophy of Grammar,* London: 1934.
   (b) Edward Sapir, *Language,* New York: 1921.

linguists and the study of basic underlying principles and theories of language upon which the whole linguistic expression rests have been taken up by philosophers. A group of philosophers, called 'linguist analysts', assumes with dedication the task of philosophical analysis of language which later on passed through the successive phases under the headings of 'linguistic philosophy', 'philosophical logic' and 'philosophy of language'.[5]

The philosophy of language is a less well-defined area because it draws its material from the various rich sources like metaphysics, logic, epistemology, etc. Searle, one of the main exponents of philosophy of language, sets the objectives for it, "to give philosophically illuminating description of certain general features of language."[6] In recent developments, it has been observed that there is no apparent distinction between linguistics and philosophy of language which was earlier emphasised and maintained by Searle. The Chomskian approach to language study seems to incorporate all those viewpoints and concerns which were earlier accounted for under philosophy of language. But for the sake of some important observations it would be useful to make a formal distinction between these two overlapping areas. This is only a matter of preference of concerns which a linguist or a philosopher posits for language. The issues related to meaning, sense, reference, truth and functions of language mainly constitute the domain of philosophy of language. Alston observes,

> . . .philosopher of language tries to determine, for example, what language is and how it is related to more or less analogous forms of activity, what it is for a linguistic expression to be meaningful . . . have a certain meaning, . . . to be used metaphorically.[7]

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5. Some of these concepts have been discussed by Tandra Patnaik (1994). However, it has always been problematic to define and determine the domains of these philosophical inquiries. See, Tandra Patnaik, *Śabda: A Study of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language,* Delhi: 1994, pp. 2-3.

6. John Searle, *Speech Act: An Essay in Philosophy of Language,* Cambridge: 1969, p. 2.

7. William P. Alston (1964), *Philosophy of Language,* Delhi:1988, p. xi.

Right from Plato we find some insightful responses to these questions in the Western philosophical tradition. But the problem is that all these views are not part of a coherent, continuous tradition of philosophical development. In fact, language had never been a central problem in Western tradition prior to Ferdinand de Saussure whose landmark publication (posthumously), in 1915 shifted the whole paradigm of linguistic and philosophical studies.[8] Saussure pointed out the fundamental flaw of linguistic studies, "Linguistics never attempted to determine the nature of the object it was studying and without this elementary operation a science cannot develop an appropriate method."[9] He introduced some new oppositions like langue-parole, signifier-signified, syntagmatic-paradigmatic. Above all, he prestiged phonocentrism over logocentrism and difference between identity and similarity. We return to some of these pertinent issues in the subsequent chapters.

In the Indian intellectual tradition those questions have been asked whose responses constitute the domain of philosophy of language. But the nature of these speculations differs from that of the West. Language has always been one of the prime concerns in all the philosophical systems in India. It has been studied both ontologically and epistemologically.

We may go to the extent of saying that language is as central to India as geometry is to the West. In the West, the carpenter is the paradigm artist who creates 'the appearance of the objects' but not the reality and truth. He is like a geometrician who cuts, arranges and rearranges the parts to make new objects. He deals with the spatio-temporal reality.[10]

In the Indian context the paradigm artist is the potter. He only helps to make the form manifest with his live hands, a form which already exists in a lump of clay. Thus, the creative process of a

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8. Ferdinand de Saussure (1913), *Course in General Linguistics*, tr. by W. Baskin, New York: 1959.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
10. Plato, *The Republic*, London: 1920, Chapter X, p. 289.

carpenter and a potter differs in a significant way.[11]

The holistic and integral viewpoint in the latter is remarkable. Language also functions in a similar manner. Like the material of the potter there is no question of cutting and rearranging of its parts. Language is itself a cognition and an instrument of approach to reality. It fashions out manifold forms out of the waters of the ocean of reality.[12]

The questions which have been constantly addressed to in all the major Indian philosophical systems are: what is language (*śabda*)? What is the nature of linguistic denotation? What is the relationship which holds between the *śabda* and the *artha*, i.e., word and meaning? Do the words refer to a universal or particular, class or individual, form or substance? How far language is valid as an epistemology? What is the relationship between language and thought on the one hand, and language and reality on the other? Does language represent reality or fashion it out? To what extent is verbal cognition reliable? Since all our intellectual discourse is constituted in language (*vāṅmaya*), do the issues of language also pertain to it? If it is so, is there any methodology to approach these texts with a deeper linguistic insight?

All philosophical systems maintaining their respective theoretical standpoints have responded to these questions. But before discussing these concerns, it would be relevant to refer to the original sources (*upajīvya*) to which all these systems relate and through which they characterise themselves. Innumerable references to language have been made in the Indian non-contingent (*apauruṣeya*) and classical texts. They appear in different contexts in different places but an attempt can be made to organise and systematise them. They shape the Indian perception of *vāk* and constitute the background of the study of language which has been taken up in subsequent phases of philosophical-linguistic developments. References to language in these source-texts can be

11. Kapil Kapoor, "Cultural Determination of Literary Theories", mimeod, 1995.

12. *Ṛ̥V. Dīrghatamas,* I.164.41.

broadly classified under two heads:

(a) Description of Linguistic Elements

This includes components of language, structure/organisation of linguistic materials and production/articulation of speech sounds. These insightful observations — which were later on taken up by etymologists, phoneticians and grammarians — flourished in the four major limbs of the Veda (*vedāṅga*).[13] These auxiliary texts of the Veda are designed to aid in the correct pronunciation and interpretation of the texts and the right employment of the *mantra* in ceremonials. Yāska's *Nighaṇṭu* and *Nirukta* a text of etymology, ninth century BC deals with linguistic meaning and semantic derivation of Vedic words. He devised the method of derivation of these terms from semantically determined verb roots (*dhātu*). It is important to note that Yāska emphasised the role of meaning in the study of scriptures and other texts along with flawless recitation which was equally important for the oral texts. He says:

> The person who is only able to recite the Veda, but does not understand its meaning, is like a post (*sthāṇu*) or a mere load-bearer (*bhārahara*) but he who understands the meaning will attain to all good here and hereafter, being purged of impurity by knowledge. . . .[14]

Grammar is said to be the most important of the *vedāṅga*. Taking the theoretical position in the Veda and Upaniṣad the grammarians have described and analysed language with a philosophic vision. The non-dualist (*advaita*) position is implicit in this grammatical literature. Later on this viewpoint flourished as one of the prominent philosophical systems in our tradition.[15]

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13. Of the six *vedāṅga*, four, are related to language:
    (i) General Phonetics (*Śikṣā*), (ii) Prosody (*Chandas*), (iii) Grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*), (iv) Etymology (*Nirukta*).
14. Yāska's *Nirukta*, I.18.
15. Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha,* Chapter 13 "Pāṇini Darśana".

(b) The Metaphysics of Language

Under this heading we may include the references concerning origin and function of language, verbal cognition, status of language as a means of knowledge and oneness of the *śabda tattva* and *Brahman*.

These are the references which diverge themselves into various issues in the philosophy of language. Among all the philosophical schools, the Grammarian and Mīmāṁsaka systems are rooted in the conception of *vāk* (speech, language) as it is perceived and revealed in these references. Since this section is of our prime concern, we shall discuss some of these references in detail.

AUM represents the paradigm sound (speech) for all the human languages. This also signifies the single basic energy principle which flows into and controls each and every particle of this cosmos (*nāda Brahman*). This is identical to the Ultimate Reality (*Brahman*). This is also the substratum of all the speech acts, sounds and meaning. Expositions of this *akṣara tattva* have been made both in terms of physical linguistic reality and metaphysics. Physically *AUṀ* represents the first vowel, the last vowel and the last consonant (bilabial stop) respectively. The *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* explicates *AUṀ* metaphysically:

> He, (AUṀ) who is non-destructible and adorned with three *mātrās* (i. e., A, U, and Ṁ) is the designation of *Brahman*. These three *mātrās* are his three feet (the fourth foot is *praṇava*). |A| is the beginning of all existence and it makes the words visible or manifest. It refers to those who know the Veda. |U| is more vital and tense than |A| which is not visible but which is meant for realization of truth. |M| refers to everything. |A| and |U| both merge into it and thus a cycle is completed. [16]

AUṀ is integral and one. In the later references *R̥V*, IV.58.3 its three components have been incorporated. Reflecting upon the epistemological aspect of language, *vāk*, the *R̥gveda* states:

16. *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, VIII. 10.

> *gaurimamaya salilāni takṣati ekapadī. . . .*[17]
>
> *Gaurī* is the symbol of *vāk*, according to the speculations of Brāhmaṇas . . . the real significance is that the principle of *vāk* creates or fashions out the manifold forms out of the waters of the infinite ocean of reality. [V.S. Agrawal; 1963][18]

This is a significant and powerful statement like one of the grand sentences (*mahāvākya*) in the Upaniṣad. This statement posits the function of language, its limitations and the nature of linguistic referentiality. Practically, we cannot draw lines or cut forms in the water. This term *takṣati* means 'to cut' is of much importance which is only possible in the context of space. But reality is like 'the waters of infinite ocean' which is continuous, indistinguishable, integral, non-discrete and one. This is the creative potentiality of language which cuts and makes the forms manifest in the reality. This is the only instrument with us to approach the reality. It does not amount to a denial of reality; it is only an assertion about the mode and status of knowledge of reality.[19] The similar thought has been expounded, "language is naming, it gives names to the objects".[20] Language involves naming the objects and this process constitutes our cognition about the reality. Language and cognition of reality are inseparable. The *Aitareyopaniṣad* states,". . . the knowledge and intrasubjective relationship is made possible by speech".[21] Language possesses great epistemic value. The *Chāndogya*

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17. *ṚV*, I.164.41.
18. Quoted by Kapil Kapoor in "Forms in the Ocean: The Indian Conception of Language and Reality", mimeod, 1989.
19. Kapil Kapoor, "Vivarta and Pariṇāma: Bhartṛhari's Theories of Language", mimeod, 1986.
20. *ṚV*, X.71.1.: Kapil Kapoor, "Forms in the Ocean: The Indian Conception of Language and Reality", mimeod, 1989: "The discrete forms and shapes are cognised through language which gives them names, for language is naming and naming is knowledge. Discreteness and sequentiality are the properties of language yet imposed on and appear as the attributes of reality itself when language is used to talk about the reality."
21. *Aitareyopaniṣad*, III:1.6.

Upaniṣad posits, "without speech who could explain right or wrong; good or evil; pleasant or unpleasant? Speech explains all".[22] Language creates differences in the integral, one, non-sequential reality and relates our awareness to an entity or state of being and by this process our cognition becomes possible.

In the subsequent sections, the exponent Sage Sanatkumāra creates a powerful hierarchy of cognition. He makes a distinction between the verbal cognition (*nāma*) and the experiential cognition. (i.e., *mantravettā* and *ātmavettā* respectively). Explaining these elements to Nārada he asserts that speech assuredly is greater than name, . . . and then mind (*manas*) is greater than speech because speech is merged in mind. This hierarchy concludes with the Truth because Truth is worth knowing.[23]

Again, in one place *Aitareyopaniṣad* restates the same thought with more clarity:

> O Lord! May my speech rest in my mind and mind merge into my speech. O Lord! Be visible and bring knowledge to my mind and speech.[24]

Thought and speech are inseparable and this integrity is a prerequisite for knowledge. But for what knowledge? *Kaṭhopaniṣad* answers:

> The wise should merge the speech in his mind, and that (mind) in the intellect and that (intellect) in the great self and again that great self in the self of peace (*śānta ātman* — the real self).[25]

In the *Vāk Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* the goddess of speech declares:

> I give birth to the Father of the World (for creation), in the infinite ocean I am in the form of seed, I inhere in the whole

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22. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, III.1.6.
23. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VII.1.16.
24. *Aitareyopaniṣad,* First Verse.
25. *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, III.13.

world and my crown touches the heaven.[26]

Language is the creative power and cause of all the manifestations of forms (objects). Language is itself a cognition of these forms. "Language knows all the objects and it can describe all the objects of the world but no one knows its extent."[27]

So far, we have seen how language is related to thought, cognition and reality. We have observed the role of language to approach the reality and also how does it shape its very cognition. In these references language occurs both as an instrument and object of knowledge. In some contexts it is identical with the absolute Reality and in others it merely signifies its instrumentality. In the hierarchy of cognition, 'name' and speech are the first two steps and they along with mind, etc., lead to the knowledge of Truth. There is sufficient space in these references for multiple interpretations regarding the pereception of *vāk* which appears in flux. One may prove the same entity (speech) as eternal or non-eternal taking a specific philosophical standpoint. But according to these source texts *vāk* does not take birth so there is no question of its decay. What matters here is its levels and states of manifestation. To distinguish the levels and states of its manifestation we quote two more references from the *R̥gveda* which have been widely quoted and variously commented upon by philosophers and grammarians in the tradition:

(i) Speech has been measured out in four divisions; the *Brāhmaṇa*s who have the understanding (intellect/wisdom), know them. Three kept in close concealment cause no motion; of speech, men speak only the fourth one.[28]

(ii) This great bull (*vr̥ṣabha*) who has four horns, three feet, two heads, seven hands; who tied in three places rains the

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26. *R̥V*, X.125.7.
27. *Ibid.*, I.164.10.
28. *Ibid.*, I.164.45

catvāri vāk parimitā padāni tāni vidurbrāhmaṇaye maṇiṣiṇaḥ guhātrīni nihitā neṅgayanti turīyāṁ vācā manuṣyāḥ vadanti

knowledge/meaning literally makes sound/*śabda* enter and dwells in mortal beings.[29]

The second verse is significant from the linguistic point of view. This metaphor of bull has been illuminated by Yāska, Vāmadeva, Gautama and Patañjali. For both Yāśka and Patañjali the four horns of the bull refer to four parts of speech: name (*nāma*), verb/event (*ākhyāta*), affixes (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*).[30] This whole metaphor has been deconstructed as:

the bull refers to the *vāk* of speech.
four horns — four parts of speech.
three feet — three tenses (past, present and future)
two heads — eternity and action (*nitya* and *kārya*)
seven hands — seven case inflections (dimensions of an action).
tied in three places — heart, throat and mind.

The word *vr̥ṣabha* which means 'bull' has been derived from the verb root *vr̥ṣ*. It means 'to rain'. Thus the bull signifies speech that rains knowledge.

Thus language/speech not only brings about the cognition but it is equally a competent instrument for expression of this knowledge. Speech has been said in this verse to be tied in three places, i.e. heart, throat and mind which can be incorporated with the three components of *AUṀ* and three stages of speech such as:

Place	*Sound*	*Vāk*
heart	|A|	*madhyamā*
throat	|U|	*vaikharī*
mind	|Ṁ|	*paśyantī*

In the process of articulation of these three sounds we may feel the vibration in these three respective places. Moreover, the heart (lungs) holds the inhaled air, the throat completes the phonation

29. R̥V, IV.58.3
catvāri śr̥ṅgāstrayo asya pādaḥ dve śīrṣe saptahastā so asya
tridhā baddho vr̥ṣabho roravīti maho devo martyā āviveśa
30. *Nirukta* Ist chapter; *Mahābhāṣya*, Ist *āhnika* (*paspaśa*).

process and the mind involves the semantic-linguistic elements.


For a clear exposition of the first verse we shall take up its interpretations in the Brāhmaṇical, Śaiva and Tantra systems separately. This exposition is pertinent to our further discussion of speech/language in the context of various philosophical systems. The verse posits four kinds of *vāk*. They are known as *parā, paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*.

In fact, these kinds of speech also refer to four stages of *vāk* in the process of its manifestation. First three are the non-manifest forms to be known only in the state of heightened consciousness. We have seen earlier that the same phrase *catvāri śṛṅgā* has been interpreted variously in the grammatical literature.[31] But in the commentary literature on the non-contingent texts (the *Ṛgveda*, commentators like Sāyaṇa — Mādhava) the same phrase refers to the four stages of speech. Nandikeśvara Sūri also mentions these four kinds.[32] Śaiva and Tantra systems also posit four levels of speech. But in the grammarians schools only three levels of *vāk* have been recognised, i.e., *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. Bhartṛhari mentions only these three levels of speech.[33] This difference in opinion is only the outcome of the theoretical positions taken by these philosophers — grammarians consistent to their respective philosophical schools. Grammar concerns these three levels of speech and particularly with the third one, i.e., articulated speech *vaikharī*. Again, in the Brāhmaṇical systems, there is no distinction between the *Śabda Brahman* and *Para Brahman*. But the Śaiva Sidhānta does not accept them as identical. For them, *Para Brahman* is the higher Reality than the *Śabda Brahman*. We may summarise this whole debate and discussion in the following tables with some key notes:

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31. *MBh paspaśa* (chapter 1).
32. Quoted in the *Śabdārtha Vimarśa* by Dev Narayana Misra, Meerut: 1980.
33. *VP*, I.43 — *trayayā vācaḥ paramam padaṁ*.

Table 1



[On the basis of Introduction to the *Vākyapadīya* by Pandit Ram Govind Shukla (Chowkhambha Orientalia, 1990, p.16.)]

In this classification, *parā* has been shown as the substratum of all three and their subsequent nine kinds of speech. All the twelve kinds are merely the *vivarta* of *parā vāk*. Hence only *parā* is ultimately real and others are the illusory appearances. *Parā* is like the sun and rest of the kinds of speech are its rays. This classification also leads to the non-dualist position of the Vedānta philosophy.

Table 2

(According to the Brāhmaṇical and Grammarian's system)

Stages of *vāk*	Exponents	Place of Manifestation	Exposition
1. *parā*	Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, Nāgeśa, Somānanda, Yāska, Bhartṛhari.	*mūlādhāra cakra*	Non-manifest, without vibration or sensation (*niṣpanda*), non-sequential, non-divisible (without the division of base and suffix) cognition in itself, not an object of cognition, devoid of modifications and traces of meaning, in the form of light, eternal, non-originate *Śabda Brahman*,[1] not the object of grammar, known in

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			indeterminate meditation (*samādhi*), primodial nature, the subtlest Being, the world in a transformation (*vivarta*, only an illusory appearance) of the *parā vāk*.
2. *paśy-antī*	Acceptable to Bhartr̥-hari and the other Gramma-rians	Navel (dwells in the intellect)	Non-manifest, subtle vibration (caused by the desire to speak, and the other in manifestation of elements of meaning, appears to be sequential,[2]) an object of mind and intellect beyond the pragmatic sphere (according to Nāgeśa), segmented (the division of base and suffix to be known in meditation), known in the determinate meditation, with nature and modification, object of grammar in the form of the awareness of the self (*ahaṁkāra rūpa*), subtler entity.
3. *madh-yamā*	Bhartr̥hari and the other Gramm-arians.	heart (in the life-breath)	Non-manifest, apparent vibration, associated with mind and the life-breath of the speaker, associated with the recollection and thought, which can be experienced but cannot be expressed, non-articulated, mental articulation, sequential at the level of mind, association of word and meaning, base of physical repre-sentation, (*āṅgika abhinaya*), known in the determinate meditation in a form of internal determination, cause of the fourth pragmatic speech (*vaikharī*), self-perception (*svayaṁ saṁvedya*), subtle entity.
4. *vai-kharī*	Patañjali Bhartr̥hari	Throat (vocal chord)	Manifest, phonated/articulated form, sequential, associated with the mind and spirit (*tejas*), segmented, to be heard, efficient to make manifest the inner word (*sphoṭa*) for the hearer, associated with the vowels and consonants, expression of the semantic content, born of the physical

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			body,[3] both for the self and others perceptions object of grammar, associated with the thoughts of linguistically acceptable/non-acceptable forms (*sādhu* and *asādhu*), physical entity.

In our second classification, which is according to the Brāhmaṇical and Grammarian's system, the same conception has been established. This classification also posits that *parā* is the ultimate *vāk* and it is identical with the absolute Reality. Rest of the three forms of *vāk* are merely the successive stages and the *vivarta* of the same. The conceptions of *parā* and *paśyantī* have remained debatable in the Grammarian's tradition. However, there is no contradiction. Bhartṛhari maintains silence over the issue of difference or identity of *parā*. Sometimes, *parā* and *paśyantī* have been accepted as identical and thus a logic has been built up of naming the *madhyamā* as the 'middle/intermediate speech' (that which comes in between *paśyantī* and *vaikharī*). Moreover, *parā* is beyond the domain of grammar, that is why it has been left for Tantra and for meditation. Hence no question of denial of *parā vāk* emerges. For grammatical speculation, the fourth stage, i.e., *vaikharī* is of prime importance.

Key Notes

1. Nāgeśa maintains a distinction between the *Śabda Brahman* and *Para Brahman*. According to him the former is the instrument/means and the later is the end. For Patañjali and Bhartṛhari both are same.

2. *VP*, II.19. *Hari Vṛtti.*

3. According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa *vikhara* refers to body and group of sense-organs. The sound/word which originates from the speech-organs is *vaikharī* — *vikhara iti dehendriya saṁghāta, ucyate tatra bhavā vaikharī.*

   According to Vādi Deva Sūri the audible speech is *vaikharī* — *vaktṛbhiḥ viśiṣṭāyāṁ kharāvasthāyāṁ spaṣṭa rūpāyāṁ bhavā vaikharī.*

Table 3
(According to Śaiva and Tantra Systems)

States (*Vāk*)	Expone-nts/Texts	Place (*deśa*)	Exposition
1. *parā*[1] According to Somā-	*Īśvara Pratyabhijñā darśana,*	*mūlādhāra*[2] *cakra*	In Śaiva system, perfect, what manifests the world, cognition in itself, self-approved spatio-temporal constrains, the Great

→

nanda and Utpala *parā* and *paśyantī* are the same.	*Pari-vasthā Rahasya, Yoginī Rahasya.*		Existence, in the form of self-awareness (*aham*) what dwells *parā* and with *paramātman*; In the Tantra system, *turīya vāṇī*, *Śabda Brahman*, cause of the origination of the world, non-manifest, without vibration, the inactive state of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*;[3] pure nature, it dwells here as will-power[4].
2. *Paśya-ntī*[5]	*Tantrā-loka* (third *ahnika*)	Navel (asso-ciated with mind)	Origin of action,[6] vibration, form of light, the will power, receptacle of *madhyamā* and (which represents knowledge and action respectively) knowledge in itself and means of knowledge too; manifestation of the semantic contents,[7] identical contents, identical with *parā* as *parā paśyantī*, three kinds.
3. *madh-yamā*[9]	*Sau. Bhās-kara, Svachh-anda Tantra*	heart (associa-ted with the life-breath and intellect)	Cognitive faculty,[10] subtle form the articulated speech sounds (*vaikharī*), vibrated, *hiranyagarbha śabda*,[12] in the form of light, associated with *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* cause of the world's exsitence, expressive (according Abhinavagupta), *bindumayī* (according to Padmapāda) and the paradigm sound (*nāda* according to Rāghavabhaṭṭa).
4. *vai-kharī*	*Abhinava-bhārati Tantrā-loka*	Throat/ mouth (vocal chord)	Power of action, physical form of the speech sounds, manifest form, audible, sequential, related to the speaker's intentions, *raudrī śakti.*[12]

The Śaiva and Tantra systems posit a very powerful concept of *vāk*. *Vāk* in these systems is the subtlest existence, the Ultimate Reality and both signifier and signfied. *Prakāśa* and *vimarśa* are the two powers of this subtlest Being. In this system first three levels of speech are of much importance.

Key Notes

1. *parā*: "*parābhūjanma paśyantī valliguccha samudbhavā madhyamā saurabhā vaikharyakṣamālā jayatyasau*"

   — *Kāma Kalā Vilāsa Ṭīkā*

   Parā is the only perfect speech which with its illuminating power manifests the world, makes the world knowable. *Parā* is the *turīya vāṇī* and is identical with *Śabda Brahman*.

   Ācarya Paramapāda has stated seven forms of speech:

   (i) *śūnya* — non-originate, without vibration.

   (ii) *saṁvita* — desire to be born (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are symbols of knowledge, action and desire respectively).

   (iii) *parā* — already discussed.

   (iv) *sūkṣama* — subtle sound, dwells in all the objects in non-overt form.

   (v) *paśyantī*

   (vi) *madhyamā* and

   (vii) *vaikharī*

2. *mūlādhāracakra* — *parā vāk* dwells in the *mūlādhāra*. This is the place from where the *citātman* manifest itself.

3. *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* means having the potential to manifest and the desire to manifest. These two are, in fact, functions of *madhyamā*.

4. The will powers when combined together appear as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

5. *paśyantī* — Three forms

   (a) physical — division of musical notes, consonants and vowels, (*nāda*).

   (b) subtle — desire to sing/speak.

   (c) Absolute — non-designate; cognition.

   parā, *paśyantī* — both refer to the same state of *vāk*.

6. Origin of action (*kārya bindu*): That causal entity which when evoked by the life-breath comes out from the navel region gets associated with the intellect, potential and desire to express is known as *kārya bindu*.

7. Semantic content; in this *vāk* thought exists, *paśyantī* has been said to be the seed of banyan tree. As the seed contains the whole tree in itself, similarly *paśyantī* contains all the semantic contents in the non-explicit form.

8. Abhinavagupta posits three kinds of *paśyantī*:

(i) *paśyantī* refers to Śiva

(ii) *mahāpaśyantī* refers to Sadāśiva

(iii) *parama mahāpaśyantī* refers to Sadā Śiveśvara.

9. *madhyamā* — which is neither completely mental or internal nor completely physical or external. Two expositions are available:

(i) *madhye mā buddhirya sā madhyamā*

(ii) *madhye sthitā madhyamā*.

10. According to Abhinavagupta, *paśyantī* involves desire to know and act. Somānanda posits it as cognition itself.

11. In the Śaiva system system *tantra* it is also known as *nāda*.

12. *Vaikharī* has two aspects — the aspect which is constituted of *prakāśa* is known as *raudrī*. The other one is made of desire to express which is a form of action (*kriyā*).

These reflections on language broadly constitute a prologue to the issues discussed in Indian philosophy of language. All the major concerns which have been taken up and developed by the later logicians, philosophers and linguists in the tradition are contained in the seminal texts. Debates regarding the linguistic denotation, referential reality, language and thought, eternity or non-eternity of words, etc., are such prominent topics in the subsequent philosophical debates whose origin can be traced back to these (and many such) references in the classical Sanskrit literature. It is important to note that these texts posit all the possible divergent views in the subject and leave the options open for further interpretations and investigations. Therefore, there developed a rich tradition of exegesis where the exponent while expounding his own theory first records the various observations available to him on the same topic and then comments and evaluates them. The *Śruti* texts are known to be non-contingent (*apauruṣeya*) in the classification of Indian verbal discourse. The knowledge which is deposited there does not belong to any individual, or any particular group, race or time only. Those systems (like Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, etc.) which propagate *Śruti* as means of valid knowledge maintain that the knowledge in these texts never contradicts our experience of reality. Whenever such situations of contradiction,

ambiguity or doubt occur then the problem is not with the texts but in our ways of understanding and interpreting them. The Mīmāṁsā system, mainly concerned with the scriptural statements, took up this problem and devised a methodology of scriptural interpretation. Even those systems which refute the scriptural authority (like Bauddha and Jaina) and those which posit other means of knowledge (like Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Dvaita, etc.) do not reject the knowledge in these texts. This debate concludes with two points:

(i) There are other valid means of knowledge popular in the world. For example, perception, inference, etc.

(ii) The knowledge which these texts contain cannot purge our self and lead to *nirvāṇa* unless we experience them ourselves. There is always a vast gap between the person who knows, recites and reiterates these texts (*mantravettā*) and who experiences the real self (*ātmavettā*) for whom the cognition becomes the very part of his self. The whole discourse of Lord Buddha emphasises this sutble fact. Later on, we will see how these approaches have facilitated the scholars to bring out a complex taxonomy of Indian philosophy. Here we simply want to argue that these non-contingent texts posit all the possible coherent viewpoints whether positive or negative (but not necessarily contradictory) in the philosophy of language and when we take into account all these references we may opine that there is no one dominant view regarding language and reality. There is an implicit 'overtone' in all these literature that the final statement of Reality is yet to be recorded.

Out of the whole discussion so far, we may posit the following points which are pertinent to this work:

1. Language is without known beginning and end. What has beginning and end is its various transformations (*vivarta*) where one form merges into others and causes to manifest them.

2. If we take into account only the last stage of *vāk*, i.e., articulated speech which is the major concern of grammar,

then *vāk* appears as non-eternal; *parā*, *paśyantī* and *madhyamā* are coherent with reality.

3. Language is both an object of knowledge and means of knowledge.
4. Those systems which hold that language can never capture reality do not recognise these three levels of *vāk*. In these systems these three levels of *vāk* have been incorporated either with perception, inference or intuition.
5. Language represents as well as constructs reality.
6. It creates and hides differences of/in reality.

Indian theories of meaning involve and resolve these issues which are mentioned earlier. Moreover, they are inseparable parts of the vision of the world and reality as they are rooted in their respective philosophical systems. These theories of signification constitute the basic standpoints for these systems. So it would be useful to present a full and vivid illustration of the Indian philosophical systems.

For this presentation epistemological parameters have been taken into account. Broadly all philosophical systems agree on the validity of these three means/instruments of knowledge: perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Similarly our philosophers and systems can be characterised as: those who only prefer perception (*ādhyakṣika*); those who accept both perception and inference but prefer inference, (*tārkika*) and lastly those who accept perception, inference and scriptural authority but attach much validity to scriptures (*śrauta*). Thus we have the following presentation (see diagram 1 on p. 25).

The competing theories of meaning mainly originate from the following systems:

Schools	*Theories of Meaning*
1. Grammarians	*sphoṭavāda* (the theory of essential word)
2. Mīmāṁsā	*śabda śakti* (*a*) *abhihitānvaya vāda*, (*b*) *anvitābhidhāna vāda*; (theory of word —

	potential and sentential meaning)
3. Buddhist	*apohavāda* (theory of contextual exclusion)
4. Jaina	*svaparyāya* and *paraparyāya* (theory of the self and other)
5. Nyāya	*tātparyārtha* (intended meaning)


A more comprehensive classification of Indian theories of meaning can be made by taking the parameters of indiviudal (*vyakti*), configuration (*ākṛti*), universal or class (*jāti*).[34]

1. Theory of individual (*vyaktivāda*)	Sāṁkhya, Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika; and Vyādi, pre-Pāṇinian grammarians, also hold this view.
2. Theory of configuration (*ākṛtivāda*)	Jaina and Nyāya.
3. Theory of universals (*jativāda*)	Mimāṁsā, Vedānta and grammarians like Vājapyāyana and Bhartṛhari.
4. Theory of composite-denotation (*jātyākṛti vyaktivāda*)	Nyāya: (expounded by Gautama).
5. Theory of individual qualified by the universal: (*jāti — viśiṣṭa vyaktivāda*)	(Some *Nyaiyāyika* and Grammarians support this view).
6. Theory of the contextual exclusion (*apohavāda*)	Buddhists: This philosophical system rejects this whole parameter of class, individual, etc., and asserts that they are not relevant to the import of words.

34. Some of the theories have been discussed by Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Rani. See her doctoral thesis entitled *The Buddhist Philosophy as Presented in Mīmāṁsā Śloka Vārttika*, Delhi: 1982, pp. 192-8

Diagram - 1

TAXONOMY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS



Sources: 1. Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha

2. Pt. Ranganath Pathak's Ṣaḍadarśana Rahasya (Patna: Bihar Raṣṭrabhāṣa Pariṣada. 1958) p. 88

Lastly, we may have another broad classification of these theories taking into account the concerns of the basic meaningful unit of language:

1. The Association Theory/Analytical Method (*khaṇḍa-pakṣa*): This theory/method has been advocated mainly by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika, Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka and Jaina.
2. Gestalt Theory/Integral Method (*akhaṇḍapakṣa*): Grammarians and Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā. A pre-Pāṇinian grammarian Audumbarāyaṇa is said to have held this view. Bhartṛhari mentions another grammarian Vārtākṣa who thinks that only a sentence bears semantic content and remains present in the hearer's mind.[35]

We do not find it easy to put the two non-Vedic philosophical systems in either of these categories. The Jainas, maintaining their theory of multiple viewpoints (*anekāntavāda*) accept the semantic content of both word and sentence. They have no one obvious point of view. We may place them in both the categories thinking that there would not emerge any contradiction. But where to seek a place for the Buddhist view? The Buddhist philosophers and logicians do not overtly state anything regarding this problem.[36]

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35. *VP*, II. 345-9.

36. Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja, observes "The *Apoha* doctrine offered to explain the nature of word-meaning by the Buddhist logicians deserves careful attention. . . . The Buddhist may be included in the Akhaṇḍapakṣa view since according to it, words have no positive meanings of their own". *See* K. Kunjunni Raja's "Buddhist Theory of Meaning According to the Buddhist Logicians" *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII, Part 3-4, p. 11 (*See* also pp. 3-18) (Madras: undated). But Prof Kunjunni Raja does not find his argument agreeable so he decides to exclude this observation. For this chapter we only record Bhartṛhari's accounts and the Buddhist & Critical approaches to these theories will be taken up again in the third chapter. The last two parameters for classifying Indian theories of meaning, can be incorporated with the first one to bring out a comprehensive discussion. These theories primarily deal with the primary denotation (*abhidhā*) of a word (*śabda*).

The section "The Buddhist Theory of apoha" is almost the reproduction →

Certainly, they have taken a position, but we shall be able to examine their view only after looking into their typical and powerful theory of meaning. We reserve this discussion for our third chapter, The Buddhist Theory of Meaning (*Apohavāda*).

Bhartṛhari in his *magnum opus Vākyapadīya* mentions twelve views regarding the actual import of the word.[37] He comments upon and refutes several of these views but in most cases he has not specified those philosophical schools from which these views emerge. Later on Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla took these views from Bhartṛhari and examined them from the Buddhist point of view. In this chapter we record only Bhartṛhari's observations.

The theories meaning constitute the major part of the philosophy of language. The questions which we have posited in our earlier discussions are still pertinent to all the theories of meaning. "All theories of meanings," Prof. Kapil Kapoor enumerates, "inquire into: (i) whether a particular relation really holds between 'word' and meaning; (ii) the nature of reference, i.e., does the word directly refer to objects in real life, or to a mediating mental image of the object; (iii) the equation that holds between the object 'meant' by the word and the corresponding object in real life, and (iv) the movements from lexical meaning to sentential meaning?"[38]

We shall discuss the competing Indian theories of meaning in the context of these questions incorporating all the parameters discussed above.

Sphoṭavāda

The Theory of *sphoṭa* or radical/essential word has been advocated by the Grammarian's system of philosophy. *Sphoṭa* is the theory of linguistic sign which emerges from the same common source of the

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→ of that article in his celebrated work *Indian Theories of Meaning*. *See* K. Kunjunni Raja (1963), *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Madras The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977, pp. 78-94.

37. Vide *VP*, II.118-34.

38. Kapil Kapoor, "Bhartṛhari on Lexical Meaning", *Linguistics at Large*, Delhi: 1991, p. 64.

non-contingent literature. In the Grammarians's tradition *sphoṭa* has a long history of thinking. Pāṇini mentions the name of Sphoṭāyaṇa who was believed to be the original expounder of this theory.[39] And then follow Pāṇini Kātyāyana and Patañjali. In Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (*Brahma Kāṇḍa*, 73-103) the conception of *sphoṭa* gains the status of theory and then a Śaiva grammarian-philosopher Nāgeśa further develops it and mentions its various forms in his *Paramalaghumañjūṣā* and *Sphoṭavāda*. The *Sphoṭa Siddhiḥ* of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra and the *Sphoṭanirṇaya* of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa are other two texts for the exposition of *sphoṭa*. Mādhavācārya (eleventh century AD) makes a lucid exposition of the philosophy involved in the theory of *sphoṭa* in the "Pāṇini Darśana" of his *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*.

Before discussing the theory it is important to consider the definition of *śabda* in the Grammarian's tradition. Etymologically *śabda*[40] has two meanings: 'to sound', and 'to manifest'. So word has a potency to manifest/signify something, though it has been a matter of debate in the tradition whether this potency is inherent or constructed.[41] Patañjali in *Mahābhāṣya* (*Paspaś*) expounds the basic structures of word and meaning: 'that which becoming manifest in articulated sounds brings/makes [possible the cognition cow-individuals with given attributes, horn, tail etc. is the *śabda* (in his own gloss: *yenoccaritena śāsnālāṅgulakakudakhura viṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*). According to the Grammarian's school the relationship between the word and meaning is given[42] (*siddha/nitya*), mental, positive and objective. The word refers to fourfold entity as its meaning as substance (*dravya* = cowness),

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39. *P*, VI.1.123.
40. *Śabda* in culturally/philosophically an identical term in the oral/ phonocentric tradition and hence cannot be reduced to the 'sign', 'word' or 'logos'.
41. In the Western linguistic thought the same debate persists as whether a linguistic sign (word) and its meaning is natural or conventional.
42. Vide Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* quoted by Patañjali in *MBh* (*paspaś*): *siddhe śabdārtha sambandhe*.
    VP, p. I.23. *nityāḥ śabdārtha sambandhāḥ*

quality (*guṇa* = white), activity (*karma/kriyā* = walking) and universal/class (*jāti* = cowhood/*gotva*). Grammarians have taken the position that universals are as real as the individual which has been either refuted or modified in the other systems of thoughts as a real category.

In the taxonomy of Indian philosophy (ref. to diagram 1), Grammarian's School has been placed as *saguṇa*, *ātmavādī*, *śrauta* and *padārthavādī*. It means that they belong to the *Śruti* tradition which attach much importance to the source-texts (the Veda) and include scriptural authority in their epistemology. Their linguistic speculation is based on that of the non-dualism of the Vedānta philosophy. The dichotomy in language as base-suffix, subject-predicate, etc., and in reality as being and the Supreme Being is only superficial and does not hold any absolutely validity. The whole cosmos is the multifoliated manifestation of the same basic energy principle, the *Brahman*. Assuming this Vedāntic vision, the Grammarians expound their theory that the world is nothing but the transformation (*vivarta*) of the *Śabda Brahman*. Hence, the one absolute Being (*śabda tattva*) inheres in all and takes various forms which are illusory. There is no contradiction between one and many and this equally holds for a class/universal and its individuals. There is only one substratum for all the things of the universe and that is the *śabda tattva*.

Again, their school in our classification has been designated as *padārthavādī*(not in opposition to *vākyārthavādī*, the name given to Mīmāṁsā system) which means both 'object and category' in philosophy and 'meaning of word' (*pada*[43] = fully inflected morpheme) in language. When we contextualise these two meanings in the philosophy of language it can be interpreted as 'the object named by language (*śabda*)'.[44] However, this notion and the validity of verbal cognition have been greatly debated in the Indian philosophical

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43. *P*, I.4.14 — *suptiṅantaṁ padaṁ*.
44. For a detailed discussion on this topic, *see* Kapil Kapoor, "Concept of Padārtha in language and philosophy".
The 200 Years. W. Jones Memorial Volume, Pune: 1997.

systems. Words cannot capture the object in its multi-layered totality but certainly, as a means they have potential to constitute the cognition of the object. The Grammarians argue that all cognition is determinate (*savikalpaka*) and no direct apprehension of object is therefore possible.

In the Grammarian's tradition only three levels of language (*vāk*) have been recognised —*paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*.[45] We have earlier discussed that the first level (that is *parā*) has been interpreted differently in Brāhmaṇical and Śaiva Systems (referred to Tables 1, 2 and 3 of this chapter). Some philosophers like Abhinava and Soma does not maintain any distinction between *parā* and *paśyantī*. It may be possible that Bhartṛhari's tradition agrees with this view.

Another significant observation is regarding the interaction of *sphoṭa* with any of these levels of speech. Pt. Ranganath Pathak quotes a verse from the *Vākyapadīya* which is not available in many of its editions:[46]

vaikharyā hi kṛto nādaḥ paraśravaṇa gocaraḥ
madhyamayā kṛto nādaḥ sphoṭa vyañjaka uccyate

According to this verse the *sphoṭa* manifests itself at the level of *madhyamā*. The notions which are posited for *madhyamā* also include the conception of *sphoṭa*.

The word *sphoṭa* is derived from the verb root √ *sphuṭ* which means 'to burst' or to 'manifest' and it is defined in two ways:[47] "That from which meaning is manifested, the word which expresses a meaning (*vācaka*)" and "an entity which is manifested by letters."

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45. *VP*, I.143, i.e., level of intellection, mental constitution.
46. Ranganath Pathak *Sphoṭadarśana*, Patna: 1967, Introduction.
47. Nāgeśa; *Sphoṭavāda of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa* ed. V. Krishnanamacharya, Madras: 1946, reprint 1977, p. 5.

    sphuṭati prakāśate artho'smad iti sphotaḥ; vācaka iti yāvat; Mādhavācārya, *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* (ed. by Umashankar Sharma 'Rishi'), Varanasi: 1984, p. 508;

    sphuṭyate vyajyate varnairiti sphoṭo varṇābhivyangyaḥ, sphuṭati sphuṭibhavatyāsmād artha iti sphoṭo'rtha pratyāyaka.

In the Grammarian's system a potential linguistic sign (*pada*) is accepted as 'Signifier' (*vācaka*), not the individual letters (*varṇa*).

Bhartṛhari defines and formulates the concept (*svarūpa*) of *sphoṭa* in *kārikā*s 44-58 of the *Vākyapadīya*. He explains that *sphoṭa* is given (*nitya*), timeless, invariant, non-partitive (*akhaṇḍa*) and non-sequential (*akrama*). It is that entity which reveals the meaning. It is the revealer as well as the revealed by itself. It is the abstract level of sound and meaning both.

From the hearer's point of view, Bhartṛhari identifies three aspects in language situation: (1) *Vaikṛta dhvani* (2) *Prākṛta dhvani* (3) *Sphoṭa*

(1) *Vaikṛta dhvani* is the utterance in purely phonetic term. It is characterised by the intonation, tempo and pitch which are specific to each speaker.

(2) *Prākṛta dhvani* is normative phonological pattern. All the non-linguistic speaker-specific variations are eliminated at this stage. But it still has the time sequence attached to it.

(3) *Sphoṭa* is that invariant, sequenceless, integral linguistic symbol which is the unit of meaning. It is made manifest (burst) by the *prākṛta dhvani*.

These three stages of comprehension of meaning of the uttered word can be represented as follows:

> *Vaikṛta dhvani* → *Prākṛta dhvani* → *sphoṭa* → *artha* sound uttered by the speaker → (the abstract sound) → (the abstract meaning) → Hearer's meaning

The presentation shows that *prākṛta dhvani* (also *nāda*) 'the abstract sound' and *sphoṭa* enter into the causal relationship.[48] The speaker focuses on a certain meaning in his intellect and then encodes and articulates in speech sound. The hearer first hears this sound and then decodes and grasps the meaning.

48. *VP*, I.44-8.

As we have stated earlier, Bhartṛhari assumes three levels/ stages of *vāk*: *paśyantī* (intellection), *madhyamā* (mental constitution) and *vaikharī* (physical expression). At the level of *paśyantī* which is a non-verbal stage, *sphoṭa* exists as an undifferentiated and non-sequential entity.

Here *sphoṭa* is identical with its meaning. *Sphoṭa* and its meaning lie dormant in the potential form here.[49] It is invoked by the speaker's desire to communicate. At the level of *madhyamā*, the pre-verbal stage, it becomes abstract meaning and abstract form. *Sphoṭa* and meaning are still one and undifferentiated here but the speaker can perceive them as distinct. All the essential linguistic elements are present in the latent form here. The speaker is also able to recognise the articulated speech as distinct and separate from *sphoṭa*. *Vaikharī* is the verbal stage. These are the actual speech sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. It is the phonetic output which is realised in the actual speech.

Sphoṭa is given (*nitya*), invariant, non-partitive and non-sequential but because it is expressed through the speech sound (*prākṛta, vaikṛta*), it appears like variant, partitive and sequential. To make a clear exposition of this phenomenon, Bhartṛhari provides some very beautiful analogies. As the reflection of the moon in different bodies of water appears to be trembling but the moon does not get affected, similarly *sphoṭa* also remains unaffected by the speech sounds.[50] *Sphoṭa* is non-sequential but in its expression it appears to be sequential. As in the peacock's egg, all the limbs of peacock exist which later develops in an ordered organic entity, so also in *sphoṭa* — everything, meaning as well as the sound pattern, exist.[51]

Sphoṭa is the revealer and revealed-like the lamp's light. The light illuminates the objects which come in its range and simultaneously it reveals its own self.[52]

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49. *See* B. K. Matilal, *The Word and The World*, Delhi: 1990, p. 68.
50. *VP*, I.49.
51. *Ibid.*, I.51.
52. *Ibid.*, I.55.

Bhartṛhari records various thoughts on *sphoṭa*.[53] Later grammarians like Bhaṭṭojīdīkṣita and Nāgeśabhaṭṭa enumerate the eight forms of *sphoṭa*.[54] This classification is made on the basis of the views related to the basic meaningful linguistic unit (*khaṇḍa* and *akhaṇḍa pakṣa*). John Brough opines that Bhartṛhari seems to have held the *akhaṇḍa vākya sphoṭa*, the indivisible sentence *sphoṭa* of *vyakti* type as the real *sphoṭa*.[55] This view is analogous to Bhartṛhari's own linguistic theory.

For comprehension of this *akhaṇḍa vākya sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari again posits a very powerful concept of *pratibhā* (intutition). According to him, words and letters are only abstractions, bearing no reality but serving the purpose of grammatical analysis. The basic semantically competent linguistic unit is sentence whose meaning is comprehended through *pratibhā*. Puṇyarāja comments that sentence as a single undivided utterance conveys its meaning in a flash.[56]

Critics of *Sphoṭa*

The *sphoṭa* theory of meaning of linguistic symbol has been evaluated and criticised mainly by three schools—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita. The grammarians assert that *sphoṭa* is an entity which is distinct from the letters/sounds that reveal them. For the Naiyāyika (here, Jayantabhaṭṭa) the word is composed of many letters/sounds and hence is a composite fact. The composite fact cannot be entirely different from the letters and the sounds that constitute them. If it is entirely different from its components, then any word may mean anything which leads to the complete blockage of communication. Even our own linguistic experience does not support this view.

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53. *Ibid.*, I.93-4.
54. *Sphoṭavāda of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa.*
55. *See* Rāja, *ITM,* pp. 138, 224.
56. Puṇyarāja's commentary on *VP*, II.2 —*sphoṭātmaka vākye pratibhā lakṣaṇe vākyārthe vākya vākyārtheyor'adhyāsarūpaḥ sambandḥ.* Quoted in Raja's *ITM*, p . 225.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa posits a power of memory-impressions by which they are related to other impressions. By this power of cohesion memory-impressions themselves generate cognition which includes all the letters as its content. Hence there is no need to establish *sphoṭa*. Moreover, we learn the meaning of a word from the context and the way it is determined by the usages. So no need emerges to accept an entity like *sphoṭa*.[57]

Ācārya Śaṅkara also criticises *sphoṭa* doctrine. The apprehension of the temporal sound sequences can be explained in terms of the synthesising activity of the mind, so the need for an independent entity like *sphoṭa* does not emerge.[58]

The Jaina theoreticians also criticise the *sphoṭa* doctrine on the same ground. They say if the last letter or sound in a word reveals the *sphoṭa* which is the *sphoṭa* of word, then it is useless to imagine such non-linguistic entity. The 'last letter or sound' is competent enough to communicate the meaning.

In fact, in all the objections recorded above, there is no denial of the entity like *sphoṭa* which is the substratum of all linguistic comprehension. These critics prefer only their own interpretation of the same fact.

Bhartṛhari records twelve contemporary views on the meaning of words.[59] Śāntarakṣita quotes from Bhartṛhari some of these views, in his *Tattvasaṁgraha* and his commentator Kamalaśīla examines them critically. We present here Bhartṛhari's account with Kamalaśīla's criticism wherever it occurs.

The First View: "All words have a meaning amounting to: 'something exists'. This meaning is the characteristic of the things denoted by each word. . . ." — *kārikā*, 119

The meaning of a word is the nature of generality, having no particular form, the utterances of words like *apūrva* and *svarga* do

57. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārttika sphoṭa* V. 69.

58. Śaṅkara, *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* on I.3.28.

59. *VP*, 119-35. All the *kārikā*s are translated by K. A. Subramania Iyer: *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari,* Chapter II , Delhi: 1977, pp. 50-8.

not cause any definite shape/form in the mind. Puṇyarāja and Kamalaśīla both share this view.[60]

The Second View : "Certain distinctive features are revealed by the words expressive of them while others understood subsequently are also considered to be this meaning." — *kārikā*, 121

Bhartṛhari refutes this view because universal always presupposes a substratum of particular. Universal does not capture the peculiarities of a particular related to its various forms, actions, etc.

The Third View: "Others accept as the expressed meaning of a word both fixed actions as well as the means necessary for their accomplishment." — *kārikā*, 125

The Fourth View: "According to others, the particular forms taken as a whole but without choice or combination are the expressed meaning of a word." — *kārikā*, 126a

Kamalaśīla comments,

> As regards the particular form of the cognition, which enters into the consciousness of some people, — that is due to the influence of their own doctrine.[61]

The Fifth View: "Still others think that it is the unreal connection (of things with their universal)." — *kārikā*, 126b

The Sixth View: 'The real, conditioned by the unreal, is the meaning of the word." — *kārikā*, 127 a

All words denote the ultimate substance as conditioned by some unreal things (for example, particular shapes in all the gold ornaments).[62]

The Seventh View: "Or the word itself, when it becomes the *abhijalpa*, it is meaning." — *kārikā*, 127b

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60. Kamalaśīla on *Tattvasaṁgraha* V.886.
61. Śāntarakṣita *TS, Pañjikā* V.887.
62. *Ibid.*, V.888.

This is the imposition of the word on the object. The object is, as it were, hidden by the word. The two become identical.[63]

The Eighth View: "Either because it (the object) has no power or because it has all powers, it is through words that it is presented in a fixed form such as action." — *kārikā*, 131

Words create/form meaning in the object [*kārikā*, 131] emphasising its universal aspects or qualities. An object becomes only a matter of presentation by words.

The Ninth View: "Another way of looking at it is that a thing has all powers, but the word emphasises one of them according to circumstances."

The Tenth View: "Others declare that the meaning is something mental but resting on an eternal object and is looked upon as the meaning of the word when it is externalised." — *kārikā*, 132

Kamalaśīla comments,

> So long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the object and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself, — it is not recognised as forming the import of words; because it is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity.[64]

The Eleventh View: "The external forms conveyed by some words are based upon distinct reminiscences. The meaning of others is in the nature of bare understanding." — *kārikā*, 133

The Twelfth View: "Just as our sense perceives the objects in different ways, in the same way an object is understood from words in different ways." — *kārikā*, 134

These are the twelve views on meanings of words recorded by Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari does not mention from which schools of thought these views come. This adds some problem to the interpretation of these views.

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63. See *TS*, *Pañjikā*, V.899.
64. *Ibid.*, V.891 *see Pañjikā* thereon.

Mīmāṁsā Theory of Meaning

The Mīmāṁsā theory of meaning accounts for the propositional meaning (hence designated as *vākyārthavādī* in the Indian philosophical systems). Though its prime concern is to interpret the scriptural statements, the competent linguistic theory which it expounds is equally applicable to human language in general. In the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* of Jaimini we first come across the real definition of sentence. A group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence if on analysis the separate words are found to have *ākāṁkṣā*[65] or 'mutual expectancy'. Here the term *ākāṁkṣā* is not a technical one. But in the next *sūtra*[66] where he states the principle of the 'syntactic split' (*vākyabheda*) the term *ākāṁkṣā* acquires a technical status. When the sentences are independent of one another (each sentence having no requirement or expectation of words outside itself to complete its meaning), they should be treated as distinct sentences. Later on two more elements are added to this primary condition of syntactic unity (*ākāṁkṣā*). These two elements are: logical compatibility (*yogyatā*) and spatio-temporal contiguity (*sannidhi*).[67] To this Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka and some Naiyāikas like Jayanta added the fourth element/condition, namely the knowledge of speaker's intention (*tātparya*).

The Mīmāṁsā school expounds two theories of meaning which primarily deal with the nature and constitution of the sentential meaning. These two theories belong to the two very powerful schools headed by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra. Kumārilabhaṭṭa proposes the theory of *abhihitānvaya* which accounts for the isolated word meanings. Prabhākara's theory of *anvitābhidhāna* appears to be more competent than Kumārila's which holds that the words acquire their meanings from their syntactic relationship.

Let us first examine the nature of word and meaning in the

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65. *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra*, II.1.46. Quoted in *IMT*, pp. 152-4.
66. *Ibid.*, II.1.47.
67. Kumārilabhaṭṭa *Tantravārttika* Vol. I, p. 455, quoted in *ITM*, p. 156 ft.

Mīmāṁsā system. Word is sacred and eternal[68] in the Mīmāṁsā system because words are not produced or created. They are only expressed or manifested. The Mīmāṁsaka advocates that the denotation of a word is universal (*jāti*). This view is also acceptable to the Vedāntins and Grammarians like Vājapyāyana[69] and Bhartṛhari.[70] The Mīmāṁsaka does not draw any distinction between *jāti* and *ākṛti* like the Naiyāyika. For the Naiyāyika, *jāti* is that which produces the notion of sameness in different Individuals,[71] while *ākṛti* or configuration is that which indicates or represents the universal and its characteristics. For the Mīmāṁsaka *ākṛti* is also called *sāmānya* which is the cause of the perception of oneness (*ekabuddhi*). Kumārila opines that actual import of a word is class/universal (*jāti*) but since class and individuals are related to each other, the individual is grasped by means of postulation (*arthāpatti*) and inference (*anumāna*). However, this view has been refuted by the Grammarians.[72]

We posit one more significant observation by Kumārilabhaṭṭa. He says that in every cognition there are two elements — similarity (*anuvṛtti*) and difference (*vyāvṛtti*). Without these two neither individual nor universal or class can be proved. Similar notions lead to the cognition of class (as cow) and the differential notions help to distinguish one class from the other classes (like horse, ox, etc.) and help to identify an individual within the class. So the meaning of a word involves both universal and particular which is determined by similarity and difference.[73] Jayantabhaṭṭa refutes Kumārila's

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68. For detail discussion on this topic see *Mīmāṁsā: The Vākyaśāstra of Ancient India* by Dr. G.V. Devasthali, Mumbai: 1959, Chapter 2.
69. *See Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha* Chapter 13: *jāti śabdārtha vācino vājapyāyanasya mate gavādayaḥ śabda bhinnadravya saṁveta jātimbhidāti.*
70. *VP*, III.1.33.
71. *NS*, II.2.69.
72. *VP*, II.336.
73. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *SV, ākṛtivāda*, 7.
vastu buddhirhi sarvatra vyāvṛtyanugātmika
jāyate hyātmakatvena vinā sa ca na siddhyati ।

arguments saying that they are self-contradictory because it amounts to positing light and darkness at the same time. How could the same entity (individual) be both eternal and non-eternal at the same time?

Prabhākara has a different opinion regarding universal and class. He opines that class is eternal. In case of extinction of the class, there cannot exist any relation with its individual.

Abhihitānvayavāda

According to Kumārila and his followers the words constituting a sentence first convey their own individual meanings which are isolated and discrete. These individual word-meanings relate themselves together in conformity with the triple syntactic requirements—expectancy, competence and contiguity. This theory of verbal comprehension is known as *abhihitānvayavāda*. This is the theory which views the propositional meaning as the relation (*anvaya*) of concepts/meanings that are denoted by (*abhihita*) the constituent words in isolation. So a sentence is nothing but an aggregate/conglomeration of word meanings. On hearing a sentence we first understand the individual word meanings one after another, then we put together these meanings according to three syntactic factors and then arrive at the meaning of the sentence. In the example, 'Bring the horse'—each word first conveys its respective meaning. Kumārila states,

> The meanings of the word having expressed by each word, independently of one another it is solely from the connection among these word meanings, that there follows the cognition of the meaning of the sentence.[74]

Kumārila and some Naiyāyikas accept the role of the speaker's intention in the verbal comprehension.

The theory of *abhihitānvaya* is based on the view advocated by

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74. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *Tantravārttika*, quoted in *ITM*, p. 204 "the individual word meanings — expressed by the words and the import of a word is always universal".

the grammarian Vājapyāyana. He was also believed to hold that the sentential meaning is the mutual association of word meanings.

Anvitābhidhānavāda

Prabhākara and his disciple Śāliknātha expound the theory of *anvitābhidhāna* which states that words possess their meaning by the mutual relationship in a sentence. Though they regard words as real and actual components of language, they clearly hold that sentence is a prerequisite to convey the word meanings. Words used in a sentence yield complete meanings and the meanings which are contextualised in a given syntactic relationship cease to exist if they are taken out of the sentence. So the mutually associated meaning (*anvita*) is communicated (*abhidhāna*) by the word. The sentential meaning is the actual import of words. Hence like Kumārila, there is no need to posit the speaker's intentions in the communication of the word meaning. The *Vākyārthamātṛkā Vṛtti* states:

> There are many words, and therefore many meanings, the unity of the sentence meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose.[75]

If we compare these two theories of propositional meaning advocated by the two schools in the Mīmāṁsā system, we find that *anvitābhidhāna* is a more coherent and powerful theory than the *abhihitānvaya*. A sentence cannot be merely a concatenation of the word meanings. Though a sentence is constituted of words and its meaning is also nothing but meaning of the words yet a sentence transcends all its components and posits something beyond. Prabhākara's theory is supported by our day-to-day linguistic experience also. First we get the whole sentence and its associated word meaning. It is almost like a second thought when we take each of the words in a sentence and speculate on them in isolation.

Gaurinath Shastri observes the difference between the two theories, viz., *anvitābhidhāna* and *abhihitānvaya* lies in their conception of medium of syntactical relation —*pada* and *padārtha*

75. Quoted in *ITM*, p. 200.

— the theory of *anvitābhidhāna* has the merit of satisfying the law of economy. It asserts that word denotes a related meaning.[76]

Anvitābhidhāna is not merely a more complete and advance theory than the *abhihitānvaya* but also more antique. C.K. Raja states, the *anvitābhidhāna* is a very antique theory — Yāska attributes this to *Audumbarāyaṇa*.[77]

As later developments, Naiyāyikas and others tried to reconcile these two theories of meaning. Jayantabhaṭṭa, associating himself with the Bhāṭṭa school, expounds the theory of intentional meaning. Mukulabhaṭṭa, in his *Abhidhā Vṛttimātṛkā*, says that both of these theories contain only the partial truth. He accepts the combination of the two views and designates it as the theory of *samuccaya*.

Nyāya theory of Meaning

Compared to the other theories of meaning, Nyāya theory of meaning may not appear well-defined, even then its position is crucial in the discussion of theories of meaning. The Naiyāyikas have proved themselves the powerful and balanced critics and commentators. Their views on the various topics of ontology and epistemology are of great importance and much required in the comprehension of the whole intellectual debate in the tradition.

In the Indian philosophical systems, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika both are known as the Realist schools of thought. For the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the world of our experience is real and not any projection of mind. It is real because it is knowable (*jñeya*) and nameable (*abhidheya*). Whatever is knowable has to have existence and whatever exists is real. We can talk about a rabbit and even about a horn because both exist but we cannot talk of presence or absence of the 'rabbit's horn' because it does not exist. We know and refer to our world of experience with a name. Hence our world of experience is given and is a set of referents. Thus, according to the

76. Gaurinath Shastri, *Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, Calcutta: 1959, p. 179.

77. C.K. Raja, *In Defence of Mīmāṁsā*, Madras; 1936, p. 33.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of thought our world is called *padārtha* (meaning or referent of a linguistic form: *padasyārthaḥ* = an entity). The world of experience may be internal and external.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of analysis, a person acquires the knowledge/experience of the world in four ways of knowing — perception, inference, language/*śabda* and analogy. Then he transfers his experience into language and expresses it orally or in the written form.

The system of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika has paid more attention to analysing the process as to how the sentential meaning is apprehended. The following process is postulated:

1. The hearer/reader receives the sentence.
2. He/she splits the sentence into words/morphemes.
3. He remembers referents from each morpheme.
4. He infers the intention (*tātparya*) of the speaker and decides the meaning of a word accordingly.
5. He relates meanings thus remembered and understands the sentential meaning. This is what is called *śabdabodha* or a verbal understanding.

It is obvious from the present discussion that this system supports the *khaṇḍapakṣa* (associational meaning) view. According to this system the minimal meaning bearing unit is *pada*.[78] The hearer/reader remembers the meaning only if he/she knows the relationship (*vṛtti*) which holds between a *pada* and its meaning (*padārtha*). This relationship is direct, real and positive. The Nyāya does not posit any conceptual entity or conceptual meaning as referred to by the word. For them, meaning is *vāstavārtha*. It denotes or signify the entity which exists ontologically. Thus, meaning is defined as "that which forms the object of a remembrance caused by the knowledge of the relationship between a morpheme

78. Nyāya system defines *pada* as *śaktaṁ padaṁ*, that which has potential to signify. This definition differs from that of the Grammarians who think of *pada* as a fully inflected morpheme — *suptiṅgantaṁ padaṁ*, P. I.4.14.

and its reference". The relationship between a word and its referent is a straight-line relationship:

A	B
vācaka	*vācya*
(signifier)	(signified)

This is how this view differs from the view of the idealist schools like the Grammarians and the Buddhists. This relation established by the Nyāya logicians can be extended to account for the intended meaning. This extended relation is called *lakṣaṇā*. Thus we have the primary relation and then extended relation. The system does not posit any third variety of relationship as *vyañjanā* or suggested meaning. Contrary to the Grammarian and Mīmāṁsaka views on the eternity (*nityatā*) of words, the Naiyāyikas maintain that the word is non-eternal (*anitya*). In this system of thought, a *śrauta* philosophy, the fourfold levels of speech have not been recognised. The system accepts only the fourth level of *vāk* that is the articulated speech. They posit three reasons for non-eternity of words:[79]

1. because it is produced, so it has a known beginning and end.
2. because it is bound in sense-organs.
3. because it is postulated and used metaphorically.

One more observation may be made about the actual import of words. The Nyāya liberally posits that the meaning of a word is individual, class and the generic form (*ākr̥ti*) all together.[80]

Thus we conclude the Nyāya view on word meaning relationship. Finally in this chapter, we discuss the Jaina theory of word and meaning.

Jaina Theory of Meaning

In the Jaina system of thought word (*śabda*) is synonym of *pudgala*

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79. *See NS*, *NSBh*. II.2.13-59.
80. *NS* and *NSBh*, II.2.68 — *vyaktyākr̥ti jātyastu padārthaḥ*.

(matter). Language is the product of physical endeavour. This conception of language is identical only with the fourth level of *vāk,* namely *vaikharī* in the classical classification of language. We have earlier mentioned the etymological meaning of *vaikharī* given by Jayantabhaṭṭa, *vikhara iti dehendriya saṁgtiata uccyate tatra bhavā vaikharī*, i.e., *vikhara* means the body and also group of organs of action. The speech sound produced/articulated by them is *vaikharī*.

Naturally this mode of thought cannot establish the word as an eternal (*nitya*) entity. For the Jaina thinkers *śabda* and *śabda dhvani* both are the same. They also maintain that even the relation between word and meaning is constructed temporally.

There are three views among the philosophers regarding the nature of word-meaning relationship:

1. relation of identity (*tādātmya*)
2. relation of origination (*utpatti*)
3. relation of signifier and signified (*vācya-vācaka*)

The first view is preferred by the Grammarians who accept the complete identity between *śabda* and its meaning. The Jaina scholars refute both the first and the second views but accept the relationship of signifier and signified.

Jaina's conception of *universal* is similar to Nyāya definition of universal.[81] Like the Naiyāyikas they also hold that the notion of sameness among many individuals constitute a class or universal. But they refuse to accept either universal or particular alone as the import of word. They assimilate both these categories and posit them as the meaning of a word. There is no absolute universal or particular — these two are mutually dependent terms. So they are both parts of the domain of signification of a word.

Jaina scholars have also discussed the phenomena of sentence and sentential meaning. The *Prameya Kamala Mārtaṇḍa* defines

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81. *NS*, II.2.71.

a sentence as a group of words where all words are dependent upon each other for their meanings. A sentence in itself is an independent linguistic construct.[82] It seems that the Jaina do not have any clear standpoint on the issues of word, sentence, meaning, etc. When they utilise the Grammarian's or the Buddhist's views, they want to assimilate the views of the opponents as well as the exponent. Even in their definition of sentence they try to capture all the elements as presented by Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara systems of Mīmāṁsā philosophy. They do not possess any extreme view on any topic. The Jaina system seems to be a skeptical philosophy. It propagates the theory of multiple truth (*anekānta*) and does not establish anything with a sense of full determination (*syādvada*). The same view prevail in their theory of meaning. They accept both the views — those of the Grammarians and of the Buddhists and state that meaning is both identical as well as differential. An entity is not only what is in itself but also what it is not. This view broadly constitutes the Jaina theory of knowledge also. We know a thing not by its similarity with the other objects but also how it is distinct from the other objects. This is what they call *svaparyāya* and *paraparyāya*. This is the Jaina theory of Identity-in-Difference in which identity is coordinated with difference.

Every entity comprises within the completeness of its being; two constituent elements are of equal importance, viz. what is itself (*svatattva*) and what is the other-than-itself (*paratattva*). The former group of traits forms the positive element (*sat*, *vidhi*), that is pitcher *per se*, for example and the latter group the negative element (*asat / niṣedha*) what it is not, the non-pitcher or a curtain or a smoking pot.[83]

Hemachandra states,

> If a thing had only positive nature, the nature would not be its own; it is because of its negative nature, its differential

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82. *See Jain Bhāṣā Darśana* by Sagarmal Jain, Delhi: 1996, p. 59.
83. Haribhadra, *Ṣaḍadarśana Samuccaya,* Calcutta: 1905, p. 238 — *sarvapadārthānāṁ svarūpeṇa sattvam para rūpeṇa satyaṁ.*

form (other objects), that a thing possesses its specific nature.[84]

Thus Jainas possess a very tolerant and multifold view on the issues of word and meaning. We have also seen that this view originates from their theories of *anekānta* and *syād*.

Buddhist Theory of Meaning

The Buddhist philosophers and logicians differ in a very significant way from the views and speculation we have examined so far. They refute the reality of categories like *class*, *universal*, *inherence*, etc., and strongly argue for the fictional character of the whole verbal cognition. Taking the idealist position, they state that a word does not refer to any real entity. It is only the conceptual construct/ mental image of the object which is designated by the word. This mental image is purely subjective and momentary. The Buddhist theory of meaning is known as *apoha* (differentiation) which asserts that a word denotes what the object is not. We end this discussion here because a comprehensive discussion of this theory constitutes the core subject-matter of this study, and discuss it in detail in chapter 3.

It is obvious from the above discussion that these various theories of meaning are integral parts of their corresponding philosophical systems. The differences which we have recorded in these theories are again a projection of the differences inherent in their own philosophical systems from which they have stemmed out. At a relatively higher sphere, all these philosophical systems make a reference to the source and non-contingent texts (the Vedas). In the various systems of Indian philosophy we have seen, in the debate, an extension/elaboration of the seed-thoughts present in the Vedas. All those seed-thoughts contained in the Veda flourish in the various *āstika* and *nāstika* systems. The *Śruti* texts leave adequate space to accomodate dissent as well and multifoliated

84. Hemachandra, *Anyayogavyavachedadvatanśikā,* Mumbai: 1933, p. 165.

interpretation. Since Indian culture and society is not bibliolatrous, its intellectual discourse is exceptionally *rich* in debate and open-endedness of thought. The last statement regarding ultimate truth and reality, Indian thinkers assert, has not yet been recorded. The *Śruti* says, "*neti neti*" not this, not this.[85]

The above discussion also shows how language has been one of the major concerns of all the prominent philosophical systems in India. In the ancient Upaniṣads, the world has been designated as *nāma rūpātmaka*,[86] a fabrication or construct of name and form. So it is difficult to distinguish the word and the world. We conclude this chapter with J.F. Staal's remark which is an apt and subtle observation about the status of language and philosophy in the Indian tradition:

> . . . at times almost excessive preoccupation with language on the one hand, and with philosophy on the other, may indeed be regarded as the characteristic of Indian civilization.[87]

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85. *BṛUp*, II.3.6.
86. *BṛUp*, I.4.7.
87. J. F. Stall "Sanskrit Philosophy of Language", ed. in *Current Trends in Linguistics*, Vol. 5 (1969) p. 499.

2
Reality, Cognition and Expression in Buddhist Thought

LIKE any theory of meaning and cognition, Buddhist theory of meaning too, is rooted in Buddhist philosophical systems. In the last chapter we noted how issues of language and meaning have been discussed with reference to their respective philosophical standpoints by the Grammarians, Mīmāṁsakas, Naiyāyikas and Jainas. Since the main objective of this work is to investigate about Buddhist theory of meaning and cognition and to examine its potential for literary analysis, it would not be out of place in the first place to carry out a comprehensive study of the Buddhist ontology, epistemology, nature and structures of reality and knowledge.

We know that Buddhism is a non-Vedic philosophical system because it refuses to accept the sole authority of the Vedas as presented by the orthodox systems in the tradition. However, this does not amount to saying that it rejects the knowledge posited in these source-texts also. Buddhism has always emphasised the need for self-realisation of reality and knowledge. It has preferred the logical critical approach towards the knowledge of reality. This constitutes the central point of departure in Buddhism which Lord Buddha had reiterated in many of his philosophical discourses (edited in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*). In course of time, Buddhism, too, developed and divided into many branches (18 *nikāya*) which over the centuries clearly divided into Sthavira and Mahāsāṁghika. As a later development they were known as Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. From these two main sects of Buddhism, there emerged four major Buddhist philosophical systems which we are here

concerned with. These systems are — Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika.[1] First two of these systems belong to the Hīnayāna sect and the rest two to the Mahāyāna. This is an ontological classification taking into account the conception of existence held by these schools of thought. However, one should not treat these divisions very rigidly. All these systems are in perfect agreement so far as the basic premises of Buddhism are concerned. Even there have been instances that a scholar-philosopher who was an adherent supporter of Vaibhāṣika system in his early life shifted to the Yogācāra system in his later life. This is the case with Vasubandhu, known in the tradition as the second Buddha. With some great philosopher-logicians we have the problem of where to place them. Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti are generally known as *vijñānavādins* but when we think of their theories of reality and meaning and especially their contribution to the Buddhist logic they appear closer to Sautrāntika principles.[2] Though historically, Mādhyamika is the most ancient system in Buddhism, we, considering the theoretical dimension, initiate our discussion with the Vaibhāṣika. It is better to proceed from complete knowability to complete unknowability, from everything exists to nothing exists, from all to void. The Vaibhāṣika and Mādhyamika posit two extreme ends of human thought in the context of Buddhism. (See Diagram 2 on p. 51)

We have earlier argued that despite the differences on the issues of existence, reality, basic elements of the world, epistemology and structure of cognition the four Buddhist sub-systems agree on the fundamental principles of Buddhism which characterise and distinguish Buddhism from the other Indian philosophical systems. The exponents of these sub-systems do not amount to propagating any new theory but humbly submit that they try to bring out a more


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1. *mukhyo mādhyamiko vivartāmakhilaṁ śūnyasya mene jagata* ।
yogācāramate tu santi matayastāsaṁ vivartokhilaḥ ॥
arhosti kṣaṇikastvasāvanumiti buddhiyeti sautrāntikaḥ ।
pratyakṣaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅguraṃ ca sakalaṃ vaibhāṣiko bhāsate ॥

2. *See* Dr. Srinivasa Sastri, *Vācaspati Miśra dvārā Bauddha Darśana Kā Vivecana* (Hindi), Kurukshetra: 1968, pp. 37-42.

Diagram - 2

DEVELOPMENT OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS



authentic and consistent interpretation of the discourses of the Master. The gospels of Lord Buddha always serve the central point of reference for all the discussions in these sub-systems. While the Mādhyamika designated their system as such because they thought their systems explicate the Buddhist doctrine of the middle path more authentically, the Sautrāntika showed more inclination to the *Sutta Piṭaka*, a Buddhist canonical text and called their system as such.

Buddhist philosophy involves the following major theoretical postulates:

1. All the objects of the world are momentary (*sarvaṁ anityaṁ*).
2. Everything is devoid of any essential self or being (*sarvaṁ anātmaṁ*).
3. The Ultimate Reality is *nirvāṇa,* emancipation from the sufferings of the world (*nirvāṇaṁ śāntaṁ*).
4. Everything in this world is a product of causal condition (*pratītyasamutpāda = prati + i gatau + lyap*).
5. The world is constituted of basic active elements (*dharma)* — which are of two kinds: originated (*saṁskṛta*) and unoriginated (*asaṁskṛta*). Only the unoriginated basic elements are exceptions to the general law of causal conditions.
6. Soul has only a pragmatic existence. What we call soul is nothing but a common designation of a group of five elements — name, form, consciousness, feeling, forces of will/impression and cognition (*pañca skandha*).
7. And lastly, all systems of thought in Buddhism agree on the point that word refers to only the mental image of the object and meaning is negative/differential in its content.

These major philosophical-theoretical assumptions are always implicit in all the debates in Buddhism. Since our main objective here is to provide a perspective to the discussion of Buddhist theory of meaning and cognition, we shall select only those topics which

are pertinent to our purpose. In this respect the discussion over the issues of existence and classification of basic elements are of prime importance for us. It is also of equal importance to know how these concepts have evolved and culminated into the major theories in Buddhism.

Vaibhāṣika System

The name Vaibhāṣika was given to this system in the first century BC. Ādiśankara and Vācaspati Miśra have designated the Vaibhāṣika as *sarvāstivādī* in their commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra*.[3]

They are known as *sarvāstivādī* because they accept the reality of internal and external objects,. i. e., mind and matter (*bhūta* and *citta*).[4] During the reign of Kuṣāṇa king Kaniṣka, in the fourth Buddhist council (first century AD) a grand commentary was composed on Ārya Kātyāynīputra's *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra* which became popular as *Vibhāṣā*. This commentary literature, *Vibhāṣā*, became the source texts for the *sarvāstivādins* around the second century and thus Vaibhāṣika, those who put faith in *vibhāṣā,* became their new designation.[5]

Later on the *vibhāṣā* was again commented upon and the greatest commentary became popular as *Mahāvibhāṣā*. This constituted the background of Vaibhāṣika philosophy. In the fourth century Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra composed their most celebrated works *Abhidharma Kośa* and *Samayapradīpikā* respectively on the basis of the *mahāvibhāṣā*.

Before we discuss the Vaibhāṣika classification of *dharma* it is important to make a full exposition of the term *dharma* itself.

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3. (a) *BSSB*, II.2.17 — *tatra te sarvāstivādino bāhyamantaraṁ ca vastu abhyupagacchanti bhūtaṁ ca bhautikaṁ ca cittaṁ ca caittaṁ ca.*

   (b) *BHT* — (*yadyapi vaibhāṣika sautrāntikayoravantaramata bhedoasti tathāpi sarvāstitayamasti sampratipattirityekikr̥tya upanyastaḥ* ।

4. *Mahāvagga*, I.23. 'Everything exists'.
5. *See* Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā* on *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu. Chapter 1.

Buddhism has contributed with new lives and meanings to many conceptual terms of Indian philosophy. The term *dharma* is also one of them. Etymologically *dharma* means that which contains (the essence or real self). Later on *dharma* became the common denomination of nature and moral code (*dharma niyama* in Patañjali's *Mahābhaṣya, Paspaśa*).

In the later Vedic phase *dharma* was used optionally for *ṛta* (equipoise).[6]

Buddhism took the term at this stage and defined it as that which contains the thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*). *Dharma* denotes the subtlest particles of mind and matter which are no more divisible. According to the Buddhist vision of reality, our world is nothing but the permutation and combination of these *dharma*s. There is no self and supreme self to control this world. These *dharma* are the product of causal conditions and subject to decay. When they unite or bind themselves they become the efficient cause to produce an effect. *Dharma* is as unique and important in Buddhist philosophy as *tattva* (element) is in the Sāṁkhya system.

The Vaibhāṣikas have classified the basic/essential elements of the world on the basis of two parameters:

(a) Sense-Organs (*viṣayīgata*), and
(b) Sense-Objects (*viṣayagata*).

The sense-organs (*viṣayīgata*) classification is comparatively more antique and relatively a simpler one which includes — *skandha* (group, aggregate), *āyatana* (the way to acquire knowledge) and *dhātu* (which causes the series of events when combined). This classification is acceptable to *sthaviravādins* (the ancient school of the Vaibhāṣika system). In his discourses, the Master himself has included this classification.[7] Among these three types of classification of the basic elements according to sense-organs, *skandha* explains

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6. *See* Dr. G.C. Pandeya, *Baudha Dharma Ke Vikāsa kā Itihāsa*, Hindi. Lucknow: 1963, 3rd edn, 1990, p. 252.
7. *Mahāṇidāna sutta, Dīgha Nikāya* II.15, *Samyukta Nikāya*, I.6.

the elements which constitute our perception of the world; *āyatana* implicates what cognitive faculties are involved to grasp a set of sense-objects; and lastly, *dhātu* shows how our cognition is structured and what are its types. This classification of *dharma* is of specific importance for us because in the fourth chapter of this work we are going to incorporate them into a more comprehensive and systematic classification of cognition as presented by the Yogācāra school. There we shall also attempt to develope an analytical model for the literary analysis on the basis of these available materials.

The Vaibhāṣika system identifies seventytwo originated (*saṁskṛta*)[8] and three unoriginated (*asaṁskṛta*) *dharma*.[8]

Among the originated basic elements there are two sub-categories: *nāma* and *rūpa* (See Diagram 3 and 4)

Again these two terms are very crucial and are defined in the context of Buddhist thought very uniquely. Buddha has taken these two terms from the Upaniṣads[9] but has altered their meanings. Physically this world consists of 'name' and 'form'. When we know a thing we give it a name and its form or configuration becomes apparently distinct from the other things. In Buddhism, we get a more penetrative insight through these terms when *rūpa* refers to all the objects (*bhūta padārtha*) of the world or elements of matter and *nāma* refers to mind and mental activities. Under *rūpa* we have three elements related to external world, viz., external sense-organs, objects of perception (sense-organs and their corresponding objects of perception) and one esoteric element *avijñapti*.[10] Other schools of Buddhism include *avijñapti* under *nāma*.[11] Name (*nāma*) includes feelings (*vedanā*), ideas/conceptions (*samjña*), volition and other faculties/impressions (*saṁskāra*) and pure sensation (*vijñāna*). These elements of matter (*rūpa*) and mind (*nāma*) are potential to explain our cognition of the world and especially the

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8. *saṁskṛta sam =sambhūya, anyonyampekṣya kṛtaḥ janita iti saṁskṛta,* "that which is born of causes and which has dependent existence".

9. *BṛUp*, I.4.7. See the word *nāma* in the Glossary.

10. *AK*, I.14.

11. *AK*, I.11.

Diagram - 3

VAIBHĀṢIKA'S CLASSIFICATION OF DHARMA

(BASIC ELEMENT OF EXISTENCE TOTAL - 75 DHARMAS





Diagram - 4

A VAIBHĀṢIKA CLASSIFICATION OF ACTIVE ELEMENTS*



***rūpa (i) rūpyante evirviṣaya* i.e. that through which things/objects have figured out = sense-organs

(ii) rūpyante iti rūpāni i.e. that element which takes a form = objects

**dharma samskr̥ta* (72) *asamskr̥ta* (3) i.e. *ākāśa, pratisaṃkhyā nirodha, apratisaṃkhyā nirodha)*

nature of verbal cognition. They constitute the logical ground for the ideational approach to reality. When the Buddhist scholars argue that name does not relate to the entity which ontologically exists but only to a mental picture of that which is variant and subjective then this classification of basic elements is implicit. There are various functions of mind involved in construction of an entity when it is denoted by a linguistic sign. Our own feelings, conceptions, attachment, the prior knowledge and impression all actively participate in the constitution of the content of a linguistic sign. Later on Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti called these mental functions as imagination (*kalpanā*).[12]

This is a very insightful classification of the basic elements of the world. This is relevant not only for the structuration of the verbal cognition but also for modern science. Prof. Stcherbatsky observes:

> If we realise that the group of matter represents no other matter than sense-data, that a soul is excluded and replaced by feelings, ideas, volitions and pure-sensation—we cannot but be surprised that from under a corner of Oriental terminology an epitome of matter and mind emerges which very nearly approaches the standpoint of modern European Science.[13]

Feelings, ideas and pure sensation (*vijñāna*) contain one element (*dharma*) each and rest of the elements are contained in will and other forces (*saṁskāra*) which is the next classification based on the sense-object (*viṣayagata*) appear as elements related to the receptive self (*citta-caittasika*). The most general classification of the basic elements of existence has been provided in the *Sutta Piṭaka* as matter (*rūpa*), mind (*citta-caitta*) and forces (*saṁskāra*).

A more detailed classification of elements has been offered (diagram 3) to represent a division into cognitive faculties and their

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12. *See PS*, I.3 and *PV*, II.123 (*pratyakṣa pariccheda*).
13. Prof. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conceptions of Buddhism and Meaning of the word Dharma*, Calcutta: 1956, p.5. Hereafter referred as *CCB*.

objects. There are six cognitive faculties with six corresponding objects. These constitute twelve *āyatana* or 'bases'[14] (etymological meaning—*ayaṁ praveśaṁ tanotīti āyatanam*, 'that through which one may enter into cognition), viz.

I Six receptive faculties/internal base (*adhyātma indriya*)

II Six external bases/objects (*bāhyāyatana / viṣaya*)

The first eleven items correspond to eleven elements (*dharma*) each including one. The twelfth item consists of all the remaining sixtyfour (Total 64+11=75 *dharma)* elements. Therefore, it is called *dharmāḥ* or *dharmāyatana*. The literal meaning of *āyatana* is 'entrance'. It is an entrance for the consciousness and mental phenomena (*citta-caitta*). The emergence of consciousness always invloves two things, a cognitive faculty and a corresponding object element. Since consciousness is pure sensation without any content, it is always supported by these two elements. *Āyatana* are 'supporters' or 'doors' which facilitate the consciousness to appear. For instance, visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) arises in correlation (*pratītya*) with the sense of vision (*cakṣurindriya*) and some colour (*rūpaṁ ca*). In the case of sixth cognitive faculty (*manas*) consciousness works itself, i.e., its preceding moment acts as a faculty for apprehending non-sensuous objects. Prof. Stcherbatsky rightly observes. "This classification intends to give a division of all objects of cognition into sense-objects and non-sensuous one."[15] These twelve bases of cognition are existent in relation to each other. The Vaibhāṣika system tends to posit that a separate object and faculty of cognition are unreal. For example, soul or personality. In case of a separate element, it is declared to be a name; not reality and not a *dharma*. This system seems to emphasise that knowledge of reality involves both the objects and its corresponding sense-organs/cognitive bases. One more point significant from the linguistic point of view is that the system reiterates the fictional character of a linguistic sign — 'name'.

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14. Prof. Stcherbatsky's term for *āyatana*, in *CCB*, p. 6.
15. Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, p. 7.

Again one more classification of the basic elements has been made on the basis of *dhātu*. (See the Diagram 5)

This is an analysis of separate elements or forces which when unite produce one stream (*santāna*) of events. The term *dhātu* has been borrowed from the medical sciences where it means the elements of body.[16] Viewed as components of such a stream the elements (*dharma*) are called *dhātu*. The unphilosophic mind of common people supposes this stream to represent a personality or an individual (*pudgala*).

In the Vaibhāṣika classification of *dharma-dhātu*, it is apparent that our cognition is a product of sense and object contact where mind has also been included as the sixth and supreme sense (*dharma-dhātu*) which contains the rest of the *dharma* related to the receptive self (*citta*). Neither a sense-organ alone nor a sense-object alone can bring about any knowledge of reality. There are six sense-organs and their corresponding sense-objects which when combined yield six corresponding cognitions of reality, viz, visual, aural, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental. We structure our knowledge of the world through this process.


We may observe that even after this very coherent classification of the basic elements of matter and mind, roles of mind have not been developed and discussed completely. This classification gives the impression that a human being is merely a passive receiver of knowledge and he does not involve any creative action. In the later stages of development of the Buddhist thought (fourth century onwards) this classification was broadened and systematized by the *vijñānavādī* philosophers. They added two more levels of cognition, that is *kliṣṭa manovijñāna* and a substratum for all the cognitive acts *ālaya vijñāna*. After that this classification becomes complete and competent enough to serve as a mode to analyse the structures and structuration principle of knowledge in any literary-philosophical discourse. We shall present an example analysis of

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16. Four Noble Truths of Buddhism and basic underlying principles of medical sciences represent a striking similarity. That might be the reason to call the Buddha as *mahābhiṣak* 'the great physician'.

Diagram - 5

A VAIBHĀṢIKA'S CLASSIFICATION OF DHARMA DHĀTU (18)



Wordsworth's masterpiece ('Tintern Abbey') in the fourth chapter of this work.

It is important to note that the Vaibhāṣika system presents the eighteen component elements (*dhātu*) which have also been enumerated as eighteen elements (*tattva*) in the Sāṁkhya systems.

The system has precisely given each and every element of matter, mind, will and other forces (*saṁskāra*). It is required to discuss them in brief because they help to understand the theoretical background of the Buddhist theory of meaning.

(A) ELEMENTS OF MATTER (*RŪPA*)

Matter (*rūpa*)[17] as a physical element (*rūpa-āyatana*) is associated with visible matter or more precisely, the phenomenon of visibility alone; this being the 'matter' of *par excellence*.[18] The general characteristic of matter or material elements is impenetrability (*sapratighatva*) which is defined as the fact that space occupied by them cannot be occupied by another at the same time (*rūpyate iti rūpaṁ* — that what materialises). Kumāralābha gives to the phenomenon of impenetrability an idealistic interpretation, "the impossibility of such objects occupying the same space".[19] Prof. Rosenberg holds that *rūpa* suggests 'sense-elements'.[20]

An opposite of this has been presented by the system. They hold that colours (*varṇa*) alone are realities and shapes (*samsthāna*) represent the construction of mind (*manas pratyakṣaṁ*) superimposed as an interpretation upon the difference of colouration.[21] This observation is of much value for the discussion of meaning and knowledge.

An assessment of all the classification of matter establishes that no other element except the sense-data is recognised which may be broadly divided into two:

17. *rūpa = rūpiṇo dharmāḥ, rūpa skandha, rūpa āyatana.*
18. *Abidharmakośa* (*AK*): I.24.
19. Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, p. 9.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 9 fn.
21. *AK*, I.10.

- sense-data constituting external objects (*viṣaya*).
- sense-data constituting sense-organs (*indriya*).

This division is also very close to Sāṁkhya view of classification of matter which developed along two different parameters, i.e., *sattva* resulting in sense-organs (intelligence), and *tamas* resulting in sense-objects (inactive) in their subtle (*tanmātra*) and gross (*mahābhūta*) forms. Even the concept of *tanmātra* comes quite close to Buddhist concept of an element of matter (*rūpa dharma*).

But certainly there are some points of difference, too. In Sāṁkhya, these elements are modifications of an eternal substance whereas in Buddhism, these are mere sense-data without any substance.

The *Abhidharma-Kośa* authoritatively defines matter (*rūpa*):

> That which cannot be cut and burnt, has no weight and it disappears without a residue at death. It is atomic and is represented by five kinds of elements.[22]

(B) ELEMENTS OF MIND (*MANA*)

In the classification of cognitive bases (*āyatana*), mind and its corresponding sense-object, (non-physical entity) are related to the elements of the receptive self (*citta-caitta dharmāḥ, arūpiṇo dharmāḥ*). According to the principle of classification they represent two correlative classes:

(i) Subjective (*indriya*) — receptive faculty (*citta, vijñāna, manas* all are synonyms).[23]

(ii) Objective (*viṣaya*) — things which exist ontologically. Subjective class of elements represents pure consciousness and sensation without any content such as name, form, etc.

In objective class the pure sensation which is the content of subjective part acquires the definite form (*savikalpaka*). This is the

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22. *AK*, I.36-42. *See also* Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, pp. 10-12.
23. *AK*, XXIV.34, *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, XXI.94.

growing awareness about the content which was initially perceived in the first stage. This is the beginning of intellection where the pure sensation is coloured with the creation of our own intellect. Here the pure sensation is attached with name, form, universal, class, substance, inherence, etc. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the first stage is known as the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*) and the second stage as determinate perception (*savikalpa pratyakṣa*). Buddhist scholars call these two stages as *vijñāna* and *samjñā* respectively.

In the *āyatana* classification feeling (*vedanā*), volitions (*cetanā*) and other various mental phenomena (total 46 in number) separate the elements which are all matter. Besides 46 mental phenomena it is the *dharmāyatana*, i.e., mind and non-physical entity (see the diagram 3, Vaibhāṣika Classification of *Dharma*) which contains the fourteen elementary forces (*viprayukta dharma / saṁskāra*) the element of character or action (*vijñapti*) and three unoriginated elements in which *nirvāṇa* is the chief *dharma*. Prof Stcherbatsky speculates,

> The common characteristic of these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any immediate agency of the senses. The apprehension of sense objects is likewise participation by the intellect; just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of vision.[24]

The *Abhidharma-Kośa* defines the receptive consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*)

> Discernment is knowledge (*vijñapti*) about each object. Knowledge about every object, that apprehension (*upalabdhi*) is called *vijñānaskandha* that again consists of six kinds of cognition (*vijñānakāyaḥ*) namely from the visual cognition up to the mental cognition.[25]

In Poussin's translation of the same verse, the definition is more vivid, 'the cognition (*vijñāna*) is the impression relative to each

24. Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, p. 13.
25. *AK*, I.16.

object'.[26] The definition of perception (*paricitti*) of a colour can be an idea (*samjñā*), but consciousness as perceptive faculty is pure sensation. This pure sensation though non-partitive, is distinguished on the basis of elements by which its appearance is accomplished. This is only a matter of choice of support through which the pure sensation is manifested. From this point of view, as we have mentioned earlier also, there arises a set of six various kinds (*dhātu*) of consciousness corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties and a set of six kinds of objects. Besides these six kinds of consciousness we have *manodhātu* which is also the same consciousness arising in connection with abstract objects — (*manovijñāna dhātu*). It is the same reality and *dharma*. But only for the symmetrical arrangement it has been found necessary to have a set of three items for the purely mental elements.[27] The difference between consciousness as receptive faculty and the same consciousness accompanying an abstract is then said to be difference of time.[28] We know, pure sensation (*citta*) could never appear in life in its pure and true isolated condition. It is always associated with some secondary mental phenomena (*caitta* of *caittasika dharma*).[29] Among these mental phenomena (*caitta dharma*) three elements are especially conspicuous: feeling (*vedanā*), idea (*samjñā*) and volition (*cetanā*). Feeling (*vedanā*)[30] has been identified as of three kinds — pleasant, unpleasant and neutral; (see diagram 4). Idea (*samjñā*) refers to the function of abstract thought, as that which 'abstracts' (*udgrahaṇa*) a common characteristic sign (*nimitta*) from the individual objects.[31] This is exactly what in the later

26. *AK*, *vijñānaṁ prativijñaptiḥ*.

27. *Ibid.*, I.16.

28. Later on, in their classification of *vijñāna*, *vijñānavādin* separated these two aspects and functions of *manovijñāna* as *manovijñāna* which is responsible only for direct gross experience — (the pure sensation is its content), and *kliṣṭa manovijñāna*, that mind which is associated with the *caitta dharma*, discriminates, reorders, reinterprets these experiences of the *manovijñāna* and finally relates them to one's self.

29. *Ibid.*, II.23.

30. *Ibid.*, I.14.

31. *Ibid.*

Indian philosophy, Buddhist as well as Brāhmaṇical, was understood by determinate (*savikalpaka*).[32] In the history of Indian logic Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti introduced the distinction between the pure sense knowledge (that is free from all mind postulates and abstract thought — *kalpanā apoḍha*) and determinate cognition (*savikalpaka*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is indebted for this contribution to these two great Buddhist philosopher-logicians. Uddyotakara took these two forms of perception from them and established them in the Nyāya system.[33]

To be more specific to the fact, not even Diṅnāga was the originator of this classification of perception. As in the earlier discussions of *dharma* we have seen that Buddhism had established this distinction between the two forms of perception from the very beginning. In the classification of elements (*dharma*) as *skandha*, *vijñāna* and its synonyms *citta, manas,* presents pure sensation (same as in Diṅnāga's gloss *pratyakṣa kalpanā apoḍhaṁ*)[34] and idea (*samjñā*) corresponds to the definite knowledge. Diṅnāga only adopted and appropriated these elements to his system. In the subsequent chapter we shall also be able to prove that not even the Buddhist theory of meaning (*apoha*) was propounded by him, as is commonly believed. In the discussion related to name and form (*nāma, rūpa*) we may easily get the notions and basic underlined principles which are at work in the constitution of linguistic sign in the Buddhist philosophy of language. At this stage of discussion, we would not be able to account for a very essential and significant aspect of linguistic sign, that is its differential nature. To comprehend the theoretical base for assignation of this notion to the linguistic sign we need to be with the philosophers of Mādhyamika School.

To conclude, this section, we may state the idea (*samjñā*) is distinguished from the *vijñāna*, i.e., pure sensation. It involves three mental functions: imagination (*kalpanā*), abstraction (*udgrahaṇa*) and definite presentation (*paricchinna*). If we compare

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32. *See* definition of *pratyakṣa* in the *Nyāya Bindu* of Diṅnāga.
33. Cf. *Nyāya Vārttika* (*pratyakṣa sūtra*).
34. Diṅnāga, *PS*, I.3.

samjñā skandha and *vijñāna skandha* with the Vijñānavāda classification of cognition, *samjñā* would be equal to *kliṣṭa manovijñāna* and *vijñāna* to *manovijñāna*.

The last among the three mental phenomena is volition (*cetanā*). In Buddhism, there is a certain arrangement of elements. There is a force or more precisely the simple fact of *dharma* that the elements are arranged in a certain way according to certain law. This fact is referred to by the term *cetanā*.[35]

(C) ELEMENT OF WILL AND OTHER FORCES (*SAṀSKĀRA*)

The definitions of will/volition (*cetanā*) and *saṁskāra* are the same. Prof. Stcherbatsky suggests,

> since all the forces are agencies acting in some combination, with other elements, we may in rendering this conception, for the sake of expediency, safely drop the word 'combining' and use 'forces' alone.[36]

Earlier there was only one *saṁskāra* 'will' in Buddhism but gradually there developed a whole catalogue of them. In the *Abhidharma-kośa* we find an attempt to prove that all *saṁskāra* could be included under *saṁskāra skandha* alone.[37] *Saṁskāra* is equivalent to action (*karma*). According to Yaśomitra, mental faculties are included in *saṁskāra skandha*. In Buddhism, we find a tendency to convert all the elements into subtler forces of some degree. Every element of mind and matter may be designated as a *saṁskāra* in Buddhism which stands for the *saṁskṛta dharma* in the classification on the basis of sense-object, (*viṣayagata*) [referred to diagram 3 "Vaibhāṣika Classification of Dharma"]. The order in which the elements appear in the first classification [into *rūpa* and *nāma*

35. *cetanā* = √*ci* = *citta* also *sañcayati*, 'that which collects (and arranges the experience in a specific way)'. *See also AK*, 9th chapter 'The Soul Theory of Buddhism'.

36. Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, p. 17 The Buddhists have replaced *saṁskṛta* by *kṛtaka* of *Nyāyabindu Ṭīkā*: A unity without combination can produce nothing — Diṅnāga (*na kiñcid ekaṃ ekasmata*).

37. *AK*, I.15 and Yaśomitra's commentary thereupon.

skandha] into groups is interpreted as a gradual progress from coarseness to subtlety, such as matter (*rūpa*), feeling, idea, forces (*saṁskāra*) and pure sensation (*vijñāna*).[38]

The Buddhists have posited three separate forces which impart to sounds of speech their signification — (i) the force of sound (*varṇa*) = phoneme (ii) the force of word (*nāma* = *samjñā*) and the force of sentences (*pada* = *vākya*). Like *sphoṭa*, these forces also refer to the same basic energy principle from which all these linguistic elements originate.[39]

Sautrāntika School

Unlike the Vaibhāṣika system, Sautrāntika accepted the *Sutta Piṭaka* (also the *Sūtra Piṭaka*) as their seminal source-texts because it contains the original teachings of the Master. It was compiled by his most beloved disciple *Ānanda*. This adds more authenticity to this source-text. The text of philosophical discourses of Lord Buddha is the *Abhidhamma* (also *Abhidharma Piṭaka*) which was heavily commented upon down the ages, especially by the philosophers of the Vaibhāṣika school. The Sautrāntika are a bit skeptical to accept it as the original *Piṭaka* because they think that many interpolations have been introduced in the original text. They accepted the *Sutta Piṭaka* and subsequently they were known in the tradition as Sautrāntika.

Sautrāntika was the second branch of the *Sarvāstivādī* sect (refer to the Diagram 2). We do not have enough primary source material to examine their conception regarding the basic elements, i.e., knowledge and reality. Historically, it seems that this school developed immediately after the Vaibhāṣika school. Vasubandhu has mentioned Sautrāntika's views as the opponent (*pūrva pakṣa*) view on certain important issues.[40]

On the issue of existence Sautrāntika are like *sarvāstivādins*.

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38. *AK*, I.22. *See also* Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, p. 19.
39. *AK*, II.47. *See also* Prof. Stcherbatsky, *CCB*, p. 20.
40. *See* Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-Kośa*, first chapter (*pratham kośasthāna*).

They accept the reality of both kinds of basic elements (*dharma*). They have criticised the principle of *vijñānavādin* who accept the reality of only internal *dharma* and *citta*. They maintain the distinction between an object and the cognition of the object. Like *pitcher*, *the knowledge of the pitcher* and *the knower of the pitcher* — these three are the distinct entities according to the Sautrāntika. In *vijñānavāda* this trilogy (*tripuṭi*) is superfluous and hence is refuted. Sautrāntika comments on the uniform and integral conception of *vijñāna*. They continue their anti-argument stating if *vijñāna* is one how do we know the difference between pitcher (*ghaṭa*) and cloth (*paṭa*). Both will be identical which is totally contrary to our daily experience of reality. The *vijñānavādī* have responded to these objections quite logically and consistently which we shall take up in the next section.

On the issue of external reality the Sautrāntika expounds a very balanced and reasoned theory and in this way they differ from the Vaibhāṣika systems. They hold if all the objects are in universal flux, there is no way to achieve a direct cognition of them through perception. At this stage perception appears to be a less competent means of knowledge. The moment we visualise an object it becomes a part of the past time. Only a sensation of that experience/ impression lingers for sometime in our sense-organs and in the receptive self (*citta*). Our mind coordinates these impressions and infers the object. Through this process we know the objects of the external world. The knowledge of the external world is inferential. This theory of the Sautrāntika is known as the theory of Inferential External Reality[41] (*bāhyārthānumeyavāda*).

Regarding the conception of knowledge they hold that knowledge reveals itself like a burning lamp. This is known as *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*. In the later phases, scholars of *vijñānavāda* accepted this theory in their system.

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41. *nīlapītādibhiścaitrair buddhayākārairihāntaraiḥ* । *sautrāntikamate nityaṁ bāhyārthāstvanumīyate*. From *Sarvasiddhānta Saṁgraha*, Quoted in Acarya Baladeva Upadhyaya's, *Bauddha Darśana Mīmāṁsā*, Varanasi: 1989, fourth edn., p. 189.

In the Sautrāntika's view form (*ākāra*) of an object is constructed by its own given form and the intellect both. They believe in the reality of the present tense.

Yogācāra-vijñānavāda School

Yogācāra-vijñānavāda school of thought stems from the Mahāyāna sect. Its philosophical vision is that of the pure-conceptualism. The system is named Yogācāra in preference to a more common designation *vijñānavāda* only to maintain some distinction. Though Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, two great philosopher-logicians essentially accept the doctrine of mind-only (*vijñaptimātratā*) and unreality of objects, but when they enter into the logical discussions they seem to adopt the Sautrāntika standpoint — which posits something being given in reality. Dr. A.K. Chatterjee suggests,

> the name of Vijñānavāda can be reserved for this school and pure idealism of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu be called Yogācāra. The entire system may be called, as is actually done by some scholars and historians, the system of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.[42]

Subjectivity is the most distinguishing and central element of Buddhist philosophy. From its very beginning in its *Tripiṭaka* literature, Buddhist approach to reality has been subjectivistic and critical. As we proceed from Vaibhāṣika ideology to Mādhyamika philosphy, we observe that the history of Buddhist thought presents a very sustained and gradual deepening of the consciousness of subjective starting from a realistic metaphysics ('everything exists') to a well-developed idealism ('only mind, *citta* exists') and finally the refutaion of all dichotomical categories ('reality is inexplicable hence *śūnya*').

Yogācāra system has often been presented as merely idealism which is a misleading conception. In fact, it is a form of absolutism which provides a logical synthesis between idealism and absolutism.

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42. Dr. A.K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, Delhi: 1975, revised edition, p. xii.

Yogācāra and Mādhyamika systems signify the most crucial and revolutionary phase in the history of Indian intellectual tradition.

Before we discuss the central principle of this system, we should ask a question which is almost like a foundation stone of this system. What is subjectivity? Generally we may maintain that subjectivity refers to something that exists in thought or in mind and which has no empirical reality. But there is no absolute denial of external reality. What is noteworthy is that it maintains a very constructive approach to the given reality. Intellect (*citta*) is deeply involved which constructs or creates the new forms and combinations among discrete objects and brings about a new life and meaning to them. Dr. A.K. Chatterjee also observes, "A content is said to be subjective, when it is merely in thought and has no grounding in reality. Subjectivity thus entails a constructive mechanism of thought."[43] This provides a point of departure into the Yogācāra system and in this whole discussion we shall feel its implicit and guiding presence.

Earlier we have seen that the Sautrāntika system formulates the theory of inferential external reality which asserts that external entities are known by means of inference alone because they are in constant flux. *Vijñānavāda* proceeds one step further following the same line of thought and argues that if the existence of external reality is based on our cognition, then cognition alone is real. Again, if the external object is only a combination or a set of atoms in its most subtlest form, even then that cannot be known and in this context we are incapable of positing any existence of the object. When we deconstruct the objects that appear to exist outside we do not find any essential self in them.

It is true that we cannot impose any existence since outside world is non-existential but at the same time we cannot negate our own experience of the world. 'We know' — this experience can hardly be negated. Hence knowledge is real and this is the only existential object. The existence of physical entity cannot be proved.

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43. Dr. A.K. Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, Delhi: 1975, p. 1.

So truth is the only *vijñāna* which does not expect any substratum for its manifestation. Due to this unique theoretical position, *vijñānavādins* are designated as *nirālambanavādī* in the tradition.

The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* clearly states,

> the external world is not, and multiplicity of object is what is seen of mind; body, property and abode — these all I call Mind-only.[44]

Citta (translated by Suzuki as 'Mind-only') alone is the real and existential. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* again establishes:

> Mind is set in motion in various ways, and mind is liberated; mind rises in no other way, and mind thus ceases.

Mind performs various roles. It imagines, cognises, associates and dissociates itself with various objects, it recieves, it keeps apart precisely. The external objects are nothing but a specific form constructed and perceived by mind only.

The outside world is nothing but the transformation (*pariṇāma* / *vivarta*) of mind and perceived by mind only. *Citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna* are names assigned to the mind-itself according to various mental activities it performs:[45]

If we examine the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda classification of *dharma* (referred to the Diagram 6; Originated elements 94 + Unoriginated elements 6, Total = 100 elements), we shall find that they have adopted only the parameter of causal condition (*pratītyasamutpāda*). They have defined and classified all the basic elements in terms of whether they are born of causal conditions or not (*hetu pratyaya janita*). The category of originated *dharma* does not have any substratum of self to establish its own independent


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44. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, III.30 tr. by Daisets Teitaro Suzuki, London, 1932, reprint 1978, p. 133. Original Sanskrit reads:
dṛśyate na vidyate bāhyam cittaṁ cittraṁ hi dṛśyate ।
dehabhogapratiṣṭhānaṁ cittamātraṁ vadāmyahaṁ ।। *LS*, III.30.

45. *LS*, III.40 *cittaṁ manaśca vijñānaṁ samjñā vaikalpa varjitāḥ* ।
vikalpa dharmatāṁ prāptaḥ śrāvakā na jinātmajāḥ ।।

Diagram - 6

VIJÑĀNAVĀDA



identity or existence. They are merely the various manifestations of mind. Among the unoriginated elements only the last one 'suchness' (*tathatā*) is ultimate Reality. Rest of five unoriginated elements are said to be dependent on 'suchness'. This *tathatā* has been designated variously as *bhūtakoṭi animitta, paramārtha, bhūtatathatā* and *dharma-dhātu*.

In the Yogācāra system *vijñāna* has been explained as both perceptible object and knower of that object. In fact, Vijñānavāda holds that the triology of knowable, knower and knowledge is nothing but an artificial construction. *Vijñāna* is integral, non-discrete and one.[46]

This one and integral *vijñāna* when takes the support of different sense-organs transforms itself in eight ways. This plurality is reflected in the *vijñāna* itself to account for the empirical distinctions we discuss, the eigth forms of *vijñāna*, a little later. But before that there are two very significant observations which help to comprehend the theoretical base of this classification. First, the *Laṅkāvatāra* states that *citta* is neutral.[47] *Manas* (derived from verb root, *mā* means 'to map out') functions in two ways. It perceives the sense-data as well as it reorders and relates them to the *citta*. Hence the emerging cognition is also either good or bad; it makes one's self either happy or grieved depending on its own content. Generally *citta* is derived from the very root √*cit* which means to think but in the context of *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and the whole Yogācāra literature it is derived from the verb root √*ci* which means simply to 'pile up'. This is a very crucial notion which constitutes the nature of *citta* or *ālaya*. *Ālaya* has been defined as the 'store-house consciousness'; it only receives and gathers the experiences as grasped and related to it by sense-organs (including *mana* and *kliṣṭa mana*). These experiences leave permanent marks in the *ālaya*. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* presents *ālaya* as an ocean and

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46. *LS*, III.65. *citta mātraṁ na dṛśyoasti, dvidhā citta hidṛśyate* ।
grāhya grāhaka bhāvena śāśvatoccheda varjitaṁ ॥

47. *LS*, *Sagāthakaṁ,* verse 103.

other seven *vijñāna* as its waves.[48] It also explains the different roles and designations given to the same entity *citta*:

> *Citta* is the *ālayavijñāna*, *manas* is that which has reflection as its characteristic nature, it apprehends the various sense fields, for which reason it is called a *vijñāna*.[49]

In the Vijñānavāda, though *ālaya* is substratum of everything, all cognitions dwell here in the seed forms which are provoked by the causal conditions in the outside world (like the waves caused by the wind of objectivity). Even then it has been perceived as momentary and an object of decay. It is interesting to know that though Buddhism does not posit any absolute existence as eternal soul (*ātman*), yet it believes in reincarnation. The reason is apparent because these waves (representing the desire caused by nescience) get Unsatiated as one wave causes another wave, similarly, the desire of one life keeps on evolving in the subsequent lives. [For more details please see the glossary of conceptual Sanskrit terms in the Appendix of this work — check the entries *nidāna*, *nirodha* and *ālaya*]. When these desires are satiated by means of practising abstinence, then the *ālaya* emerges in its original form that is the state of pure consciousness and for that state *nirvāṇa* or *tathatā* has been postulated. *Ālaya* is like an ocean — discrete, one and continuous.

Secondly, at least in one place the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* distinguishes *vijñāna* from *jñāna* [as a specific/relative form of knowledge and complete/absolute knowledge].[50] According to *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* knowledge (*jñāna*) is of three kinds — worldly, super worldly and transcendental. The notions expounded there can be summarised as follows:

> The worldly knowledge belongs to philosophers, and the

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48. *LS*, II.100 "The *ālaya* - Ocean in a similar manner (like the waves that rise on the ocean stirred by the wind) is constantly stirred by the winds of objectivity and is seen dancing about with the *vijñānas* which are the waves of multiplicity."
49. *LS*, *Sagāthakaṁ*, 102.
50. *LS*, *see* in Suzuki's translation, pp. 135-7.

ignorant, simple minded people. Super worldly belongs to the *śrāvakas* and Pratyekabuddha; and transcendental belongs to Bodhisattvas which originates when they thoroughly examine the things of imagelessness, they see into the state of no birth and death and they realise egolessness at the stage of Tathāgatahood.

Vijñāna is of eight kinds and subject to origination and cessation. It falls in the net of dualism — being or non-being and characterises with multiplicity.

Broadly, *vijñāna* has been classified in the Yogācāra system under the three headings.

1. *ālaya-vijñāna* — the store-house consciousness.
2. *mano-vijñāna* — (it also includes *kliṣṭa mano-vijñāna*).
3. *pravṛtti-vijñāna* — 'evolving consciousness'.

These three are not to be construed as distinct and static categories but rather as so many phases of the cosmic evolution of *vijñāna*. *Vijñāna* diversifies itself and gives rise to the whole panorama of empirical world. These three *vijñānas* represent the different stages of this diversifying and self-determining process. The evolution of diversifying process is not an end in itself. Finally it rests in the pristine purity of *vijñāptimātratā*, the mind-only. As we have earlier suggested that the very specific nature of *vijñāna* is its creativity, we shall use this notion of *vijñāna* in our model for literary analysis in the fourth (last) chapter. There we also discuss in detail the eight forms of *vijñāna* and its interaction with the other philosophical systems. We would be able to show how cognition is experienced and structured in a literary text on the basis of eight kinds of *vijñāna*. We would also examine the language of literary discourse as the evidence of this phenomenon.

Mādhyamika School

Buddhist philosophy achieves zenith with the development of Mādhyamika system. This system emerged from the Mahāyāna sect and Ācārya Nāgārjuna is undisputably its greatest philosopher

and exponent. As *vijñānavāda* was designated Yogācāra system because, for its theoretical support, it solely rests on the *Yogācārabhūmi* of Ārya Asaṅga. Similarly since the doctrine of *śūnya* was established in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā*, therefore, this school was designated as Mādhyamika, the school of Middle path. The philosophy of middle path was propounded by Lord Buddha himself who preached the avoidance of extremes in theory and practice both. This system is coherent with the central theoretical assumptions of Buddhism and expounds that truth is neither solely positive nor negative but somewhere in between, which is inexplicable and only *śūnya* could be its reasonable and valid designation. *Śūnya* is an exceptionally significant term and could be presented as one of the greatest achievements of the Indian intellect. This is possibly the only term in the whole lexicon which serves as a substratum for both positive and negative conceptions. Etymologically *śūnya* has been derived from the verb root √*su* which means 'to swell' in two senses: not only 'hollow or empty' but also 'to be swollen' in the sense of full.[51] So it signifies both presence as well as absence. This philosophical system does not try to capture reality in either of the dichotomical categories like being and non-being. The Mahāyāna philosophy presents the concepts of *advaya-vāda* which is very much like non-dualism (*advaita*) of the Vedāntic philosophy. But there is one very significant difference between these two concepts. Technically *advaita* states that there is no distinction between being and Superme Being (*jīvo brhamaiva nāparaḥ*) where as *advaya-vāda*[52] expounds that in the exposition of the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), even the question of categories like being and Supreme Being becomes non-relevant. The ultimate Reality thus transcends all the dichotomical categories which are merely the fictional fabrication of our own intellect. But no doubt, the concepts of *tathatā* in Vijñānavāda and *śūnya* in Mādhyamika refer to the same Vedāntic concept of *Brahman*. These systems only

51. *See* David Loy, "The Clôture of Deconstruction: A Mahayana Critique of Derrida", *International Philosophical Quaterly,* 27 (1987) p. 63fn. Loy records, "It has been unfortunate for Buddhist studies in the west that 'emptiness' captures only the first sense."

52. Quoted by Vācaspati Miśra, *BhT* on *Brhama Sūtra*, II.2.18.

differ in their methods of exposition of the same reality and this is because they identify themselves with different philosophical systems. Nāgārjuna clearly states that ultimate Reality, (*śūnya padārtha*) is beyond the following four rational categories: (i) it exists, (ii) it does not exist, (iii) it exists and simultaneously it does not exist, and (iv) neither it exists nor it does not exist. All worldly objects could be classified in these four categories but ultimate Being is beyond these categories.[53] Śrīharṣa has also termed this ultimate Being as the fifth category (*pañcaṁ koṭi mātra*).[54] Ācārya Nāgārjuna was not the original expounder of the doctrine of void. The vast literature of *pāramitā* expounds the concepts of *śūnya* in innumerable verses and quotes. But certainly it was the sole contribution of Nāgārjuna that he established the concept of *śūnya* on a sound logico-philosophical foundation. For exposition of his doctrine of void (*śūnya*) he prefers mainly anti-epistemological method and establishes *śūnya* on the level of absolute being (*pāramārthika sattā*). In one of very crucial *kārikā*s he explains characteristic of *śūnya* which is of much importance for us in the context of the Buddhist theory of meaning:

> Independently realised, peaceful, unobsessed by obsessions, without discriminations and a variety of meanings: such is the characteristic of truth.[55]

There are five points worthy of note here:

1. *Śūnya* or *tattva* cannot be explained in terms of other objects of knowledge, or of other persons. It transcends any form of empirical conditionality.

2. It is devoid of self (*śānta* = see this entry in glossary). *Santa*

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53. *Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā* (*MMK*), I.7.

54. Śrīharṣa, *Naiṣadhīyacaritaṁ* XIII. 36 Quoted by Baladeva Upādhyāya in *Baudha Darśana Mīmāṁsā* (*BDM*), p. 276.

55. *MMK*, XVIII.9 tr. by David J. Kalupahana, *Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā of Nāgārjuna*, Delhi: 1991, p. 270. The original verse reads,

aparapratyayam śāntaṁ prapañcairaprapañcitaṁ ı *nirvikalpa-ṁanānārthametat tattvasya lakṣanam* ıı

(*MMK*, XVIII.9).

signifies 'quiescence' which results from the avoidance of any conceptuality.

3. It cannot be explicated through words (*prapañca* means language according to the *Mādhyamika Vṛtti* on this verse).
4. It is beyond the dichotomy of subject-object. It is not captured by the functions of *citta* (*nirvikalpa*).
5. It exists where the variety of meanings or fruits is eliminated. Those which are born of *dharma* bear a variety of meanings or aspects.

This kind of existential theory of objects places Buddhist thought in extremely complex situation. We may examine this position keeping in mind the nature of linguistic denotation. In the realist system of thought there is a direct and unmediated relationship between the word and the object as we have seen in the context of Nyaya system. It is not even that much complicated in the idealist systems like Vedānta (grammarian's school) and Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda systems where we observe the mediation of mind between word and object (like 'the Ogden-Richards Triangle'). In the Grammarian's and Mīmāṁsaka tradition we posit the notion of class, universal and configuration (*ākṛti*) and present them as the denotation of words. In the Vijnanavāda system we have singular substratum *vijñāna* or *citta* which may be presented as actual object/referents. But Mādhyamika philosophy nullifies even this option. What would be the denotation of a word in this system? There is no question of quality, substance, inherence, class or universal since we have already established that every object is devoid of its self. Certainly, language does not function at the level of absolute existence (*paramārtha*). We have recorded references from the *Śruti* texts which expound this view.[56] To resolve a problem like this Mādhyamika and Yogācāra systems both construct their ontology very carefully. They posit that Reality or Truth is of two kinds, i.e., absolute (*pāramārthika*) and phenomenal

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56. *BṛUp*, VII.1.16. See also Ādi Śaṅkara's *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (*VC*) V.256 — *sakala vāk agocaraṁ*.

(*sāmvr̥tika*). Language is related to the phenomenal existence only. Nāgārjuna expounds that in the case of absence of a self-nature, no identity or difference among objects emerges. Things have no self-existence, their existence is mutually dependent and hence these do not hold any real self in them. Nāgārjuna expounds,

> In the absence of self-nature, whence can there be other-nature? For, self-nature of other-nature is called other.[57]

Candrakīrti explains the distinction between *sammuti* (Sanskrit *samvr̥tti*) and *paramattha* (Sanskrit=*paramārtha*). He explains *samvr̥tti* as language and *paramārtha* as ultimate reality or absolute truth.[58] These terms occur in the early discourses.[59] *Samvr̥tti* has been derived from *sam* + √*man* means 'to think' and literally means 'agreement' and therefore 'convention'. Kalupahana (David J.) tries to extend the meaning of this term saying that conventions are of various types — linguistic, social, political, moral or ethical. We may add several of other types of conventions to the list but it will hardly serve our purpose. What we want to establish is a simple fact. Since all objects are devoid of their 'real self' and for their existence they are bound to depend on the other dependent objects, in that case word has no potential to refer to any object directly. We cannot establish what is 'blue'. But since the existence of 'blue' is dependent of other colours (objects) we can certainly posit what is not 'blue'. To signify a term clearly we are bound to accept the differential nature of the objects. If we posit similarity, difference is implicit there too, as no two objects can be identical. Otherwise the problem of signification will remain unresolved. The actual semantic content cannot be communicated by means of establishing similarity between the two objects. We can comprehend what is cow, in terms of what is not cow (non-cow), but it is difficult to grasp any meaning when we say cow is like *gavaya* or *vice-versa*. We do

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57. Nāgārjuna, *MMK*, XIV.3, the same argument has been presented in I.3 and XIV.4 of the *MMK*.
58. *See* David J. Kalupahana, *MMK of Nāgārjuna*, Delhi: 1991, p. 17.
59. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I.202 ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter, London: 1890-1911.

not find more support on this topic in Mādhyamika system. Later *vijñānavadi* scholars like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti took up this task to provide a sound logical-philosophical base to the theory of meaning (*apoha*) taking into account the major Buddhist theoretical premises. Their discussion is not only coherent with the Buddhist philosophical discussions but also it is relevant to our own modern linguistic-philosophical debates. Even today, it is not difficult to maintain that their discussion are no less consistent, systematised, logical and insightful than the intellectual discussions of our own century on this topic.

The exposition of Buddhist theory of meaning constitutes the subject-matter of the next chapter. To conclude, we present here a resumé of our discussion and other relevant information regarding these four major Buddhist philosophical systems in the form of a table. (see table 4 on page nos. 82-85)

Table 4
Assumptions of Buddhist Philosophical Systems

Schools/ Systems	Philosophy	The founder and other prominent philosophers	Major Texts	Theoretical Assumptions
Mādhyamika	Śūnyavāda	Nāgārjuna (2nd c.)	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* *Vigrahavyāvrttanī*	An object is devoid of its nature, refutation of *citta* and *bhūta* both. Mahāyāna Sect, originated from the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, conception of *śūnya* that is ultimate Real and cannot be manifested.
		Āryadeva (3rd c.)		
		Bhavya		Verb root $\sqrt{}$*śu* = two meanings:
		Buddhapālita (5th c.)		(i) to swell — empty =⟩ all objects are devod of their self - nature.
		Candrakīrti (6th c.)		

		Śāntarakṣita (died in AD 762)	*Tattvasaṁgraha*	(ii) to be swollen—full =) the Reality is non-manifest.
		Kamalaśīla	*Pañjikā*	*śūnya* = *pārmārthika*/absolute truth. However, close to the Vedāntic concept of *Brahman*. *Śūnya* — a very powerful concept where both positive as well as negative significations originate or merge.
		Maitreyanātha	*Mahāsūtrālaṁkāra Kārikā* *Abhisamayālam-kārakārika*	Mahāyāna sect. *Citta* = *mana* = *vijñapti* = *jīva* = *vijñāna* = in real *citta* itself takes various forms that are called cognition/knowledge.
Yogācāra	Vijñanavāda	Asaṅga (4th.c. AD)	*Yogācārabhūmi* *Māhāyāna Sūtrālaṅ-kāra* *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (compiled before AD 443)	Pure Idealism/Conceptualism; a later development of Buddhist logic, the object as it appears is unreal; even subject-object duality is refuted (*advaya-vāda* = non-dualism) *vijñāna* is creative and its

		Vasubandhu (4th c. AD)	*Sutralankara* (Commentary) *Vijñapatimātratā Siddhi*	creativity is governed by the illusory idea of the object, acceptance of three strata of consciousness, viz, *ālaya-vijñāna*, *kliṣṭa manovijñāna* and the *pravṛtti- vijñāna* for the idealistic explanation of the empirical world. *Vijñāna* is the ultimate reality, the essence of every object (*dharmānāṁ dharmatā*). Emergence of Buddhist logic.
		Diṅnāga (AD 345-425)	*Pramāṇasamucaya* *Pramāṇa Samuccaya Vṛtti* *Nyāya Pravesa*	
		Dharmakīrti (AD 550)	*Pramāṇavārttika* *Nyāya Bindu*	
		Candragomin (6th c. AD)		
Sautrāntika	Bāhyarthānumeyavāda	Kumarlāta (2nd c. AD)	*Kalpanāmaṇdaṭikā* *Dṛṣṭānta Paṅkti*	Hīnayāna Sect, Inferential external Reality. *Sutta Piṭaka*; it maintains the distinction between the knower and object of knowledge; *Citta* is real and the empirical world is known by means of inference;
		Śrilābha	*Sautrāntika Vibhāṣā*	
		Yaśomitra	*Sphuṭārtha*	

				debate over the form of an object (see the glossary of Sanskrit terms); only present time is real. Acceptance of both — *bhūta* and *citta*.
Vaibhāṣika	Sarvāstivāda	Saṅghbhadra	*Abhidharma Nyāyānusara*	Hīnayāna Sect; Acceptance of both mind and matter. *Abhidharma* — the source text. Classification of *dharma* the basic elements (total 75) in terms of *skandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*. *Dharma* are born of causes and are subject of cessation.
			Abhidharma Samaya Dīpikā	
		Vasubandhu (Second Buddha) (280-360 AD)	*Abhidharma Kosa* (*Bhāṣya*) *Vādavidhi*	

3

Buddhist Theory of Meaning (*Apohavāda*)

pramānabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe pranamya śāstre
sugatāya tāyine ।
pramāna siddhayai svakr̥tprakīrnāt nibaddhyate
viprasr̥ṭam samuccaritaṁ ॥
— *Pramāṇa Samuccaya*, I.1[1]

vidhūtakalpānājāla gambhīrodāramūrtaya ।
namaḥ samantabhadrāya samantaspharanatvise ॥
— *Pramāna Vārttika*, I.1[2]

namaḥ Śri Lokanāthāya
— *Apohasiddhiḥ*[3]

FROM our discussions so far some crucial notions of linguistic sign in Buddhist schools of thought have emerged. We may summarise them as

(i) a linguistic sign does not hold any direct and real relation with the object it refers to.

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1. *See* Masaki Hattori (tr.) *Dignāga, On Perception*, Cambridge: 1968, p. 23.
2. *PV Pramāṇa Siddhi*, I.1.
3. *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, ed. by Mm. Haraparsad Shastri, Calcutta: 1910, p. 1, reprint 1989.

(ii) a linguistic sign refers to a conceptual construct (*vikalpa*) of the object which exists— ontologically.

(iii) it is purely a subjective construction which varies from person to person.

(iv) it is differential in nature. It cannot express what a thing 'really' is but since that thing is mutually dependent on the other dependent things—it certainly refers to that relation by means of its differential nature, i.e., it can express what thing is not or that the thing is different from the things which are not compatible with it.

We may draw a parallel of the notions of linguistic sign as posited by three systems of thought in the tradition:

Schools	*Linguistic sign*
Grammarian's:	indirect, conceptual image, positive, real.
Buddhists	indirect, conceptual image, negative/ differential, unreal.
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	direct, ontological entity (not the conceptual image), positive, real.

The first two schools (Grammarians and Buddhists) are known as idealist systems of thought whereas Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has been designated as the realist system in the taxonomy of Indian philosophy. We have also discussed that these differences in their conceptions of a linguistic sign are the outcome of their specific philosophical standpoints. In the last chapter we have also stated that in the later phases of philosophical developments, especially with the emergence of Buddhist logic with its two great pioneer-philosophers Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, Buddhist theory of meaning acquired new dimensions, i.e., the dimensions of logic and epistemology and then it deserved to be called a full-fledged theory. The term *apoha* acquires a new meaning with these new postulates of logic and epistemology. *Apoha* is quite an antique term used often by Buddha in his own sermons where it signifies a logical method of exposition. Let us examine, first the etymological meaning of the term *apoha*.

According to the *Śabdakalpadruma*[4] and *Amarakośa* (*Rāmāśramī Ṭīkā*) *apoha* has been derived from the verb root *ūh*. In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, in the verb-root lexicon *ūh* has been classed under the set of *bhū* etc. (*bhvādi gaṇa*) which means to infer, to think logically, to reason etc. A negative prefix *apa* and the nominal suffix *ghañ* have been added to the verb root *ūh*. According to the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the following pertinent rules by means of their own potential (generative property) take part in the derivation process of the term *apoha*. We may illustrate them systematically as follows:

(i) Identifying the verb root *ūh* (from the verb lexicon attached to the main text of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) = *bhvādigaṇa* (1.679; 1.775)

(ii)	*bhāve ghañ*	(*P*. III.3.8)	
(iii)	*pratyaya*	(*P*. III.1.1)	= *ūh* + *ghañ*
(iv)	*paraśca*	(*P*. III.1.2)	
(v)	*halantyaṁ*	(*P*. I.3.3)	
(vi)	*tasya lopaḥ*	(*P*. I.3.9)	= *ūh* + *gha*
(vii)	*adarśanam lopaḥ*	(*P*. I.1.60)	
(viii)	*laśakvataddhite*	(*P*. I.3.8)	
(ix)	*tasya lopaḥ*	(*P*. I.3.9)	= *ūh* + *a* = *uha*
(x)	*adarśanaṁ lopaḥ*	(*P*. I.1.60)	
(xi)	*ādaguṇaḥ*	(*P*.VI.1.87) *apa* + *ūha* (*apa* is a negative prefix)	

= *apa* + *ūpa* (*a*+*ū*= *o*)= *apoha*

4. The complete entry in the *Śabdakalpadruma* reads:

apoha pu. (*apa* + *uh* + *bhāve ghañ*), *apagata uh; vitarkābhāvaḥ; suśrudyaṣṭādhyāyī guṇāntargata stha guṇaḥ; suśruṣa śravaṇaṁ caiva grahaṇaṁ dharaṇaṁ tathā; uhapoho artha vijñānaṁ tattva jñānaṁ ca dhīguṇaḥ* (according to Hemachandra = *iti* Hemachandra). *atadvyāvṛttiḥ; iti Kāvyaprakāśa Ṭīkāyāṁ Māheśvaraḥ* (according to the commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* by Māheśvara).

(xii) *kṛt taddhita samāsāsca* (P. I.2.46) = *apoha* (substantive).

According to the *Sanskrit-Hindi Kośa* compiled by Vaman Shivrama Apte, the term *apoha* is derived from the verb root *vah* which means 'to carry away', etc. Like the root *ūh* it is also used in both the voices (*ātmanepadī* and *prasmaipadī*). According to the *Kośa* when negative prefix *apa* and nominal suffix *ghañ* are attached with the root, the term *apoha* is formed and it also provides the same meaning as we get from the root *ūh*. But the problem is that of the derivation of the term from verb root *vah*. the Pāṇinian model does not allow such constructions. It may be possible that the term may be derived from the root *vah* in the grammatical tradition other than that of Pāṇini. Since this speculation is not much pertinent to our discussion, we shall stick to the morphological structure as it is given in the *Śabdakalpadruma* and *Amarakośa* because these two are the most authentic sources in language study in the Indian linguistic tradition.

Apoha literally means 'to exclude by means of logic or reasoning'.[5] But what to exclude? The explanation in the Buddhist tradition given is 'to exclude that which is not compatible or consistent to the context in discussion'.

Ratnakīrti in his *Apohasiddhi* makes an elaborate exposition of the term as how it is comprehended in general sense and what is its actual signification in Buddhist thought.[6] Ratnakīrti begins with the question, "what is meant by the term *apoha* (differentiation)".[7] He gives three possible interpretations of *apoha*:

(i) Etymologically it means *A* is differentiated from non-*A* or non-*A* from *A*.

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5. *tadvāna apoha vā śabdārtha, atadvyāvṛtti, tadbhinna vyāvṛtti.*
6. *Apoha* has been rendered in English as discrimination (John Brough) differentiation, (Dr. Dhirendra Sharma), negation (B.P. Bhattacharya) and exclusion (K. Kunjunni Raja).
7. *See* Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhiḥ;* (*AS*) tr. by Dr. D. Sharma in his *The Differential Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic,* Hague: Mouton, 1969, p. 49. *Also see Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, ed. by Mm. Haraprasad Shastri, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1989, p. 1.

(ii) When *B* is differentiated out from *A* then what is intended by a term is simply *A*; which stands for either the external object or the mental concept separated from (the class of) non-*A* or else.

(iii) 'Differentiation' is denial (and thus) is mere exclusion of non-*A*.

Ratnakīrti refutes these three interpretations of *apoha* on the ground that they only contain negative signification — but what is known by means of negation is ultimately a positive fact or an affirmation of some existence. He presents the same stock example as first given by Diṅnāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (2nd chapter):

"There is fire on the mountain" and states that the apprehension of this statement develops on the delineation of something in the affirmative form and not on a purely negative statement: "there is not non-fire. He also posits in consistence with the Buddhist thought that what is contrary to perception cannot be justified by some other means (such as an inferential argument)."[8] Ratnakīrti deviates to some extent from the traditional-Buddhist thought on the theory of meaning, which we shall examine after a few pages in this chapter. His new interpretation of *apoha* theory is known as 'specified *apoha* theory of meaning' and hence it also adds some new elements to it. It is better to examine *apoha* theory of meaning in the historical perspective of its development. We shall now present the main issues and assumptions related to this theory in the four primary source texts:

Author	*Text / Chapters*
Diṅnāga	*Pramāṇasamuccaya* chapter 2 *Svārthānumāna* chapter 5 *Apoha*
Dharmakīrti	*Pramāṇavārttika*

8. Ratnakīrti *AS*, tr. by D. Sharma, p. 49. The Buddhists hold that inference is primarily based on perception.

	chapter 1 *Pramāṇasiddhiḥ* chapter 2 *Pratyakṣaṁ* chapter 3 *Svārthānumāna*
Śāntarakṣita (also as Śāntirakṣita)	*Tattvasaṁgraha* Verses 867-1212 (Examination of Import of Words).
Ratnakīrti	*Apohasiddhiḥ* (complete text).

Before discussing these texts, there are some key concepts to be examined in Buddhist ontology and epistemology which serve as background to our discussion.

We know Buddhist epistemology begins with Diṅnāga. He has been regarded as the founder of logic in the medieval phase in Indian intellectual tradition. In Buddhist philosophy there are two kinds of truth or existence:[9] (i) phenomenal (*saṁvṛti*) (ii) transcendental (*paramārtha*). The phenomenal existence is true only pragmatically and it has been refuted from the point of view of transcendental truth. *Saṁvṛti* literally means that which conceals the real self (in the Mādhyamika thought the real is selflessness, *śūnya*. Self is imposed by our own intellect on the object which is born of ignorance). The phenomenal truth is born of causal conditions and hence, it is momentary and bound to decay.[10] *Paramārtha* alone is the reality. In Buddhist logic, the same ontological division has been presented as 'the thing-in-itself'/unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universal/general properties (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*). These are the two knowables in Buddhist thought. Similarly, in consistence with its ontological categories Buddhist philosophers have posited two valid means of acquiring knowledge, i.e., sensation

9. Nāgārjuna, *MMK*, XIV.8. It reads:
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā ।
lokasaṃvṛttisatyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthataḥ ॥

10. Kumārila has criticised this view of Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda. How a truth can be false? This division of truth is illogical. *tasmada yannasti nāstyeva yastvasti paramārthataḥ tatsatyamanyan mithyeti na sadvaya kalpanā* (*ŚV Nirālambanavāda,* 10). But Nāgārjuna is justified because his definition of two kinds of truth is based on 'relativity' and 'absolute' respectively.

or perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). The object of sensation or perception is the 'thing-in-itself' which is efficient to perform any significant act and which is momentary. A unique particular is positive, existent in the external world, not dependent on space and time, non-explicable in terms of quality or substance, knowable through indeterminate perception, free from the postulates of class, name, configuration, etc. The object of inference is universal or the general properties of an object.[11] In Buddhist system of thought universal has been defined as that which is differential in nature (*atadvyāvṛtti* form of the real object), knowable through verbal or inferential sign, conceptual form of the object, non-existent in the external world, dependent on space and time; associated with quality, generic configuration/form, name and class. It is also important to note that word as a linguistic sign is not different from the inferential sign in Buddhist epistemology. Both linguistic as well as inferential signs (*liṅga* = *hetu* = 'smoke' for the cognition of 'fire') capture only the general properties of the object. This is the reason why Buddhist logicians include verbal testimony and analogy both in inference. The Sanskrit word *anumāna* for inference has two distinct meanings: (a) the process of inferring, and (b) the cognition that results from this process.[12] Similarly *pramāṇa* is also taken to refer both to the process of cognising and to the resulting cognition.

The Buddhist philosophers refute the Nyāya classification of perception as determinate (*savikalpa*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). In their epistemological framework only indeterminate perception has been accepted because its knowable object is unique particular. In the terminology of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda system

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11. In the second chapter we have indicated the unique positions of two *vijñānavādī* philosophers — Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti whose views on knowables (*prameya*) and means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) we are presenting here. They accept the existence of external reality which is known by means of sensation. This view differs from the basic thesis of Vijñānavāda.
12. Diṅnāga, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*) II.1 (*svārthānumāna*) tr. by Richard P. Hayes, London: 1987, pp. 231-2.

this indeterminate perception is known as *vijñāna* (pure sensation without any intellectual postulates) and determinate perception is called *samjñā* (ideas) which refers to the second stage of the process of cognition where an object is associated with properties of universal. This universal is the main object of the linguistic or inferential sign. Dharmakīrti explains the four types of sensation (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*); these are (i) sense perception (*indriyapratyakṣa*), (ii) mental perception (*mānas pratyakṣa*), (iii) self-perception, and (iv) intuitive perception.[13] We discuss here only the just two types of perception and then we shall be able to show how these two types lead to the determinate cognition of the object.

Sense perception means direct knowledge, as contrasted with indirect knowledge or knowledge through concepts.[14] It is evidently nothing more than the element of attention following upon the moment when the incoming stimulus has affected the sense-faculty. The sense faculty has been designated as substratum of cognition (*ālambana pratyaya*). We have already discussed six faculties and its resulting six corresponding cognitions in the classification of *dharma* in the last chapter.

Mental perception refers to the presence of mind behind the senses. Mind grasps all these impressions of senses and constitutes experiences. There is another entity between the senses and mind. This is the reason why the Buddhists call mind as *samantara pratyaya* (literally the immediate cause of cognition). Mental perception refers to the second stage of cognition.

The third stage in the same direction leads to the domain of intellect and determinate knowledge of the object. We may present

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13. Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa Vārttikaṁ pratyakṣam* (sense-perception) from II.191-2, mental perception from II.39-48, self-perception from II.249-80, and intuitive perception from II.281-6. These four types of perception along with two types of inference have been discussed in the fourth chapter in the context of epistemological reading of 'Tintern Abbey'.

14. Prof. Stcherbatsky holds that all these four types of perception are in fact the types of intuition which seems incongruent with Dharmakīrti's discussion. *See Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, New York: 1962, p. 161.

these three successive stages of cognition as follows:

First moment of sense-object contact:
Sense perception (indeterminate).
Second moment of sense-object contact:
mental perception (indeterminate).
Third stage/moment and so forth:
determinate cognition of the object.[15]

This determinate cognition constitutes the main domain of inference. So it is obvious that there are two knowables (*prameya*), i.e., unique particular and universal; and there are also two corresponding means of knowledge, i.e., perception (indeterminate) and inference.

Another key concept is that of conceptual image *vikalpa*. *Vikalpa* is derived from *kr̥p* verb root (*vi* + *kr̥p* + *ghañ*) which means doubt, uncertainty but more appropriately it means 'option' or 'optionality'. In this sense it comes very close to sign (*liṅga* / *hetu*) or symbol. It is an option or alternative or sign/symbol that may be a pictorial representation, any culture-community's specific code or a linguistic/inferential sign. Buddhist scholars hold that this linguistic sign is a mental postulate only and comes in the domain of inference. They also maintain that this linguistic sign (*vikalpa*) is given (*siddha*) but certainly it is constructed conventionally in any historical/physical time.

The Buddhist philosophers do not accept universal (*sāmānya*) and class (*jāti*) and inherence (*samavāya*) as real categories — like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. They hold that the whole is not different from its parts which constitute it in the absolute sense. But certainly they rightly think that the whole is more than its parts because all its individual components contribute to frame out the whole and in this way whole performs more significant acts (*arthakriyā kārayitva*). To explicate this phenomena an analogy of yarn and cloth may be presented.

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15. For more details *see*, Dr. Srinivas Shastri's doctoral thesis *Vācaspati Miśra dvārā Bauddha Darśana Kā Vivecana*, Kurukshetra: 1968, pp. 125-9.

There is a striking similarity on this topic between Bhartṛhari and Diṅnāga. We shall discuss it in the context of sentential meaning. (See *PS* chapter 5.15) We may also present the relation between the whole and its constituent elements in the algebraic form:

$$a + b + c + \ldots n < X; \text{ and } a + b \neq b + a$$

This notion is important for us in the context of sentential meaning. Buddhists attach much value to the particular and they try to establish it as the real thing whereas universal is only a conceptual construct in this tradition. Here whole exists only in relation to its parts. Diṅnāga seems to take a very safe position in discussing the lexical and sentential meanings. He holds,

> Although the individual phonetic units have no meaning, each of these two words in a complex expression[16] do make their respective object known. Supposing you say the word does express something, even in this view what it makes known is a thing in isolation.[17]

We now first record the main issues and assumptions of Buddhist theory of meaning in the four source texts listed above.

Text : *Pramāṇa Samuccaya*[18] ([19]only first chapter available at Government Oriental Library, Mysore, 1990)

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16. Compound or sentence.
17. *PS*, V.16.
18. This seminal text of Indian epistemology only exists in fragments and in Tibetan translations which vary in many respects in their interpretation. The structure of the text has been presented on the basis of Pt. Rahul Sankrtyayana's *Buddha Darśana*, Allahabad: 1944.
19. Richard P. Hayes has translated chapter 2 and 5 from the Tibetan sources and he has relied much on the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi (also known as Jitendrabuddhi) along with his own commmentary which is very useful, though it bears some conceptual mistakes in one or two places. Here discussion is based mainly on this translation of the text.

	Contents	*number of verses*
1.	On Perception (*pratyakṣa*)	48
2.	On Reasoning (*svārthānumāna*)	51
3.	On Reasoning (*parārthānumāna*)	50
4.	On Analogy (*upamāna*)	21
5.	On Linguistic sign (*apoha*)	52
6.	On Universal/Class (*jāti*)	25
		247 verses

As the contents show chapters 2 and 5 are very pertinent to our discussion where Diṅnāga formulates and theorises the Buddhist notions of sign and its meaning.

Chapter 2. Inference for the self (*svārthānumāna*) Diṅnāga categorises inference as (i) for the self (*svārthānumāna*), and (ii) for others (*parārthānumāna*).[20] He defines inference for oneself as consisting in cognition of an object through a sign (*liṅga* / *hetu*)[21]. A sign refers to a property that serves as evidence for another property that shares the sign's locus.

Inference Differentiated from Perception (Pratyakṣa)

The two major means of knowledge are: perception[22] and inference. Th fields of these two means of knowledge are essentially different. Similarly, the natures of these two resulting cognitions are also different. Jinendrabuddhi explains[23] that sensation has external objects making up

20. Prof. Stcherbatsky translates *parārthārthānumāna* as 'syllogism'. *See BL*, Vol. 1, p. 275.
21. Dharmakīrti *PV svārthānumāna*, III.1
22. Diṅnāga defines perception as that which is free from mental constructs, class, universal, etc. The original verse reads, "*pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍhaṁ nāmajātyāsamyutaṃ PS*, I.3.
23. *See* Hayes translation of *PS*, p. 232.

its field of operation. Its cognitive images are vivid. The objects of inference are only concepts. So its cognitive images are subjective, differential and vague.

Unique particular is inexpressible. The objects grasped by inference differ which capture only the general properties and the name is not attributed to an object on the basis of its essential natures or properties.

In Diṅnāga's system inference refers to:

(a) the acquisition of new knowledge through reasoning (*svārthānumāna*).

(b) the communication of what one knows through syllogistic arguments (*parārthānumāna*).[24]

Sensation cannot be sub-divided, like inference, as (i) for the sake of oneself and (ii) for others.

Mind has two cognitive images of an object, i.e., unique particular and universal. These two are mutually exclusive to each other.[25]

So a particular sense-datum ('blue') is both 'an object of sensation' and 'object of thought/cognition by means of exclusion'.

It is by means of this universal cognitive image that a thing is expressible, and not by means of particular.

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24. *PS*, II.1.1 p. 232. Diṅnāga was first in the tradition to distinguish these two types of inference.

25. Hayes opines that what Dinnāga calls sensation (*pratyakṣa*) seems to comprise exactly the five types of external awareness (*see* his translation of *PS*, p. 234). It is a misleading observation. Even in the *Abhidharma* system mind has been included in the series of instruments of external awareness. Vijñānavāda makes this series more systematic including *kliṣṭa mana* also. The question is that how can we perceive any sense-datum without the intervention of mind?

An object cognised through a name is the cognitive/conceptual image of that object—which is certainly different from the 'unique particular' (*svalakṣaṇa*).[26]

In the final analysis scripture is no different in principle from inference. Scriptural evidences are constituted by means of inference.[27]

The statements of credible persons are also inference insofar as they have the common character of not being false. But we cannot go to that extent saying that whatever is in scripture must be true. Diṅnāga holds that not all scripture is to be regarded as a source of knowledge simply by virtue of its being scripture. A scripture can be regarded as authoritative only insofar as what it says is true which is determined or evidenced by our own experience and reason.[28] So scripture should be examined for its validity on two standards — experience and reason.

The Three Characteristics of Valid Evidence

A sign (inferential) is present in the inferrable object and what is similar to it and absent in their absence (more discussion in the fourth chapter of *PS parārthānumāna* which we have excluded from our present discussion because of its orientations completely in logic). The sign, whether inferential or linguistic, and the person who is aware of it together constitute the sufficient condition for the awareness

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26. Hayes suggests that the phrase 'by rejecting what is not blue' indicates the other cognitive image — 'by excluding non-blue' from the object . . . those who are expressing it in language are thinking about". *Ibid.*, p. 234.
27. In the first verse of *PS*, Diṅnāga has address Lord Buddha as '*Pramāṇabhūta* who in himself is the valid means of cognition.'
28. Dharmakīrti *PV*, *Pramāṇasiddhi* (I.3) *pramāṇaṁ avisaṁvādī jñānaṁ*' a valid means of knowledge is that which does not go against the common experience.

of the sign.[29]

Substratum as the Subject of Inference

Dinnāga suggests that through the inferential sign 'smoke' — we may infer 'fire' but we cannot infer its locus also because these two, the inferential sign and its locus, do not occur in relation.

On Limited and Erratic Properties

An object may have many properties all of which cannot be manifested through an inferential sign.[30] By a process of eliminating others, the sign makes known those which are in a relation (*anubandha*). This relation is that of difference. For example, the cognition of fire is in accordance with things that are being related to it and can exclude only what is not fire. One does not observe them all in fire's absence, but one becomes aware of (some of them) in things other than fire.[31]

Since the sign makes the inferred property known generally by exclusion of non-fire we know fire by means of its general properties (universal). We become aware of its general form, but not of the particular form.

We cannot confirm a universal because neither it is observed in the substratum nor outside of it.

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29. Hayes notes, "It is noteworthy that in the discussion of matters of logic and epistemology in classical Indian philosophy, psychological issues are never far in background and are often brought into the foreground for especial attention." West has a tendency to avoid 'psychologism' in the intellectual debates. *Ibid.*, p. 240.

30. *See* Kapil Kapoor, "The Concept of *Padārtha* in Philosophy and Language" *The 200 Years William Jones Memorial Volume*, Pune, 1997.

31. Cf. Bhartṛhari, *VP*, II.122.

Non-symmetry of Limitation and Permeation

A sign is not interchangeable with the sign-bearer, as 'smoke' and 'fire' cannot be identical. Diṅnāga states: Although the relation of the co-existing sign and sign bearer is located in both of them, it occurs in the manner of a content to its container rather than in manner of things in contact.[32]

In this chapter Diṅnāga completes the theoretical background for the Vth chapter where he discusses the theory of meaning. He claims that in principle there is no distinction between an inferential sign and a linguistic sign. An inferential sign has its access only to the general properties of the object: similarly a linguistic sign also expresses the universal of that object (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*). Diṅnāga feels some fundamental problems in accepting a universal as a real (*paramārtha*) category as it is held by the Grammarian's and Naiyāyika's schools. They say the universal inheres in all of its particulars by means of which they form a class. Diṅnāga states that universal is neither observed in its substratum in which it is said to be inherent nor it exists outside the substratum. So it is nothing more than mental postulate which is the functioning domain of inference. An inferential sign cannot express the unique particular (in case of fire, through the sign 'smoke' we cannot infer the temperature, light, etc., exactly in different successive moments) which only exists in particular point of time. In the same way a linguistic sign is also incompetent to grasp this unique particular. Moreover, an inferential sign expresses its object by means of difference. When we see 'smoke' we get the cognition of common properties of fire through exclusion of what is not fire. A linguistic sign also functions like this. In fact, a universal, in the system of Diṅnāga is always posited by means of difference or exclusion of those elements which are not contextually compatible. As an inferential sign constitutes the cognition of the universal of any

32. Hayes quotes the original Sanskrit verse vide Katura:
sambandho yadyapi dviṣṭaḥ sahabhūliṅgaliṅginoḥ ।
ādhārādheyavad vṛttis tasya saṁyogivan na tu — see Hayes, *ibid.*, p. 251.

object, a linguistic sign is also equally efficient for cognition of universal. The differences between these two are:

(a) They choose two different media for expression. In case of inferential sign, as smoke, it is primarily an object of sense perception which in the second phase results in the cognition of fire through inference or mental function.

In case of a linguistic sign which is conventionally constructed (but given or *nitya*) it is primarily a mental perception which constitutes the ideal image of the object.

(b) An inferential sign is constituted of its three elements (*pakṣadharmatā*, *avinābhāva*, *hetu*) whereas in the case of linguistic sign no such components are involved.

One of the most important aspects of these two kinds of sign is that they both involve the constitution of cognition. We may posit here that the Buddhist theory of meaning (*apoha*) is basically a theory of knowledge. In fact it has been rightly argued that every theory of meaning is also a theory of cognition.

One more important observation of Diṅnāga is that all the inferences do not have their field of operation as universal. Somewhere it is specific or particular also. For example, we may refer to Wordsworth's *Tintern Abbey* where the 'smoke' (as *hetu* or *liṅga*) leads him to recall and infer Hermit. (See the poem in the fourth chapter of this work, lines. 14-22). Lastly, we present the discussion so far in the following way:

Ontology (*sattā*)	Knowable (*prameya*)	Epistemolgy (*pramāṇa*)	Field of operation (*kārya kṣetra*)
(i) Transcendental (*paramārtha*)	(i) Unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*)	(i) Sensation perception (*pratyakṣa*)	(i) momentary particular (inexpressible)
(ii) Phenomena (*saṁvṛti*)	(ii) Universal (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*)	(ii) Inference (*anumāna*)	(ii) static universal (expressible)

Chapter 5: *On Linguistic Sign* (*Apoha*)

Kārika 1-13 nature of knowledge yielded by linguistic sign and content and nature of this cognition.

14-16 How the linguistic symbols that express difference or exclusion combine to form a larger unit of expression (like compounds and sentence) and how the components of the expressions are related to themselves and to the larger linguistic organisation.

17-20 The relations among components in a complex state of affairs combine individuals and their properties. Diṅnāga deals with 'the relations between symbol complexes and property complexes. He refutes universal (*sāmānya*) and qualities (*guṇa*) as realities that have 'a relation to individual and that relation exists outside the mind as a fact to be discovered by awareness' (rejection of these elements as presented in the Sāṁkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of thought). (The text is discontinuous in this translation by Hayes).

25-36 Discussion on a very conspicuous issue as to what exactly it is that an application of a given term to a subject of discourse excludes. This in turn leads to a discussion of the metaphysical basis underlying the contrarity of terms and of propositions.

(*Again the text is discontinuous. Originally this chapter is supposed to contain 52 verses).

This chapter, as it is obvious from the main issues and assumptions presented above, provides logical-philosophical background to 'the theory of contextual exclusion'. The theory explicates the content and nature of verbal import or the meaning of a word. Diṅnāga succeeded in establishing that the content of verbal import is universal and its nature is that of difference. Universal cannot be posited by means other than differentiation or exclusion.

In the very opening verse of this chapter Diṅnāga states that

verbal communication is no different from inference as a means of acquiring knowledge. For it names its object in a way similar to the property of having been produced, by precluding what is incompatible.[33]

Diṅnāga correlates the linguistic meaning with inference for one's self (*svārthānumāna*) which signifies that the theory of *apoha* is also a valid means of acquiring knowledge for the self. For cognition comes in the domain of mind (*mānasa vyāpāra*) which performs two functions simultaneously — to identify the object by means of pure sensation and as a next subsequent phase to establish its distinctness by means of differentiation. When we know a thing, we simply know how it is different from the other entities in terms of its general qualities, shapes, substances, etc. Language as a means of knowledge also serves this purpose. In the process of 'languaging' we construct a conceptual form of the object which posits only the universal and this universal is achieved through various hierarchies/levels of differentiation or exclusion. We have already discussed that language creates difference (*bheda*) in the continuous and discrete reality. This difference leaves out unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) because it has no potential to express it. This difference is our conceptual construct that we impose on objects which ontologically exist. Diṅnāga also establishes that sensation (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) are mutually exclusive which means their respective fields of operation are different and they do not interfere into each other's domains. These two means of knowledge are also exhaustive and there is no means of knowledge other than these two.

Diṅnāga refutes the views that verbal testimony is a valid means of knowledge as advocated by Kapila and Bhartṛhari[34] on two grounds:[35] (i) Something mentioned in scripture, such as

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33. The original Sanskrit verse reads,
ná pramāṇātaraṁ śabdaṁ anumānāt tathā hi tat
kṛtakatvāt svārthaṁ anyāpohena bhāsate

34. Bhartṛhari, *VP*, I.30.

35. Hayes, (tr.) *PS*, V.1, p. 253.

heaven and primordial matter (*prakṛti*) are utterly unknowable and belief in them is not knowledge at all and hence we cannot include scriptural authority as a valid means of knowledge. (ii) Something mentioned in scriptures is unknowable, but our knowledge of that turns out to be justified by ordinary sense of experience or inferences that rest in the final analysis on sense experience.[36]

Diṅnāga holds that linguistic signs are one of the types of evidence and what we learn through a verbal expression is of the same nature as what one learns through the inferential process.[37]

Diṅnāga reflects upon the limitations of linguistic expression,

> A general term does not express particular (*bheda*) because they are limited in number, because it is errant, nor the relation nor the universal itself, because it is heard without a difference with words referring to particulars.[38]

Śāntarakṣita also supports Diṅnāga's claim that a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*, *vyakti*, *bheda*) cannot be cognised through verbal symbol. A verbal symbol is a type of inferential sign. Like an inferential sign which reveals its object if the object revealed by it is present on every occasion in which a sign is present (*pakṣadharmatā*); a verbal symbol also expresses an object only if the object expressed by it is present in the mind of the speaker each time the verbal symbol is used correctly, i.e., whenever it is justified (*āpta*) by linguistic convention (*saṁketa*) and common usages (*loka*

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36. It is important to know that Dharmakīrti differs from Diṅnāga on this issue and take a similar position as that of Kapila and Bhartṛhari. For him the basis of trustworthiness of the Buddhist scriptures is that they are confirmed by reason and experience in all the areas. *See* Hayes, *Ibid.*, p. 253.

37. Again Kamalaśīla differs from Diṅnāga's view. He states the meaning of verbal expression is understood due to both the causal relation between the sentence and the speaker's intention. *See TSP* on 539-40.

38. The Sanskrit verse reads,
na jātiśabdo bhedānāṁ anātmyavyabhi caratah ।
vācako yogajātuorvā bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ ।।

vyavahāra).[39] Śāntarakṣita clearly states that

> particular is not made known through verbal symbols, because it lacks pervasion (*vyāpti*). Again, particulars do not include one another because they are mutually distinct in time, place, potentiality etc.[40]

On the question of relation which holds between the words and the things symbolised by them Diṅnāga is very close to Bhartṛhari's view on the same topic.[41] Bhartṛhari posits three views regarding the relation:

(a) that the relation between the expression and expressed is fixed,[42]

(b) that the principal information that an expression conveys is of its own form, and

(c) that a relation is essentially inexpressible.

Diṅnāga rejects the first view because any concept of permanence goes against the basic premises of Buddhist philosophy.

Diṅnāga does not say anything clearly regarding the second view of Bhartṛhari that an expression makes its own form directly known.[43]

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39. *See* Hayes, *Ibid*., p. 256. Hayes quotes from *TS* and *TSP* verses (871-3), 'To state the matter in the terminology of logicians, there must be a pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the occasions of verbal symbol's correct usages (*saṁketavyavahārakāla*) by the thing expressed by verbal symbol, just as in the inference of one property by means of another property there must be a pervasion of the indicator property by the property indicated.
40. Śāntarakṣita, *TS*, verses 871-3.
41. *See* Bhartṛhari, *VP sambandhasamuddeśa.*
42. *See also VP*, I.23 — *nityāh śabdārtha sambandha.*
43. Dharmakīrti seems to comment upon Diṅnāga's view on this second option: "Language is a source of knowledge concerning the object that, being a content of speaker's intention, appears in his mind. But language is not necessarily connected to a real state of affairs." — *PV*, I.4, see also Hayes *ibid*., p. 260 on *PS*, V.3.

Regarding the third point that the relation between word and its meaning is inexpressible, Diṅnāga is in full agreement with Bhartṛhari.

Diṅnāga examines this relation and establishes that it is not instantiation,[44] because (a) it is grammatically subordinate, (b) applied figuratively, (c) it is not the case of analogy since there is a difference in the form of an idea (as in the metonymical application of 'king' to a servant.[45]

According to Diṅnāga two things can be said to resemble each other if they either have a similar quality or if they each seem to have a similar quality. The stock example of two things appearing to have similar qualities is the notion that arises when a crystal reflects the colour of an object placed near it.[46] Diṅnāga rejects this opinion also that in the figurative expression there is a case of transference of a set of universals because at the level of universal two objects (as in simile or metaphor) acquire the nature of instantiation (*tadvat*). Diṅnāga objects because there is a difference in the form of the idea. 'King' and 'servant' cannot be said to be identical though they possess the same quality or universal. He holds that a particular can only be named by a generic term, and this generic term must refer primarily to the genus (pitcher-hood) and secondarily to the individual jugs. In other words, Diṅnāga seems to reiterate his theory that the verbal comprehension leads to the universal of that object.

Diṅnāga extends the domain of 'exclusion' (*apoha*) from lexical meaning to the meaning of complex expressions like compounds and sentences. In the stock example, 'blue lotus', a word that names a property excludes those objects that lack that property, i.e., 'blue' excludes all those objects which are 'non-blue'; and so it divides the universe into the class of things to which the word is applicable and the class of thing to which the word is not applicable. If the two

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44. Hayes's translation of the Sanskrit term *tadvat*.
45. *PS*, V.4.
46. *See* Nāgārjuna, *MMK* XIV *Sansarga parīkṣā*.

words are combined to form a larger unit of expression then each of them excludes some of the items from other's domain. Thus the word 'blue' in the compound 'blue lotus' (*nīlotpala*) eliminates all those things to which the word 'blue' is not applicable, while the word 'lotus' eliminates from the extension of the word 'blue' all those blue things to which the word lotus is not applicable. In theory, any two words will remain in grammatical agreement (*samānādhikaraṇa*) unless their mutual exclusion forms a null set. The same view can be extended up to the levels of syntactic organisation where each word in the sentence mutually qualifies other by means of exclusion or difference. So in a sentence there is only difference. We may also apply the same notion and take the sentence as representative discourse or directly for a discourse analysis. Each discourse posits its own meaning or identity by means of exclusion/difference, i.e., by excluding or differentiating what is contextually incompatible.

In the first chapter we had argued that Buddhist theory of meaning is associated with the Gestalt view (*akhaṇḍapakṣa*). The notions established above clearly support our assumption. For more evidence we quote this verse (in translation) of Diṅnāga:

> Since the thing expressed is a complex entity, neither blue is in isolation nor a lotus in isolation is expressed. [The individual words] have no meaning, just as the individual phonetic components of a word have no meaning.[47]

In this verse Diṅnāga seems sharing the Grammarian's (Bhartṛhari) view that a sentence is basic semantic unit of language.[48] Diṅnāga's view on the relation of lexical and sentential meaning is really appreciable. He maintains that in a sentence words do not give up their own individual meanings.

Explaining the logical implication of *apoha* theory of meaning

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47. Diṅnāga, *PS*, V.15.

48. Hayes records, Diṅnāga at *Pramāṇa Samuccaya,* V.46-49 (not included in this translation and in his own commentary to 2:4d endorses this theory of Bhartṛhari. *See Ibid.*, p. 280.

Diṅnāga states that a term does not exclude terms of wider extension, terms of narrower extension or coexistensive terms, even if they differ from it.[49] Jinendrabuddhi elucidates because these terms are incompatible which is a prerequisite condition of exclusion.[50] For example, a synonymous term which is the same with respect to what it excludes is excluded. Similarly the exclusion of other objects that a wider term makes for its own members is not overruled by a narrower term. For example, 'tree' does not exclude *śiṁśapā* or *vice versa*. The exponent states that a wider term does not exclude its narrower terms because it creates an anticipation for them alone.[51]

Thus Diṅnāga expounds the theory of *apoha* in consistence with Buddhist epistemology, logic and ontology. One of the fundamental principles, i.e., cause-effect relationship, is also implicit here between the word and its meaning. We have already discussed that Bhartṛhari while formulating his own theory of meaning (*sphoṭa*) provides a base of causal relationship to the signifier and signified. Similarly in the Diṅnāga's school it is also maintained that an efficient sign (inferential, say 'smoke') is the cause of the cognition of the object (fire). Similarly a word, conventionally established, when properly articulated triggers the meaning/refers to the object. We have already discussed in detail the nature of this referentiality in the context of Buddhist thought.

Text : *Pramāṇa Vārttikaṁ*[52]

Contents	*Number of verses*
1. On the Validity of Epistemology (*Pramāṇa Siddhiḥ*)	287
2. Perception (*Pratyakṣaṁ*)	541

49. *PS*, *ibid.*, V.25.

50. *PS*, *Ibid.*, p. 288.

51. *PS*, *ibid.*, V.26.

52. Dharmakīrti *Pramāṇavārttikaṁ* (Vol. I & II) edited by Swami Yogindrananda (Varanasi: 1991); the *Pramāṇa-Vārttika of Ācārya Dharmakīrti*, (ed.) Ram Chandra Pandeya, Delhi: 1989.

3. Inference for self (*Svārthānumānaṁ*)	340
4. Inference for other/syllogism (*Parārthānumānaṁ*)	285
Total	1453 verses

Pramāṇa Vārttikaṁ[53] is a celebrated commentary on Diṅnāga's epistemological treatise *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. But it is more than a text-based commentary. Dharmakīrti on many issues differs from Diṅnāga and expounds his own views. For our present discussion the third chapter (*svārthānumāna*) is more important where he discusses the differential nature of linguistic sign. We shall also select some pertinent *kārikās* from the first two chapters of this significant work.

Dharmakīrti speculates on the very basic enquiry what is *pramāṇa*? He differs from the definition given in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system that states *pramāṇa* is valid means of cognition.[54] According to him *pramāṇa* is that cognition which does not go against the basic principles of causation and efficient action (*arthakriyā*).[55] That which goes against this basic principle amounts to be false or untrue.

Dharmakīrti expounds the same view as stated by Diṅnāga that meaning is a purely subjective and conceptual construct which is not related to the object in the external word. The speaker has the impressions of the object in his mind and he expresses that individual impression in language. Similarly the hearer also perceives the

53. Prof. Stcherbatsky in *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, p. 38, examines the order of chapters in *Pramāṇa Vārttika*. According to the Tibetan sources, the text has following ordering of contents:

1. *Svārthānumāna*, 2. *Pramāṇasiddhi*, 3. *Pratyakṣa*, 4. *Parārthānumana*. The author has an auto-commentary on the first chapter, i.e., *Svārthānumāna*. For our present discussion we follow the previous order which most of the Indian editions of the text follow. This order is also in accordance with the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

54. *See NS Bhāṣya*, on I.1-2.

55. *PV*, I.3.

conceptual image in his mind through the verbal expression. So both the speaker and the hearer deal with the conceptual images (*vikalpa*) which are devoid of any ontological content.[56] So words have no direct access to the external reality (*vāstavārtha*). The function of verbal import is simply to negate the counter-correlates of the object.

Dharmakīrti refutes the status of determinate perception as a valid means of knowledge because that is the awareness of awareness and hence is 'twice removed from the reality'. This kind of knowledge falls in the domain of inference where conceptual image is associated with name, universal, class and which excludes the conceptual images of those objects which are not pertinent to the context.

In his auto-commentary of *Pramāṇa Samuccaya*[57] Diṅnāga expounds two knowables and two means of knowledge. Dharmakīrti supports this view in full agreement.[58]

Dharmakīrti discusses the various aspects of counter-correlates (*anyāpoha*)[59] in the chapter on perception of *Pramāṇavārttika*. He maintains that there is no need to posit an imaginative category like class and put argument to establish it a real category. By means of exclusion of the counter-correlates, the word itself forms a class. Every word has this inherent potential to establish its own meaning by means of exclusion. There is no such generic form inherent in the counter-correlates (non-cow) but certainly there is a form in the cognition (*vijñāna*) of the entity which is constituted by the previous experiences and impressions of that object in mind. Taking the firm theoretical position in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda system, Dharmakīrti states that in the cognition of an object the meaning which appears to be existent in external reality is nothing but the form of our self

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56. *PV*, I.4. *see also TS*, verse 1002.
57. *Pramāṇa Samuccaya Vṛtti:*
    atra pramāṇaṁ dvidhineva kutaścet? avilakṣaṇaṁ prameyaṁ ।
    svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām bhinnalakṣaṇam prameyāntaraṁ nāsti.
    PSV, on I.2.
58. *PV*, II.1.
59. *PV*, II.163-73.

(*citta*) which is shaped by the previous impressions and cognitions.[60] This universal mental image (sign) appears as the object in our cognition.[61] The word refers to this counter-correlates (*anyāpoha*) which is inherent in all those entities which are not pertinent contextually. For example, the word cow refers to its counter-correlates which is non-cow. Now this notion of non-cow is identifiable in all those animals which are non-cow. It is important to note here that a word excludes its counter-correlates at two levels:

(a) at the level of genus or class.

— as *cow* excludes *non-cow* (horse, ox, buffalo, etc.)

(b) at the level of individual

— as cow_1 also excludes cow_2, cow_3, cow_4, . . . cow_n.

So whenever the word is uttered and heard that cognition/conceptual image seems to refer to the external reality.

Dharmakīrti explicates Diṅnāga's view that in the indeterminate perception, the cognition of name, class and universal does not emerge, so words are not functional at that level. Words function in exclusion of the counter-correlate only. Here we should not be mistaken that the meaning is a counter-correlate of the object. What Dharmakīrti is arguing for is the cognition of that positive entity which emerges with the exclusion of contextually incompatible objects. Meaning is nothing but cognition. There are various ways of constituting cognition. Verbal import is also one of these methods.[62]

In the chapter on Inference (*Svārthānumāna*) Dharmakīrti concretizes the theory of meaning. He states that by means of

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60. Swami Yogindrananda quotes verses from Pañcadaśī, a treatise in Advaita Vedānta where the same view has been explained. The same woman has two images — one physical and the other cognitive. Physically she is one but from the cognitive point of view she has several shapes and identities as daughter, mother, wife, etc. *See* Vol. 2 of *PV*, p. 639.

61. *anyāpoho vastubhūtaḥ*.

62. *PV*, II.173.

exclusion the word only indicates the difference between the two sets as

{cow}	=>	not {non-cow}
finite or single set		infinite

Words have potential only to explicate this difference. They do not posit any essential nature of the entity (*vastu-dharma*). Words are included in inference but this does not amount to expounding that a word is equal to inference. In that case words will become an independent means of acquiring knowledge. In fact, words in Buddhist thought are related only to inference for one's self. Hence in *apoha* the nature of signification through a word is not contradicted by any other means of knowledge.[63] *Apoha* refers to conceptual meaning (*bauddhārtha*) through which the contextual elimination takes place in the mind.[64] Words do not establish any positive and real entity in themselves.[65]

Dharmakīrti states that differences among the objects are posited on the basis of their respective substratum. In the cognition of 'tree' we also cognise what is non-tree and its absence. So an object contains two aspects of its identity — positive and negative. When we know an object we know what it is in itself and also what it is not. For instance, a tree is a positive entity as well as a negative one in the form of non-tree. Both the aspects are known in verbal comprehension. These two aspects are mutually exclusive and through difference they qualify each other and by this process the identity of an entity is established.[66]

With this exposition of *apoha* theory the phase of formulation is concluded. In the works of two other great philosophers

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63. *PV*, III.46.
64. *Ibid.*, III.88.
65. *Ibid.*, III. 91-2.
66. *PV*, III.113-4:
avr̥kṣāvyatirekeṇa vr̥kṣārthā grahaṇe dvayaṁ ।
anyonyāśrayāmityekagrahabhāve dvayagraha ॥

Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti, the theory has undergone some modifications. These later theoreticians were compelled to reinterpret *apoha* theory due to the sustained criticism by the schools of Mīmāṁsaka, Naiyāika and poeticians (*ālaṁkārika*).

Text : *Tattvasaṁgraha*[67]

Examination of Import of Words

Kārikā: 867 to 1212.

After examining the concepts like substance, quality, action, universal, ultimate individuality, inherence as accepted in the systems of Mīmāṁsaka, Vaiyākaraṇa and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Śāntarakṣita examines the import of words in the sixteenth chapter of his *magnum opus Tattvasaṁgraha.*

Continuing with the Buddhist theory of meaning and language Śāntarakṣita sets forth the arguments in support of the view that truth is amenable to words and what we designate as verbal cognition is nothing but only the super-imposition of mental construct on the object. Kamalaśīla comments:

> There is nothing real that is expressed by words, all verbal cognition is deviant because it proceeds by imposing non-difference upon things that are really different; in a case where there is indirect connection with an entity, there is some sort of agreement with the object, even though the cognition is really deviant.[68]

There is no real basis, in fact, for the expression of subjective consciousness or of mental images through language. The very essences of the objects are not really cognised in the linguistic expressions. Śāntarakṣita confines the domain of verbal import: "Specific individuality, universal, relation to universal, something endowed with the universal form of the cognition of the object —

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67. Ganganath Jha (ed.), *The Tattvasaṁgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla,* 2 Vols.

68. Kamalaśīla *Pañjikā* on 867-8 of *TS.*

none of these *really* find a place in the import of words."[69] However, there is no denial of the import of words but Śāntarakṣita critiques the illusory nature of verbal import. A unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is ultimately real cannot be denoted by words because it cannot be determined by the convention and usage which is a prerequisite for verbal cognition.

Śāntarakṣita exhaustively records the criticism against the *apoha* theory of meaning from the schools of poetics (Bhāmaha), Mīmāṁsā (Kumārila) and Nyāya (Uddyotakara) in more than hundred verses in his *Tattvasaṁgraha*. From the verse 1003-4 onwards he starts formulating and reinterpreting *apoha* theory. He states that these views (recorded in the earlier verses) are wrong, based upon ignorance of what is meant by the *apoha* — negation of the other things. He turns bitter towards his critics as he states, "people who are themselves damned damn others also".[70]

He establishes that *apoha* is of two kinds due to the difference between relative and absolute negation. Again the relative negation is also of two kinds due to the difference of conception of idea and object. We may present these types in this form:

Negation (*Apoha*)

- Relative (*paryudāsa*)
  - Negation of Ideal Universal/Conception (*buddhyātman*) (i)
  - Negation of Object (*arthātman*) (ii)
- Absolute (*prasajya pratiṣedha*) (iii)

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69. Śāntarakṣita, *TS*, 871.
70. *TS*, 1003-4.
The verse reads:
tathāhi dvividho phalāḥ paryudāsa niṣedhataḥ ।
dvividho paryudāsopi budhyātmarcātmabhedataḥ ।।

Absolute negation (*prasajya pratiṣedha*) is complete denial or prohibition.[71] In the relative negation the negative suffix which bears this meaning (as in *anātman*, the negative suffix is *ana*) posits two facts — that there is a negation of some positive/present entity and simultaneously it also states that instead of that entity which has been negated something is present. Consider a very technical term in Buddhist philosophy — *anātman*. It denies the existence of *ātman* on one hand and on the other it posits the existence of *dharma*.

The negation of ideal universal consists in the appearance of cognition of several things in one comprehensive form and negation of object consists as contradistinguished from unlike objects. This is the form of specific individuality. Śāntarakṣita continues to explain the relative negation in the form of ideal universal. He states that things which are distinct from each other only on the basis of single common property, constitute the basis of unitary conception. On the basis of such attribute/attributes there appears a *reflection* in the determinate cognition. This reflection is conceived of as 'object' even though the objective character is absent in it. He designates this conception of reflected image as *apoha*.[72] The reason to call it *apoha* is (i) because it appears as 'excluded' (distinguished) from other appearances, (ii) because it is the cause of the cognition of the thing as 'excluded' from the others, (iii) because it is cognised through an entity 'excluded' from other, and (iv) because it is apprehended in the form of the *specific individuality* consisting in the exclusion of unlike things.[73]

So it is to the specific individuality that the name *apoha* (exclusion of other heterogeneous things) is applicable in its primary sense.

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71. According to D.N. Shastri *prasajya pratiṣedha* means a negation of something positive and *parayudasa* is a special kind of negation. *See* his *Critique of Indian Realism*, Agra: 1964, p. 357. We cannot admit this interpretation of these two very crucial terms in our discussion because it seems rooted in Nyāya system.

72. *TS*, 1005-6.

73. *TS*, 1007-8.

Śāntarakṣita defines now what is the absolute negation. In the statement like 'cow' is not non-cow, there is absolute/complete negation of 'non-cow'.[74]

Hence there are three kinds of *apoha*:

(i) ideal: no external reality, subjective, discrete, and self-contained, negative implication; it functions/excludes at two levels — (i) at the level of class, cow and non-cow (horse, ox, etc.); (ii) at the level of individual which excludes cow_1 from cow_2, cow_3 . . . cow_n.

(ii) objective *apoha*: another name for the particular instance in question. That cognitive image which was that of the subjective nature now amounts to becoming objective (*arthātman*).

(iii) absolute *apoha*: attested by our own experience and introspection: this particular is 'not-non-cow' (= cow, and nothing else).

It seems these types of *apoha* constitute an integral hierarchy. These are the successive stages of the verbal cognition. Only first of these *apoha* (*buddhyātman*) is directly expressed by words and rest two of these function in complete integrity and harmony. Kamalaśīla's commentary upon the verse 1011 establishes that that which consists in the reflection of the object (*buddhyātman*) alone should be regarded as the denotation of words because it actually appears in the verbal cognition; and as a matter of fact there is no apprehension of 'absolute negation' nor that of the 'specific individuality' as there is in sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*). What actually appears from the verbal cognition is only a reflection of the external object and this is the denotation of words.[75]

The relation between denotative and denoted which subsists

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74. *TS*, 1010.

75. *TSP*, on 1011
tatrayaṁ prathamaḥ śabdairapoha pratipadyate bāhyārthādhyā-savasayena buddhena śabdāt samudbhavati.

between the word and its meaning is none other than the relation of cause and effect. This relationship has been categorically stated by Śāntarakṣita:

> When the cognition of the reflection in that form has resulted from the word, there has come about the relation of denoted and denotative in the form of cause and effect.[76]

As it is suggested earlier that the other two forms of *apoha* are also two successive stages of cognition. We can now present another structure of verbal cognition.[77]

apoha	types of linguistic denotation.
(i) ideal *apoha*	primary
(ii) objective *apoha*	secondary
(iii) absolute *apoha*	secondary

It is noteworthy that all these three stages constitute the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka jñāna*).

Kamalaśīla investigates how absolute negation is apprehended by implication (secondary denotation of a word). It is on the basis of the fact that the nature of the thing, the reflection of cow which is not the nature of other things, that this secondary denotation is apprehended.

In response to Uddyotakara's criticism that if *apoha* is not denoted by the word (*apoha*) then what can the word signify apart from what is denotable by it,[78] Śāntarakṣita explains:

> when the word brings about the exclusion of the other things, it is said to 'denote' its own meaning also and there is no incongruity in this thesis.[79]

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76. *TS*, 1012.
77. *See TS*, 1013-15.
78. Uddyotakara, *Nyāya Vārttika*, II.2.63, quoted by Kamalaśīla in *Pañjikā* on the verse 1016 of *TS*.
79. *TS*, 1016.

Śāntarakṣita expounds the same view as that of Diṅnāga on the content and nature of the verbal import. Like Diṅnāga he also holds that a word only makes an access to the reflection of the object in mind through exclusion and it does not touch either the shape or specific individuality of the object.[80]

To establish the seconday denotation by implication is a notion very much similar to postulation (*arthāpatti*) which is a valid means of knowledge in the epistemology of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta. 'Not eating at night' can have two resultants — one positive and the other negative. Similarly a word also has two kinds of fruits/meanings — one identifies the object (positive) and another excludes its counter-correlates (negative). Śāntarakṣita tends to establish that there is no affirmation without negation and *vice-versa*.[81]

Śāntarakṣita seems to take a different position from that of the revered Diṅnāga. Diṅnāga possibly does not provide any such indication that exclusion of the counter-correlates (negation/ *anyāpoha*) is achieved secondarily by means of implication.

The introduction of these notions like postulation, direct and indirect or primary or secondary signification do not harm the basic principle of *apoha* as expounded by the earlier philosophers. This extension and interpretation of the theory proceeds in the same direction as it was taken up by the earlier exponents. The contribution of Śāntarakṣita to the Buddhist theory can be realised in the fact that he saved the theory from falling in the vicious circle like cow means the exclusion of non-cow and *vice-versa*. With the introduction of two more types of *apoha* (objective and absolute) the theory has become competent for analysing the discourses constituted in language. Śāntarakṣita holds that the externality attributed to these exclusions is only assumed (imaginary), not real. In reality difference and non-difference subsists only in real things.[82]

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80. *TS*, vv.1017-19.
81. *TS*, 1020.
82. *TS*, 1047.

It is stated earlier that in Buddhist epistemology verbal testimony (cognition through word) is included under inference and the domain of inference is universal *sāmānya lakṣaṇa*[83] which deals with the phenomenal truth (*saṃvṛti satya*). In the same tradition of thought Śāntarakṣita states, "What differ among themselves are the conceptual contents (subjective, momentary) apprehending the said exclusion."[84] Examining the status of verbal testimony or cognition through words, Śāntarakṣita reveals, "Just as the man whose eye has been attacked by a disorder says to another like himself that 'there are two moons,'[85] so also is the verbal usage" and furthermore, all cognitions brought about by words are *ultimately* false.[86]

Text : *Apohasiddhi*[87] (tenth century)

Main Issues

- Determining the meaning of the term *apoha* (exclusion/ differentiation); three possible views. All these three views are refuted because they all contain only the negative signification. Stock example:

  'There is fire on the mountain' —>a positive fact.

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83. We must distinguish *sāmānya* from *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* in the context of *apoha* theory of meaning. This is the problem of translation that we render all these crucial terms *jāti*, *sāmānya lakṣaṇa*, *ākṛti* as universal. Buddhist scholars refute *sāmānya* as a real category as expounded by Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya schools of thought, but posit *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* which is in opposition to *svalakṣaṇa* in Buddhist ontology.
84. *TS*, 1048.
85. *TS*, 1212.
86. *TS*, 1211.
87. Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi* in
    (a) *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts* ed., by Haraprasad Shastri, Asiatic Society: Calcutta, 1910, reprint. 1989, pp. 1-19.
    (b) *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic* by Dhirendra Sharma, The Hague: Mouton, 1969, pp. 48-101.

This is not purely a negative statement:

'There is not non-fire.'

- Perception > inference. What is not confirmed by perception cannot be confirmed by inferential argument (or any/other means of knowledge). [This view is to be understood keeping in view the rich classification of perception by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti].[88]
- Arguments with realist school.
- Negation as class-character (like universal) and qualifier.
- Perception, too, is of the nature of *apoha*.
- Definition of *apoha*:

By the term 'Differentiation' what is intended is not merely a positive entity, not merely exclusion of non-*A*, but the meaning of a term is the positive thing qualified by the exclusion of the other.[89]

- Two conflicting interpretations of *apoha*: extreme views.
  (i) "Differentiation — a secondary meaning based on the force of the (primary affirmative) perception of cow."
  (ii) Positive entity — a secondary meaning based on the force of negation of the other (non-*A*, which is the primary meaning of the word).
- Refutation of Śāntarakṣita's View[90] : "No one apprehends a negative meaning, after having understood an affirmative meaning, by logical implication."
- The Realist's view (refuted) who holds, "Individuals belong

88. *PS*, I.5-7, *PV*, II.191-92, II.39-4.86.
89. *kintvanyāpoha viśiṣṭo vidhiḥ; śabdānāmarthāḥ*.
90. *See TS*, 911, 1020. *See also* K. Kunjunni Raja's article "The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians", reprinted from *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII part 3-4. p. 14. (The same article reproduced in *ITM*, See p. 90).

to universals and they are perceived (or approached) by judgmental construction of words. Individuals possess the class character of other things."[91]

- The Realists also hold that the universal is posited by differentiation.
- Sentential meaning is also that of the nature of difference where each and every word excludes its counter-correlates. Example:

  "This path leads to (the town) Śrughna."

- According to Buddhists, positive meaning (qualified by negation) posits two things: (a) an external object (*bāhyārtha*)—according to the logical synthesis (negatively) excluded from all other things. (b) an ideal image (*buddhyākāra*) — corresponding to the sense-stimulus.
- The unique particular or the thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) is not the object of verbal expression because verbal import is established on the dialectics of both affirmation and negation.
- Particular and universal are not mutually contradictory forms in one and the same entity. The distinctness of a thing is nothing else but its distinct self-character which is nothing other than the distinct reflection of the object in our mind.
- Refutation of the Realist's arguments for universal as real category because universal does not appear in a verbal cognition, nor does it arise in sense-perception (Realists regard the universal, *sāmānya*, as a perception reality); nor it can be established through inference. In fact, there is no need to bear the extra burden of universal.
- Kumārila's charges and observation regarding class (*jāti*), universal (*sāmānya*) and the need to add more means of

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91. *See AP*, tr. by D. Sharma, pp. 56-7.

knowledge (apart from perception or inference) refuted.

- The Realist's view that the rule of natural relation between substance and attribute holds in the same way as it is applied to the cause and effect (like fire and smoke) is rejected.
- The Realistic view of *Nyāya Bhūṣaṇa* (authored by Bhāsarvajña) is also denied.
- Verbal cognition has been explained in the form of syllogism.
- Acceptance of the pragmatic importance of verbal import: "What is affirmed and denied is only the *idea* of an external object. Otherwise no pragmatic purpose would possibly be served."
- Criticism of Dharmottara (a fellow Buddhist of Ratnakīrti) for advancing an argument like the realists that words refer to external reality.
- A positive statement comprises the particular qualified by the negation of the other (individuals) and discriminated from the class of dissimilar instances (non-*x*).
- This qualified positive entity alone is the direct meaning of the term 'Differentiation' (*apoha*).
- *Apoha* theory presented on the structure of syllogistic reasoning:

  (*Major premise*): Whatsoever is a denotative term implies the cognition of the mere positive thing *x*, differentiated form *non-x*.

  Example: 'There is water in this well.' That distinctly expresses the well, and thus differentiates it from old and dried wells and also from the waters in non-wells.

  Reason: The reason is identity: word and the referred object (as cow = cow animal in reality).

  Conclusion: Thus it is established that every denotative term denotes the positive thing qualified by the

discrimination of others in the judgmental conclusion.

- In this reasoning no fallacies of invalid reasoning (*asiddhiḥ*), incompatibility (*viruddhaḥ*), inconclusive (*anekāntika*) are applicable.
- The unique particular though not perceived through 'wordsign' is superimposed as the meaning of a word which is only fiction created by our mind.
- There is no other than the concomitant relation (existing between word and meaning).
- The view that a word denotes a mentally constructed relation of *x* and *non-x* is supported by three-fold reasoning:
  - (i) For, there can be no conditioning of the beginning and the end of the thing which is momentary and thus constantly in flux, for beginning and end are expressed by words only on the basis of our mental construction.
  - (ii) Neither a syllogistic conclusion nor the indirect expressive force (suggestion, pun, metaphors, etc.) of the word is possible (if the momentary external object is denoted).
  - (iii) If we accept the opponent's view that word denotes the momentary thing only at the present point of time, then there is also the difficulty that an imposed property shall not be denoted by a word at all.

Hence, the direct import of word is nothing other than differentiation (*apoha*).

- What is reflected in our mind through words (verbal cognition) is not the self-nature of the positive (momentary) thing.

The importance of Ratnakīrti's great philosophical treatise on *apoha* theory of meaning lies in these facts:

First, he eliminates much controversy regarding the actual signification of the term *apoha*. Like Śāntarakṣita he too admits

that meaning is neither purely positive nor negative. But he differs from Śāntarakṣita because he assigns secondary position to the negative content of verbal import. He asserts that there is no successive stage in the verbal comprehension. So it is baseless to argue that a word first expresses its positive meaning and then the negative meaning by means of logical implication. Ratnakīrti defines *apoha* as positive entity qualified by the exclusion of others which are contextually incompatible. Both positive and negative mutually qualify each other. Logically both positive and negative meanings are relative terms. When we say something about the former the latter is implied automatically. So there is no point in postulating a successive stage in verbal comprehension. Both of these meanings are mutually qualifying (exclusive) and exist in the same substratum simultaneously. The meaning of a word is conceptually[92] a distinctive concept which is actually an experiential content in terms of its distinction or negation of the other elements. Satkari Mukherjee explains that the word cow is conventionally affixed to the distinctive cow concept felt as divorced from non-cows.[93] The exclusion of counter-correlates (non-cow) and acceptance of cow as positive entity establishes the fact that even the negative aspect of verbal import refers to the existential phenomenon. With this interpretation Ratnakīrti provides a psychological/cognitive base to the theory of *apoha*.

Ratnakīrti successfully meets the criticism of *apoha* theory put forth by Kumārila, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Jayanta in his *Apohasiddhiḥ*. This constitutes a long and thoughtful tradition of debate in Indian philosophy. We shall examine the content and importance of this debate in a few pages hereafter.

Perhaps it would be too much to assert that under the constant

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92. Satkari Mukherjee provides a detailed account of Ratnakīrti's contribution to Buddhist theory of meaning in his celebrated work *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Delhi: 1975, pp. 125-39. Instead of the term conceptual he prefers psychological. However, there is no apparent distinction between these two.

93. S. Mukherjee, *BPUF*, p. 133.

attack from Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya schools of thought, later Buddhist philosophers — Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti — modified the theory in favour of the these two systems. In fact, these two scholars have reinterpreted the theory which was originally expounded by Diṅnāga and systematically developed by Dharmakīrti in order to respond to these criticisms and in this process they have never deviated from the basic theoretical assumptions of their predecessors. Kamalaśīla raised the doubt that if word had a positive meaning why did the author (Diṅnāga) deny this positive connotation in the *Hetumukha*?[94] Śāntarakṣita's response to the enquiry is that the master denied that word had not, from the logical standpoint, any reference to an objective reality, and not that he meant negation to be direct import."[95] In the later phases of development Buddhist logicians and philosophers have maintained this original point of departure (*prasthāna bindu*) that a word has no access to the ontological entities which is primarily and singularly an object of indeterminate perception (= sensation or *pratyakṣa*). The definition of *apoha* theory of meaning given by Śāntarakṣita is not incongruent with Diṅnāga's conception of linguistic sign. Dharmakīrti in his auto-commentary quotes the master:

> Differentiation is the meaning of the word. What is meant by this is not merely affirmative nor merely negative but an affirmation qualified by negation of its counter-correlates.[96]

So far as the concept of universal is concerned Buddhists make their own standpoint. Dharmakīrti clearly asserts:

> The universal by its very essence is the exclusion of the other.[97]

So Ratnakīriti's own modification of the theory (*viśiṣṭāpohavāda*) does not advance against any basic principle of Buddhist system of

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94. Quoted by S. Mukherjee, *BPUF*, p. 138.
95. *TS*, 1097.
96. Quoted by D. Sharma in his translation of *AS*, p. 52 — *śabdo, 'rthāntara-vyāvṛtti-viśiṣṭaneva bhāvanāheti.*
97. Dharmakīrti, *PV*, III.30 (*svārthānumāna*).

thought. His exposition of *apoha* theory is elaborate, critical and lucid.

We cannot ignore even the opponents' understanding and critical observation of *apoha* theory who helped to eliminate many misconceptions about this theory.We are indebted to the scholars from the other schools of thought for one more important reason. In their quotes we have many crucial statements of the Buddhist scholars which are now lost from the original source-text. Indian intellectual discourse is constituted on a dialectics of thought where the opponents' view is accorded prestige and presented faithfully. This is also a device to preserve the text in the tradition.

Though we cannot present here the whole tradition of debate between the Buddhists and other schools, we can very selectively take up objections to the theory of *apoha* and the rejoinders from the Buddhist scholars. This tradition of debate is summarised in the following pages.

Diṅnāga (fourth century) assimilates thoughts related to language and verbal comprehension in his tradition and provides the logical-epistemological base to it. He developed this approach and put it forward in the form of a full-fledged theory (*apoha*). The theory is taken note of by Bhāmaha (fifth century), one of the earliest poetician in Indian Literature, who criticised the theory of its negative content. Then comes Dharmakīrti (seventh century) who developed and systematised the *apoha* theory. After him the theory came for very radical criticism — first in the hands of Uddyotakara and then of Kumarilabhaṭṭa. Later Buddhist scholars, especially Śāntarakṣita gave a new orientation to the theory of *apoha*. This position was again criticised by two great Naiyāyikas, Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Ratnakīrti came after them and squarely defended the Buddhist's position by refuting the objections raised by these scholars. He also established the master's original ideas as sound and valid. Then comes another Naiyāyika Udayana who again criticised the reinterpreted theory of *apoha*. But from Buddhist's side we do not find much interest in his criticism. Buddhist have not even responded to the criticism against their theory of meaning advanced by Jaina scholars. Their criticism

is not even much substantial for our present discussion because these scholars do not come out of their own theoretical web to initiate a debate of universal nature.

We present this proliferous debate in the same order as stated above.

Bhāmaha: (Text: *Kāvyālaṁkāra* Chapter VI)

(i) If the term cow connotes nothing but the negation of opposite, a purely negative concept, then how do we account for the positive concept of cow. In this case we need to search for some other word which can communicate the positive idea of cow.[98]

(ii) The same word cannot connote two opposite meanings simultaneoulsy—one positive and the other negative.

(iii) The word primarily expresses its positive meaning and only after that we can exclude what are its counter-correlates. But when we know the positive import of the word as is real, then where does arise the need to negate its opposite?

In Bhāmaha's objections there is something what we comprehend about *apoha* in the very first stage. It is a very common understanding of this theory which is bound to result in such objections. Nevertheless, his criticism deserves to be taken note of because such understanding of this theory is shared by many people.

There is some fundamental misconception in Bhāmaha's comprehension of this theory. He has interpreted the phrase *anyāpohena* as mere negation and nothing else.[99] This is a misleading view and it has been countered by

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98. Śāntarakṣita records all the three verses of *KL* in his *TS*, vv. 912-14 in which Bhāmaha has criticised the theory.

99. *KL*, VI.16-19.

Śāntarakṣita[100] and Ratnakīrti.[101] The phrase used for differentiation by the Buddhist is *atadvyāvṛtti* that simply means 'negation of those elements or entities which are opposed to the positive entity which a word ultimately refers to'. Again positive and negative cognitions are not contradictory but complementary to each other. These two aspects of a single entity qualify each other by means of identification and differentiation. *Apoha* like any other theory of verbal import is a theory of cognition as Bhāmaha rightly thinks. It deals not only with cognition but also how this cognition is constituted. It is constituted by means of difference. So Buddhist's position is valid. But we must appreciate Ācārya Bhāmaha for one other reason and that is for this beautiful expression *arthajñānaphalā śabdā* (cognition is the fruit of words). This is perhaps the most beautiful expression in the history of poetics and linguistic thought. A theory of meaning does not involve anything more than cognition of the object or reality. This phrase contains a lot of poetic flavour and deep linguistic insight which signifies the greatness of Bhāmaha as a poetician.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa (Text Ślokavārttika/Section on Apohavāda)

Kumārila's critique of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* is more penetrating and exhaustive. His animadversions could be presented in brief.[102]

(i) Those who have admitted the universal 'negation of non-cow' as the import of words, have by the expression admitted the universal 'cow' as an entity.[103]

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100. *TS*, 912-14.

101. *AS*, *nasmabhirpohaśabdena vidhireva kevalobhipretaḥ nāpyanya vyāvṛttimātraṁ kintvayāpoha viśiṣṭovidhi śabdānamṛthā.*

102. *See also* Dr. Vijaya Rani's *Buddhist Philosophy as presented in Mīmāṁsā Śloka-Vārttika*, Kuruksetra: 1982, pp. 192-222.

103. Kumārilabhaṭṭa, *SV*, *apohavāda* 1.

Exponent's view: Kumārila belongs to the Mīmāṁsā school and his school of thought posits universal as the import of word (*jātivāda*). So he interprets the theory incorporating his own standpoint. Dharmakīrti expounds that the universal is in its very essence exclusion of the other.[104] In fact, what is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* in the Buddhist system is itself of universal nature but at the same time we must postulate two more notions to it — (i) it is a differential conceptual construct and (ii) it has no direct access to the ontological reality. We might hope that these two postulates cause much problems for Kumārila to include *anyāpoha* within the fold of Mīmāṁsā theory of meaning.

(ii) Insamuch as all 'inexistence' has been held to be of the nature of some other 'existence' — please say what that 'inexistence' is which is of the nature of the negation of the negation of the horse (and other non-cows).[105]

Exponent's view: The positive entity in requisition is nothing but the real, momentary and none other than the cow-individual in-itself — intended to be the connotation of the word cow.

(iii) But such a reply is inconsistent with the Buddhist theory of unique particular which is not contained in the verbal import. 'Hence the idea of the 'cow' must be based upon that from which something subsists in common in every single individual cow.'[106]

(iv) And if the import of words be assumed to be of the nature of mere negation, then it would only be another kind of 'void' spoken by the means of the negative word. In that void there would be no cognition and so it would be useless to posit *apoha* as the import of words.[107]

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104. Dharmakīrti, *PV*, II.30 (*pratyakṣaṁ*).
105. *SV*, *apohavādā*; also cited in *BV*, 916.
106. *SV*, *apohavādā*, 3 and 10.
107. *SV*, 919-20.

Exponent's view: The pure negative content of the word has been suggested from the logical point of view, . . . that word has no reference to objective reality.[108] The validity of verbal import has been accepted at the pragmatic level. In *apoha* no question of mere negation emerges since the master has suggested himself that the positive entity is qualified by the exclusion of the others.[109] So there is no point to argue for 'mere negation' and hence there is no fear for the emergence of any 'void' where linguistic expression has no significance.

We now put forth only the content of other objections postulated by Kumārila against this theory of meaning in the section of *apoha* in his *Ślokavārttika*:

(a) Every negation, at least, posits a positive entity cow => not non-cow => cow (a positive entity).

(b) The theory leads to absolute negativism and makes all activities utterly impossible.

(c) What would be the connotation of terms like 'existent' (*sat*) and knowable (*jñeya*)?

(d) Meaning of *apoha* is itself 'which is negated' [not non-*apoha*].

(e) It fails to explain the negative particles, prepositions and verbal form.

(f) In the absence of the corresponding external object there is intuition expressed by the sentence. Similar may be the case with what is expressed by the word also. Why should *apoha* be postulated at all?[110]

(g) Without positing universal we cannot explain the phenomenon of different individuals belonging to the

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108. *TS*, 1097.

109. *See AS* tr. by D. Sharma in his *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning and Logic*, Mouton, 1969, p. 52.

110. *TS*, 923 (*SV* 43 *apoha* section).

same class, such as black, white, brown cows.

Exponent's view: Every negation posits a positive entity in the form of ideas/image (*buddhyātman*). This is a subjective phenomenon achieved through the differentiation or through negating its counter-correlates. In the classification of *apoha* by Śāntarakṣita, the theory hardly leave any scope to posit absolute negativism but it certainly does not attach much validity to the linguistic discourse in terms of transcendental reality too. So far as the meanings of particles and adjectives are concerned, it has been clearly explained that these are mere abstractions/fictions created by the mind. Dharmakīrti clearly states, "The universal is in its very essence exclusion of others."[111] So a word forms a class not only on the basis of universal as it is held by orthodox systems but also by means of exclusion. We may explain the phenomenon of black, white and brown cow by not only positing a positive and real universal like 'cowness' but also in terms of negation. All these cows of different colours in one respect are the same that they all negate non-cow and hence form a homogeneous group or class. So far as the element of 'intuition' is concerned we may hold that even intuition is of differential nature. The intuition of one thing is naturally distinct from that of other things. So the postulation of *apoha* is justified.[112]

Uddyotakara (Text : *Nyāya Vārttikaṁ*)

(a) In the case of 'all', the theory utterly fails, because there is possibly nothing to be excluded. 'All' is 'not not-one' or 'not two', etc., because Buddhists themselves accept that whole (*samudāya*) is nothing but collection

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111. *PV*, II.30.

112. There is hardly any substance in Jayanta's remark, "Kumārilabhaṭṭa has brandished his sword of polemics with a view to demolishing the Buddhist position of negation of the opposite being the connotation of words." Quoted by B.P. Bhattacharya in *A Study in Language and Meaning*, p. 97.

of parts (*samudāyin*). If they negate parts, it would lead to the negation of whole. So 'all' becomes self-negatory in character.

(b) What is the nature of 'not non-cow'. If it is positive it is identical with the cow entity and if negative it is 'not cow' which is not true.

Exponent's view: Uddyotakara's own assumptions are based on wrong observations. Let us examine the nature of 'all' as a concept; it is not constituted of numericals like one, two, three or so forth. If we proceed in this direction, it will lead us to innumerability but even then we would not be able to say what is 'all' in positive terms. The question is not even that of *samudāya* and *samudāyin* but that of the negation of counter-correlates. And counter-corretate of 'all' is 'some', etc. which is definitely negated.

So far as the next objection is concerned the answer has already been given. Cow, individual, etc., is a positive concept qualified by negation of non-cow. So no logical problem emerges.

And lastly we must mention Vācaspati Miśra for his contribution to Buddhist studies is no less than that of any other Buddhist philosopher. We are really deeply indebted to his scholarship. He is possibly one of the best commentators on the seminal texts in India's intellectual tradition. He is the great preserver of these texts too because he quotes exhaustively with authenticity from the source text and examines the concept being free from his personal bias.[113]

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113. Prof. Stcherbatsky has recorded in full Vācaspati's accounts on Buddhist philosophy in his celebrated work, *Buddhist Logic* Vol. 2, Oriental Reprint, Delhi: 1984, we are here concerned with Vācaspati Miśra's literature on *apohavāda*. See *BL*, Vol. 2, 401-32.

Vācaspati Miśra (Text: *Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya Ṭīkā*)

At first we quote one complete verse ascribed to Diṅnāga from his *ṭikā* which is very crucial to understand the Master's theoretical position also:

vikalpāyonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdonayaḥ
kārya kāraṇatā teṣāṁarthāṁ śabdāḥ spṛśyantyapi [114]

"The cause of words is mental constructs (*vikalpa)* and mental constructs are based on words. Hence there is a cause-effect relationship between these two. Words do not even touch the ultimate reality."

To make a full exposition of *apoha* theory he quotes from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* the following verse:

tasyaṁ yadrūpamavibhati bāhyamekamivānyataḥ
vyāvṛttiṁiva nistattvaṁ parikṣābhaṅgabhavataḥ [115]

"That which appears as a definite form 'cow' is produced by the external object and conceptual construct in our intellect which is identical with the class cow and differential with the non-cow. This is not real at the transcendental level but after examining them we find nothing."

Vācaspati Miśra makes three remarkable observations regarding *apoha* theory:[116]

(a) It is both positive and negative.

(b) It posits similarity between unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa)* in form of negation of counter-correlates.

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114. Prof. Stcherbatsky has also quoted this verse but only the first line of it. See *BL,* Vol. 2. p. 405 fn. The full verse is quoted by Dr. Srinivas Shastri in his *Vācaspati Miśra dvārā Bauddha Darśana Kā Vivecana*, Kurukshetra: 1968, pp. 213 fn. 27.

115. *PV*, III.77.

116. *See* Dr. Srinivas Shastri, *ibid.,* pp. 220-2.

(c) It is experienced in the form of the negation of counter-correlates.

Ratnakīrti counters some of the criticisms raised by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Apohasiddhi*:[117]

(i) "Since the difference between the impercipient and the percipient is based on the difference between their respective causes, no (difficulty) of non-differentiation of apprehension of an object perceived through words and senses will arise?"

(ii) When a substance is qualified by an attribute and is grasped so, (then) this is not apprehended as being qualified by another attribute or universal. The substance is characterised by the attributes. But these two (attribute and substance) are separate entities.

Exponents' view: As regards the first argument the Buddhists think it unsatisfactory because indirect cognition is not produced from the direct objective stimulus. The ground for indirect perceptibility of *apoha* is its separate cause because *apoha* is a logical synthesis. This constitutes meaning which is not apprehended by sense-perception.

Regarding the second view the Buddhists rejoin that even this view is not sound. In the Buddhists view apprehension of different attributes is not taken into account. It is not even justified to posit a natural relation between substance and attribute in the same way as it is applicable in the case of fire and smoke.

Like *sphoṭa* theory of meaning, *apoha* also has an antique tradition in Indian linguistic thought. Prof. Kunjunni Raja[118] opines

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117. *See AS* translated by D. Sharma, *ibid.*, pp. 65, 75.

118. *See*, K. Kunjunni Raja "The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians" reprint from *Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII, part 3-4 (undated) pp. 185-7.

that the Buddhist theory of meaning has some similarity with the view of the great pre-Pāṇinian Grammarian, Vyāḍi. Vyāḍi also holds that the meaning of a sentence is not a conglomeration (*saṁgraha*) of word meanings but the mutual exclusion of these. But again his view on word meaning as particular (*dravya*) is close to the Grammarian's theory of meaning. However, it is difficult to substantiate that Vyāḍi's conception of sentential meaning represents the early stages of Buddhism. In the second chapter of this work, we have already established the various phases of the development of the concept of linguistic sign. It originated from the four major philosophical schools of Buddhism and then in the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti it acquires the status of a theory of meaning. The relevance of this theory in the Indian linguistic thought can be deduced from the fact that it involves a very rich and live debate of about one thousand years. The schools of Grammarians,[119] Mīmāṁsaka, Naiyāyika and Jaina have constantly commented upon this theory of meaning. The age of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti represents the second phase in the development of *apoha* theory of meaning. The third phase comes with Śāntarakṣita who not only classified the *apoha* but also provided psychological-cognitive dimensions to it in his interpretation of the theory. The fourth phase of development involves the work of Ratnakīrti who gives a new orientation to this theory and reinterprets it as 'positive qualified by negation'.

In the linguistic-philosophical debate of our century some aspects of Buddhist theory of meaning have been discussed in the West, though without due acknowledgement to these philosopher-logicians. This debate in the fields of linguistics, philosophy and lastly in literature started due to some subtle observations and powerful theories propounded by Ferdinand de Saussure who is known as the father of structuralism. Saussure advanced a competent linguistic theory which is similar to the Buddhists' analysis of language and meaning.[120] He asserts that in language

119. Bhartṛhari mentions this theory of meaning in the 3rd kāṇda of his *Vākyapadīya*.

120. *See Course*, pp. 167-75, quoted by K. Raja in his *ITM*, pp. 85-6.

there are only differences without positive terms. Meaning corresponds to the concept of that object whose content is differential without any positive fact. The words through the process of contextual exclusion signifies their meaning. In language words are mutually dependent on each other and through this dependence they acquire a distinct semantic value. So when the meaning of one term is changed the adjacent term undergoes modification. Saussure posits that the two aspects of linguistic sign — signifier and signified are negative only when they are taken in isolation but their combination posits a positive fact. In Saussurean discussion the following characteristics of linguistic sign emerge:[121]

A sign is:

> arbitrary, part of a conceptual system (language), differential in nature and a conceptual entity. No term/ word can communicate its meaning in isolation. What we know as colour blue is dependent on the various other colours from which it is different. So a sign has relational identity and this relation is certainly that of difference.

We quote from Saussure:

> . . . in all cases, then, we discover not *ideas* given in advance but values emanating from the system. When we say that these values correspond to concepts, it is understood that these concepts are purely differential, not positively defined by their content but negatively defined by their relation with the other terms of the system. The most precise characteristic is that they are what the others are not.[122]

Thus what we call identity is wholly a function of differences within the system. Saussure asserts, "there are only differences with no positive term":[123]

Such speculations in language and meaning is without any

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121. *See* Jonathan Culler, *Saussure*, London: 1985, pp. 24-5.
122. Quoted by Culler, *Saussure* p. 26. See also *Course*, p. 162.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 28, in *Course* p. 166.

antiquity. These ideas floated in the intellectual circle of West only with and after Saussure. Where was its origin? Where did he acquire all these novel conceptions from? Saussure was a scholar of Sanskrit.[124] What he says about the relational identity and differential nature of linguistic sign is almost reproduction of the expositions on these issues expounded by great Buddhist scholars like Nāgārjuna[125] and Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. Prof. J.R. Firth states, "It is just possible that he (de Saussure) had learned something of Indian philosophy."[126]

In the post-modern philosophy (post-structuralism) Jacques Derrida continues to argue in the same direction and has caused much trouble to the European intellect. His notion of difference/ différance again seems close to Nāgārjuna's philosophy. The basic theoretical inspiration for such theories, it seems, does not come from their own continent but from the Indian soil.

The problem posed by the two philosophers have caused much uneasiness in modern literary theories, too. Terry Eagleton aptly interrogates:

> But how far is one to press this process of difference? Where is one to stop? . . . Saussure's *langue* suggests a delimited structure of meaning; but where in language do you draw this line.[127]

It is difficult to answer such inevitable questions in the schools of structuralism and post-structuralism. It is even difficult to get any convincing and reasonable answer of the question, "why sign is differential in nature?" We have responded to this question in the Buddhist system of thought in the second chapter of this work.

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124. His doctoral thesis is entitled "*On the use of Genitive case in Sanskrit*".
125. *See MMK*, (Examination of Relation) XIV verses 5-8.
126. Prof. J.R. Firth, "Technique of semantics", *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1935, p. 63. Quoted in *ITM*, pp 86fn.
127. Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theories : An Introduction*, Oxford: 1983, p. 127.

Thus, a critical assessment of the theory reveals that the theory of *apoha* is as much pertinent to our age as it was in its own antiquities. Some scholars prefer to call it as Buddhist nominalism.[128] But it requires a very specific understanding of Buddhist's position regarding universals. Such conventionally established term might cause many serious consequences of misunderstanding of the Buddhist philosophical position.

The Buddhist theory of meaning is basically a theory of cognition. And with the strength of this notion we may develop a model for the analysis of literary discourse which is primarily a discourse constituted in language. Though Buddhist philosophy does not posit anything in terms of pure absolutism it allows a pluralistic approach to ontology.[129] In the next chapter we shall examine a literary composition (Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey') in the models suggested in Buddhism — such as the models of cognising self, epistemology and contextual elimination (*apoha*).These three models, though dealt with separately, present a 'trinity' (integral) at last.

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128. *See* Dravid Raja Ram, *The Problem of Universal in Indian Philosophy*, Delhi :1972, p. 264.

129. *BṛUp*, II.3.6 asserts *neti neti*. Pluralism is the essence of Indian intellectual thought. *Apoha* may be interpreted in terms of 'not this, not this' a process of constant deferring. It is also true that an absolute entity is always defined negatively — as *Brahman*. Buddhist theory is also consistent with Vedāntin's imposition-exclusion method (*adhyāropa-apavādavidhi* pl. *see* in glossary).

4

Meaning and Literary Analysis

An Example Study of 'Tintern Abbey'

POETRY involves two worlds of reality — internal and external. These two worlds are given (*nitya*) but they keep on evolving all the time. Every time the previous balance and harmony is given up and another equipoise (*ṛta*) is achieved. In the given worlds of reality nothing is discrete and nothing associated. Reality is continuous and integral like infinite waters of the ocean. Our intellect fashions out manifold forms out of it. An artist also attempts to carry out new sets of relations among the various entities with his own specific perception and formulates an approach to the world reality.

The external world is given but no cognition or experience of reality is possible unless there is an interaction with the inner world. On the dialectics of these two worlds all the cognitions and experiences are constituted and felt. Poetry becomes a complex entity when it involves the expression of the content of this dialectics.

Reality as it is in the external world and as it is perceived and interpreted in the inner world is something qualified and modified one. Something more is added to the complexity of the literary discourse when language becomes the medium of expression of these multi-layered qualified experiences. Now literary text becomes neither an objective nor a subjective, but a linguistic reality. The issues and assumptions of language are also pertinent to the literary composition and in its analysis a deeper linguistic insight and competent linguistic model is a prerequisite.

Every literary composition, as stated above, also constitutes some kinds of realisation or cognition of some aspects of reality. To know the text means to explicate its various layers of experience and cognition. Deconstruction of a text involves two things — first to know multi-layers of signification; and second to explicate how this signification has been constituted in the text. These two main objectives are implcit in our literary analysis and are directly related to the issues of language. Here language itself serves as an evidence to how the reality has been approached, experienced and structured in the literary discourse.

However, this does amount to ignoring the major concerns of literature. Literature has extra-linguistic domains where it critiques the socio-cultural norms and values of human civilization. A linguistic analysis of literary composition does not involve any strategy to dissociate literature from its most functional domains where it becomes the voice of the man and of his struggles against the atrocities at various levels. It also shapes the perception of people for a better world. If literature performs such great roles, as many literary critics assume it does, then it is much more required to know the text to its very roots. And for this purpose we have, possibly no other method other than linguistic.

First it is important to make our standpoint and perspective clear. When we talk of language in this context, we almost repudiate the maxim which asserts that language is a means of communication. To say this means to trivialise the great concerns of language. We have examined the nature and content of verbal import in the previous chapters which serves sufficient ground to reject this perception that language deserves only secondary treatment in literary analysis. Any literary discourse is primarily a linguistic enterprise and to ignore this very fact may cause anarchy in the textual analysis and interpretation. The modern literary theories like formalism, structuralism and deconstruction — they all have developed with this consciousness that a text cannot be reduced to the context which is defined and constructed by the socio-political and cultural bias of the particular 'class' of critics. Indian poeticians have realised the importance of language from the very

beginning and this was the reason why they developed their literary theories and analytical models with linguistic consciousness. The theory of suggestion (*dhvani*) expounded by Ānandavardhana in the eleventh century is an outstanding instance of this awareness. In the Indian tradition, literary theories and theories of meaning have been in constant interaction and in profound harmony.

We have argued that every theory of meaning is also a theory of cognition. The theories of meaning with their own strength allow us to develop a literary theory or analytical model based on them. Because all the literary theories and analytical models primarily involve the textual understanding and interpretation. Ācārya Bhāmaha, one of the oldest poeticians in the tradition, states, "Cognition is the fruit of words".[1] So we find some chords of association between meaning and literary analysis. This association leads to a more penetrating comprehension of literary composition and helps us experience the text at much deeper levels of consciousness. In this way also literature serves its greatest purpose. It binds us with the chords of humanity and harmonises our self. This bondage is the very emancipation in its essence. There is no greater quality of human being other than compassion (*karuṇā*) for all the beings of the world. Suffering is one of the first noble truths in the Buddhist doctrine. Wordsworth writes somewhere, "A deep distress has harmonised my soul."

This harmony is bound to result in *ānanda* which is the goal of both life and literary experience.

Considering the functions and approaches of theories of meaning and literary theories we may analyse a literary text at three levels:

(1) What is its cognitive structure and how has it been achieved?

(2) What instruments are involved in constituting this cognition in the text — both for the poet as his direct experience and for the reader through the language?

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1. Bhāmaha, *KL*, VI.18 — *arthajñāna phalāḥ śabdā.*

(3) How do we comprehend this cognition/meaning constituted in language?

The Buddhist theory of meaning remarkably concerns all these three aspects of literary analysis. In the previous chapters we have discussed about the rich classifications of basic elements (*dharma*), epistemology and verbal import (types of *apoha*). These all constitute a rich and competent model for literary analysis which is the main objective of this chapter. We have applied this to one of the most invaluable and widely read poems 'Tintern Abbey' of Wordsworth. The poem has been highly valued for its rich contents, " for loftiness of feelings and ideas which it conveys and for eloquence with which they are conveyed".[2] Our purpose in analysing this poem is two-fold. First we analyse this poem in the Buddhist theory of meaning with an expectation that we shall be able to posit some more layers of experience and signification which are yet unexplored or not much discussed and established. Second, this also provides the scope to assess the competence and limits of applicability of the analytical model based on Buddhist philosophical assumptions. This is an attempt to evaluate Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey' in the other tradition.[3]

A General Estimate of the Poem 'Tintern Abbey' (Date of Composition 13 July 1798):

Wordsworth himself writes about this poem, "No poem of mine was composed under circumstances more pleasant for me to

2. *See* Albert S. Gerard, "Exploring Tintern Abbey", in *Critics on Wordsworth*, ed. by Dr. Raymond Cowell, Delhi: 1994, reprint pp. 58-69.

3. Here we are presenting only the example study. For further analysis any poem by any poet can be taken. This is also like any other textual reading. The poet, Wordsworth, has been chosen again with a personal interest in his poetical works. The other important reason is that he comes very close to Indian literary norms and sensibility. His vision of the world and life is remarkably coherent with the Indian world-view. The element of 'pleasure' in his poetics is similar to Indian literary experience of *ānanda*.

remember than this."[4] The poem is not only remarkable in Wordsworth's own poetic career but also in the whole corpus of English Romantic poetry. The poem explicates with effective stylistic achievements the fundamental philosophy of the Romantic revival. The elements of imagination (in Blake's terminology 'the divine vision'), liberation, nature and human love — all these are the chief romantic ideals which have been manifested with great effectiveness.

The content of the poem is constituted with the poetics of 'recollection'. Revisiting the 'Tintern Abbey' after five years ('Five years have past') Wordsworth recalls all the impressions which his heart received at that time. These impressions are still live in his memory. They have become a part of his very self.

The landscape of Wye is symbolic in the terms of Coleridge — 'naturalistic as well as significant'. The poem "in its indirect references to the three planes of being (the natural, the human, and the divine), it adumbrates the great Romantic vision of cosmic unity".

The existence of two worlds of reality is apparent in the poem as the actual description of the Wye landscape and the actual experience of it. These two worlds are mutually dependent and are bound in causal relationship. This relationship at the next stage results in a cognition of the reality.

The poem presents three stages of the experience:

(i) Memories of past visit to 'Tintern Abbey'.

(ii) Actually felt experience at the present time.

(iii) Its sustained impression on the poet's cognising self.

The poem passes through the different psychic stages, binds actual and imagined experiences, constitutes a harmony in terms of space and time and finally integrates the form and the content. It is just like completing a circle — it concludes almost with those

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4. W. Wordsworth, *Complete Poetical Works* of William Wordsworth. Intro. by John Morley, London: 1950, p. 93.

words which it begins with. So it does not have any manifest beginning or end.

Now we intend to study this poem in the three analytical frameworks as they emerge from our discussions in the previous chapters on Buddhist theory of meaning. We are proposing three analytical models for the three corresponding objectives. These three modes lastly form a unity of cognition:

	Models	*Objectives*
(i)	*Ālaya Vijñāna*	cognitive structure of the poem.
(ii)	Reading of the poem in the Buddhist epistemology	means of structuring the cognition, epistemology of the poet and of the reader; problem of interpretation.
(iii)	*aphoa* (theory of contextual exclusion)	nature and content of verbal imports, how meaning is constituted.

Ālaya-Vijñāna and Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey'

The school of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda expounds the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*, i.e., 'mind-only'. This is a system which holds that the outside world is merely different shapes and forms of our own *citta*. It is noteworthy that in Yogācāra idealism, *citta*, *manas*, *vijñapti* and *vijñāna* are synonymous terms.[5] In this system *citta* or *vijñāna* is the only real entity.[6] This is one and integral which manifests itself variously taking support from five sense-organs and mind. These different designations have been given to *citta* on the basis of specific function which it performs. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* states, "*citta* is always neutral; *manas* functions in two ways; the functioning *vijñāna* is either good or bad."[7] In the Buddhist texts, the word *citta* has been derived from the verb root '*ci*' which simply means 'to collect'. So *citta* refers to the receptive

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5. *LS*, III.40, *VMS*, (*Viṃśatikā*) *citta mano vijñānaṃ vijñaptiśceti paryāyaḥ*, p. 1.
6. *LS*, Gāthā, 145.
7. *LS*, Gāthā, 103.

faculty which is the substratum of all cognitive activities. *Vijñāna* which is comparatively a more antique term (it occurs in the oldest classification of *dharma* into five *skandhas*). *Vijñāna skandha* is called so because this is the causal element in perceiving any object.[8] When the same single entity performs the act of thinking it is called *mana*. Again, in the Buddhist philosophical texts *mana* has been derived from verb root *mā* which means to 'map out' or 'to determine' about the objects. So *mana* identifies the object in terms of discrimination and similarity. Of all these terms only *citta* refers to the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda system. The *Laṅkāvatāra* clearly distinguishes the fields of these mutually related terms,

> *Citta* is the *ālayavijñāna, manas* is that which has reflection as its characteristic nature — it apprehends the various sense fields for which reason it is called a *vijñana*.[9]

Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda expounds the theory of mind-only. According to this system the external reality is non-existent and merely a reflex of our own *vijñāna*.[10] The world is nothing more than the thought construction.[11] The *citta* in its essence is thoroughly pure, the *manas* is defiled (*kleśa*). The *mana* is with *vijñāna*. With these cognitive faculties our impressions are constituted and manifested.[12]

The system accepts no distinction between knowable, knower

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8. *viśeṣeṇa jāyate iti vijñānaṁ* — a specific realization or cognition is called *vijñāna*.
9. *LS*, Gāthā, 102.
10. The theoretical standpoint of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda has been criticised by Kumārilabhaṭṭa (*Ślokavārttika: vijñānavāda*), Ādi Śaṅkara (in his *Śārīrka Bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, II.2) and Vācaspati Miśra (in his *Bhāmati Ṭīkā* of Brahmasūtra, II.2). Their criticism has been squarely countered by Buddhist scholars and Vijñānavāda position has been defended. However this debate is not pertinent to our present discussion so it is being left. For *vijñānavādin*'s position, *see* Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*.
11. *LS*, Gāthā, 44.
12. *LS*, Gāthā, 216.

and knowledge at the absolute level.[13] But the *citta*, which alone is real, appears to be in these forms. In fact, at the level of mind alone there is no discrimination of even the external world because the objects are all of different shapes and forms of the *vijñāna* only. In the Buddhist thought *dhātu* also means the world which is of three kinds — physical (*kāya-dhātu*), formal (*rūpa-dhātu*) and mental (*arūpa-dhātu*). In the system of Yogācāra Vijñānavāda, these three worlds are nothing but the mind-only. There is no object (*padārtha*) except the mind-only.[14]

The Yogācāra system accepted the six *vijñānas* (*indriya* and *mano-vijñāna*) of the Vaibhāsika system but added two more kinds to it.[15] These two are *klistamanas* (defiled mind) and *ālayavijñāna* (store-house of consciousness, which is the *citta* itself in its purest form). As a later development these eight *vijñānas* have been systematised and classified as (1) *ālaya-vijñāna*, (2) *mano-vijñāna*, (3) *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. The evolutes of the *vijñānas* are infinite. These three only represent the three stages of its evolution. As it is stated earlier the system posits *vijñāna* as one, an integral and real entity and as such these three *vijñānas* are not distinct.

Ālaya-Vijñāna ('Store-house Consciousness')

In the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *ālaya-vijñāna* is synonymous to *citta*. As it is suggested above that etymologically *citta* means receptum, receptive faculty or it refers to the receptive self. It is called *ālaya* because it is a receptum where all seeds or impressions (*vāsanā* / *saṁskāra*) of any action whatsoever, good, bad or indifferent are contained. It is the 'store-house' where things are stored for use in future. The *citta* as a culminating faculty is identified with *ālaya*.

In the truest sense of the term *ālaya* is not a *vijñāna* because it has no discerning power in it. It harbours all those impressions without any discrimination which are powered into it through the

13. *LS*, III. 65.
14. *VMS*, (*Viṃśatikā*) commentary on verse 1.
15. *LS*, Gāthā, 13. Suzuki comments 'the *sūtra* itself maintains a system of eight *vijñānas* and not a nine-fold one, which is a later development'. See his translation of *LS*, p. 227.

channel of *vijñānas*. Thus, *ālaya* is perfectly neutral, indifferent and does not indulge in assessment and offering judgements.

This might be the reason that the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* distinguishes two kinds of *ālaya*, "There is highest *ālaya-vijñāna* and *ālaya* is thought construction (*vijñapti*)."[16] *Ālaya* as a thought construction is the very self of all beings which is constituted and reconstituted (evolving all the time) with the cognition which filters into it through the other *vijñāna*.

According to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, *ālaya* has two aspects:

(i) it is self-contained and hence called *paramālaya-vijñāna*. It is like *śūnyatā* which is beyond the activities of *vijñāna*. It is incessant because of its uninterrupted existence. It is manifested because its activities are perceptible only to the mind.

(ii) it is related to the mental responses and so it is called *vijñaptirālaya*. It is manifested and subject to evolution as other *vijñānas* (*pravṛtti*).

As long as this *ālaya* remains self-contained, it is beyond the reach of an individual empirical consciousness. It is almost like *śūnyatā* itself, although it ever lies behind all the activities of *vijñāna*.

Two terms associated with *ālaya* are important to know. First is called *sarvabījaka* because it is the cause of everything being empirical, and second is called *vipāka* because any kind of action (*karma*) performed by the individual in any sphere of existence leaves a permanent mark/trace in the *ālaya*.

In the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* the relation of *ālaya* with other two *vijñānas* namely *mano-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna* has been explained with the analogy of ocean and waves caused by the winds:

> The *ālaya*-ocean in a similar manner is constantly stirred by the winds of objectivity, and is seen dancing about the

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16. *LS*, Gāthā, 59.

vijñānas which are waves of multiplicity.[17]

Ālaya is the substratum of all the seven *vijñānas*. The seven other *vijñānas* are only the illusory transformation (*vivarta*) of *ālaya*.[18] *Ālaya* as an ocean is a very significant analogy and it must not be associated with the Vedāntic concept of *ātman*. Unlike *ātman*, *ālaya* keeps on evolving but at the same time it does not cease to exist unless other *vijñānas* are functioning. An ocean within its own limitlessness is also an evolving entity. So like an ocean *ālaya* without any impression is like an ocean without waves. It is the pure consciousness and it refers to the concept of *nirvāṇa* in the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda system.

Ālaya is the level of *citta* where all impressions dwell in the seed form. But *ālaya* is not simply a receptive faculty. As it has been noted earlier, creativity is the very essence of all *vijñāna*. What is perceived by five senses, *vijñānas* and the way that experience is felt and reprocessed and reinterpreted at the level of mind — in all these functions *ālaya* implicitly performs a very crucial role. Every thing is perceived and reinterpreted with respect to the earlier impression (*vipāka / saṁskāra*)[19] already accumulated in the *ālaya* (*citta*), the store-house consciousness. For example, Wordsworth writes:

> *There is a blessing in the gentle breeze*
> (The Prelude's opening line).

The realised feeling simply emerges from the breeze blowing slowly and calmly, a touch which is pleasant. Now to interpret this tactile feeling as blessing is not merely the function of *manas* or *kliṣṭa manas* alone. The earlier impressions lying in the *citta* of the poet also take part in shaping this experience. This experience again filters into the *citta* of the poet and reconstitutes his self and makes

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17. *LS*, II.100. *ālyaoudhastathā nityaṁ viṣaya pavanapreritaḥ cittrais taṙṅga vijñānairnṛtyamānḥ pravartate.*

18. *LS*, II. 103. "As the waves in their variety are stirred on the ocean, so in the *ālaya* is produced the variety of what is known as the *vijñānas*."

19. *vipāka, saṁskāra, vāsanā* all are synonymous. *VMS*, (*triṁśikā*).

him a blessed person. The self of a being is not static but a dynamic entity in the Buddhist thought. This distinction between the *ālaya* and the Vedāntic concept of *ātman* is very significant.

Vijñānavāda holds that there are five mental *dharmas* (*caitta dharma*) associated with the *ālaya*. They participate actively in the cognitive process. They are,

(i) Concentration of the *citta* on the object (*manaskāra*).

(ii) The association of *vijñāna* with sense-organs and the object (*sparśa*).

(iii) Feelings (*vedanā*) of three kinds — pleasant unpleasant and indifferent.

(iv) Conceptual construct name (*samjñā*).[20]

(v) Consciousness which stimultates *citta* to incline towards the object (*cetanā*)

The notions of *ālaya* in this system bear a close similarity with the Sāṁkhya concept of *prakṛti* and the Vedāntic concept of *sākṣī*.[21]

Mana/Kliṣṭa Manovijñāna (Conceptual Domain of Intellection)

Manovijñāna is a binding element of *ālaya* and *pravṛtti vijñānas*. For cognition, neither only store-house consciousness nor the evolving consciousness are sufficient. Unless there is a binding element they cannot function in harmony to bring about the cognition of an object. The content of *ālaya* is completely indeterminate whereas the content of *pravṛtti* is totally determinate. *Mana* involves the transitional function of these two in the process of determination. It makes possible the object consciousness (*manaskāra*) in the *ālaya*.

In the Yogācāra idealism *mana* and *kliṣṭa mana* have been distinguished from each other. The concepts of *ālaya*, 'defiled mind'

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20. *LS*, Gāthā, 264. "Name is not born of meaning nor meaning is born of name."

21. For detailed study *see* A.K. Chatterjee's *The Yogācāra Idealism*.

and *kliṣṭa mana* are the contribution of this system to the Buddhist as well as to Indian philosophy.

First we examine the mind (*mana*). Behind all sense perception there is the presence of the mind. Mind feels all these experiences in pure form in the indeterminate perception. There is only experience without any qualification like name, quality, universal, etc. It has been called *samantara āśraya* because this becomes the substratum for all the cognitions grasped by the five sense-organs. But it does not mean that for its function it is always dependent on the sense-organs. Its functions involve imagination, cognition, thinking and experiencing of non-physical entities. Mind is also behind the performance of lingual and physical acts. In fact, this is associated with the sensory domain (*prāṇamaya kośa*).[22]

Defiled or marked mind (*kliṣṭa mana*) is the domain of intellection. It is called *kliṣṭa* or marked because it is associated with a specific class of Mentals (*caitta dharma*). When it becomes active it is accompanied by these four:

1. the false notion of an ego (*ātmadṛṣṭi*)
2. ignorance about ego (*ātmamoha*)
3. a sense of pride over it (*ātmamana*), and
4. attachment to it (*ātmaprema*).

The marked mind collects all the information and expriences coming from six senses/*vijñānas*. It shifts and reprocesses, discriminates and associates and forms new sets of cognition and finally relates all these to the *citta* where these cognitions leave a permanent trace or impression which reconstitute ourself (*citta*). The marked mind constructs many new sets of combinations and permutations among the given sets of experiences. It makes judgement like right and wrong; it creates dichotomies like self and other; it discriminates experiences like pleasant and unpleasant, joyful and sorrowful, etc.

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22. We shall draw a parallel between *ālaya vijñāna* and *pañca kośa* models after few pages.

The marked mind functions like a mediator between the 'store-house consciousness' and 'evolving consciousness'. When there takes place a 'turning back' (*pravṛtti*) in it, the whole arrangement of things in the subtle/mental body (*vijñānakāya / cittakāya*) changes. The marked mind functions in harmony with the traces already stored in the *ālaya*. In this way it is dependent on the *ālaya* without which it has no meaning of being itself. In turn, *ālaya* also depends on the mind because whatever is stored there cannot be recognised without the supports of mind.

Unlike mind, this marked mind involves determinate cognition. It determines the form and identity of the objects in terms of similarity and difference. It constitutes the 'qualified cognition' on the basis of an interaction between the *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna* ('evolving consciousness').

This is the third stage of the evolution of the *vijñāna* which involves determinate cognition of the objects. *Pravṛtti-vijñāna* includes five sense-organs, corresponding sense-objects and their six concerning cognitions. As stated earlier mind (*manovijñāna*) serves the mediate position between store-house consicousness and the evolving conciousness. We can include mind as the evolving consciousness. We can include mind as the supreme sense in this category also. The evolving consciousness is known as *sahabhū āśraya* because the senses participate actively and primarily in the cognitive act.

The five *vijñāna*s function in their respective domains with their own supports (*ālambana*). For instance, visual cognition has three supports for its emergence, i.e., colour (*varṇa*), shape (*saṁsthāna*) and action (*vijñāpti*). The visual cognition rises when it is directed to these three supports. It is dependent on its object and it is capable of grasping its 'self-nature'. It is related to present time and space. It gains the auspicious or inauspicious effects from the objects of vision.

Rest of the four *vijñāna*s are also alike, i.e., they have their own supports and domains of function.

The concept of *ālaya-vijñāna* as it is presented on the basis of the

two source-texts (*The Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and *Vijñapatimatratā-siddhiḥ*) of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda system is a very powerful theory to explicate how our cognitive mechanism functions. This theory can be extended to literary analysis.[23] This serves as a competent model for how cognition in a text is achieved and structured. As we have argued that a literary text is neither subjective nor objective but a linguistic reality we shall also examine how the language of a literary text serves as an evidence for the cognitions passing through the many stages of structuration in the text. We are not much concerned with what is called 'literariness' of language. We are approaching the text with an altogether different orientation and objective. Our chief goal is to 'know' the text to its very root, — to find its various layers of signification.

But before that we present a parallel and comparative estimate of *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pañca kośa* models.

Pañca kośa is a model of cognising self. In his *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* Ādi Śaṅkara expounds the conception of five sheaths as physical, sensory, perceptual, conceptual and the domain of bliss. For a full exposition of this theory a quote of the pertinent section of the article 'The Cognising Self and Experience of Poetry' is necessary.

Cognitive apparatus

(corresponding to the gross body)	*Kośa*s
1. *mana* (mind)	1. *annamaya*: the physical domain.
	2. *prāṇamaya*: the sensory domain. It includes the five parts of the body that are instruments of action (*karmendriya*) — feet, hands, speech and two excretory organs and breath. Acts such as walking, talking, holding belong here.

23. This study takes its sole inspiration from Prof. Kapil Kapoor's article entitled, "The Cognising Self and Experience of Poetry", Here an analysis of Wordsworth's 'Daffodils' has been presented in the Pañca kośa model as discussed in some Upaniṣad's and in the *VC* of Ādi Śaṅkara, vv. 156-213.

	3. *manomaya:* The perceptual domain. It includes the five senses that are instruments of receiving impressions (*jñānendriya*) and mind (*mana*), eyes, ears, nose, tongue, fingers, touch. Perceptual acts like see, hear belong here.
II. *Buddhi* (intellect)	4. *vijñānamaya*: The conceptual domain of intellection. It evaluates the input (knowledge received through/in the *prāṇamaya* and *manomaya kośa*) by relating it to the ego, the self and interprets and synthesises the experience. Involvement in conditions of wakefulness, etc., experience of something as joyful and sorrowful judgements such as right and wrong, good and bad, large and small is the attribute of this *kośa*. It is self-illuminated — i.e., one is highly aware of this level of one's consciousness — and being very intimately related to the self, is often mistaken for the self. (see *VC kārikā* 156-190). When one walks somewhere or when one sees something that place or that object one sees is interpreted and stored in this level as lonely, lovely, beautiful etc.
III. *Citta*	5. *ānandamaya*: The domain of bliss. It is activated when something, i.e., in harmony (*anukūla*) with the self, happens or becomes existent. There are levels of bliss from gross (material) to the most subtle — the bliss arising from spiritual elevation (worship, good deeds, self-realisation) is the highest form. Thus an exposure to beautiful objects will produce joy. When the experience is discordant with the self

> (*pratikūla*), one has the opposite of bliss — deep suffering.

We may present a parallel and comparative estimate of both the models of cognitive mechanism on the following page.

Though there are some remarkable similarities between these two, there are some significant differences as well. The cognition and reconstitution of the self in the *pañca kośa* model is unidirectional whereas it functions in both ways in the *ālaya-vijñāna* (denoted by ⇓ or ⇑ or <=> signs in the table on page 157). The cognition in *ālaya* is based on the dialectics (consistent with the major premises of Buddhist philosophy) of the 'store-house consciousness' and 'evolving consciousness'. Reconstitution of the 'self' signifies that the self is a dynamic entity which keeps on evolving with all the *ālaya-vijñāna*. It refers to the Buddhist doctrine of universal flux but it poses some theoretical problems in the context of the Vedāntic concept of the self (*ātman*). But it is very true and evidenced at the experiential level which we are here chiefly concerned with. This whole discussion up to this point has been summarised in the form of diagrams entitled as *Vijñāna Vāda* and Classification of *vijñāna*: (Diagram 7 and 8 see on page nos. 158-159).

Buddhist theoretical position regarding language and cognition do not differ much from that of Bhartrhari. It basically differs only in the nature of this relationship and their refutation of all such relations between language and thought on one hand and language and reality on the other. Their refutation is only from the point of view of absolute reality. Pragmatically they accept the validity of language and its involvements at different levels of the world and reality. We quote from Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*:

> There is no cognition in the world which permeates without language. Hence all the cognition seems to be a linguistic construct.[24]

With this observation from the Grammarian's school we have some logic to examine the language of a literary text as Bhartṛhari

24. *VP*, I.123.

	Pañca kośa		**Ālaya Vijñāna**
	1. *annamaya* (physical domain) ⇓		1. *cakṣu vijñāna* 2. *śrotra vijñāna*
	2. *prāṇamaya* (*karmendriya*) Sensory domain ⇓	(i) *sahabhū āśraya*	3. *ghrāṇa vijñāna* 4. *jihvā vijñāna*
(i) *mana* (mind)	3. *manomaya* (*jñānendriya*) perceptual domain. ⇓		5. *kāya vijñāna* ⇕
(ii) *buddhi* (intellect)	4. *vijñānamaya*- the conceptual domain of intellection	(ii) *samantara* *āśraya*	6. *manovijñāna* (pure subjective sensation) ⇔
	⇓	⇕	7. *kliṣṭa manovijñāna* (reprocessing, reinterpretation, altered and objective cognition) filters into *citta* ⇕
(iii) *citta* (the rece- ptive self)	5. *ānandamaya* the domin of bliss. ⇓ *antaḥkaraṇa* (the inner self).	(iii) *sarvabījaka* *āśraya*	*ālaya vijñāna* ('all-conserving mind') '*citta*'

Diagram - 7

VIJÑĀNAVĀDA





Diagram - 8

CLASSIFICATION OF VIJÑĀNA (CONSCIOUSNESS)

VIJÑANAVĀDA



provides an evidence of structuring the cognition.[25]

However, we cannot posit the following quote from him where he has taken a typical Grammarian's position, "The *antaḥkaraṇa* endowed with the specific *vṛttis* is knowledge itself. The same takes the form of and appears as language (*śabda*)."[26] The Buddhist scholars do not accept the complete identity of language and thought.

At first we append the poem with its events and attributes (see the Table of Analysis 1 and 2).

Table of Analysis 1

Tintern Abbey

William Wordsworth

(*Lyrical Ballads*, 1798)

Note: Words which appear in bold and italicised types are attributes (along with nouns) and events respectively.

1. Five years have *past*; five summers, **with the length**
2. **Of five long winters** ! and again I *hear*
3. These waters, *rolling* from their mountain-springs
4. With **a soft inland murmur**.[27] — Once again
5. Do I *behold* **these steep** and **lofty cliffs**,
6. That on **a wild secluded scene** *impress*
7. Thoughts of **more deep seclusion**; and *connect*
8. The landscape with **the quiet of the sky.**
9. The day is *come* when I again *repose*

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25. *See* the *Yogasūtra*, III.17 which marks a disjunction between word, meaning and cognition. Buddhist position bears similarity with this view.
26. *VP*, I.112.
27. The river is not affected by the tides a few miles above Tintern.

10. Here, under **this dark sycamore**, and *view*
11. These plots of cottage-ground, these orchard-tufts,
12. Which at this season, with their unripe fruits,
13. Are *clad* in **one green hue**, and *lose* themselves
14. 'Mid groves and corpses. Once again I *see*
15. These hedge-rows, **hardly hedge-rows little lines**
16. Of **sportive wood** *run* **wild** : **these pastoral farms**,
17. **Green** to the very door and **wreaths of smoke**
18. *Sent up*, to **silence**, from among the trees!
19. With some **uncertain** notice, **as might *seem***
20. **Of vagrant dwellers in the houseless woods,**
21. **Or of some Hermit's cave, where by his fire**
22. **The Hermit *sits* alone**
23. **These beauteous forms,**
24. Through **a long absence**, have not been to me
25. **As is a landscape to a blindman's eye**
26. But oft, in **lonely rooms**, and 'mid the din'
27. Of towns and cities, I have *owed* to them
28. **In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,**
29. ***Felt* in the blood, and *felt* along the heart,**
30. **And *passing* even into my purer mind,**
31. **With tranquil restoration:** — feelings too
32. Of **unremembered pleasure:** such, perhaps,
33. As have no slight or trivial influence
34. On that best portion of a good man's life,
35. His **little nameless, unremembered, acts**

36. **Of kindness and of love.** Nor less, I *trust,*
37. To them I may have *owed* another gift,
38. Of aspect **more sublime**; that **blessed mood**,
39. In which **the burthen of the mystery**.
40. In which **the heavy and the weary weight**
41. **Of all this unintelligible world,**
42. Is *lightened*: — that scene and **blessed mood**,
43. In which the affections **gently** *lead* us on, —
44. Until, the breath of **this corporeal frame**
45. And even the motion of our human blood
46. Almost *suspended*, we are *laid* asleep
47. In body, and *become* **a living soul;**
48. **While with an eye** ***made*** **quiet by the power**
49. **Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,**
50. **We** ***see*** **into the life of things.**
51. If this
52. Be but **a vain belief**, yet, oh ! how oft —
53. In darkness and amid the many shapes
54. Of **joyless daylight**; when **the fretful stir**
55. **Unprofitable**, and the **fever of the world**,
56. Have *hung upon* the beatings of my heart —
57. How oft, in spirit, have I *turned* to thee,
58. O sylvan Wye! thou **wanderer thro' the woods,**
59. How often has my spirit *turned* to thee !
60. And now, **with gleams of half-extinguished thought,**
61. With many recognitions **dim and faint,**

62. And somewhat of **a sad perplexity,**
63. The picture of the mind *revives* again:
64. While here I *stand,* not only with the sense
65. Of **present pleasure**, but with **pleasing thoughts**
66. That in this moment there is **life and food**
67. **For future years**. And so I *dare* to *hope,*
68. Though **changed**, no doubt, from what I was when first
69. I *came* among these hills; when **like a roe**
70. I *bounded* o' er the mountains, by the sides
71. Of **the deep rivers**, and **the lonely streams,**
72. Wherever nature *led:* **more like a man**
73. *Flying* from something that he *dreads,* than one
74. Who *sought* the thing he *loved.* For nature then
75. (The **coarser pleasures** of my **boyish days,**
76. And their glad animal movements all *gone by*)
77. To me was **all in all** — I cannot *paint*
78. What then I was. **The sounding cataract**
79. *Haunted* me **like a passion; the tall rock,**
80. The mountain, and **the deep and gloomy wood.**
81. Their colours and their forms, were then to me
82. **An appetite; a feeling and a love,**
83. That had no need of **a remoter charm,**
84. By thought *supplied* nor any interest
85. *Unborrowed* from the eye — That time is *past*,
86. And all its **aching joys** are now no more,
87. And all its **dizzy raptures**. Not for this

Faint I, nor *mourn* nor *murmur*; other gifts
Have *followed;* for such loss, I would *believe,*
Abundant recompence. For I have *learned*
To *look* on nature, not as in the hour
Of **thoughtless youth;** but *hearing* often times
The still and sad music of humanity,
Nor harsh nor grating, though of **ample power**
To *chasten* and *subdue*. And I have *felt*
A presence that *disturbs* me with the joy
Of **elevated thoughts; a sense sublime**
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that *impels*
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things. Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains; and of all that we *behold*
From this **green earth;** of all **the mighty world**
Of eye, and ear, — both what they half *create,*[28]
And what *perceive;* **well pleased** to *recognise*
In nature and the language of the sense,
The anchore of my purest thoughts, the nurse,

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28. This line has a close resemblance to an admirable line of Young's, the exact expressions of which I do not recollect.

112. **The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul**
113. **Of all my moral being.**
114. Not perchance,
115. If I were not thus *taught,* should I the more
116. *Suffer* my **genial spirits** to *decay;*
117. For thou art with me here upon the banks
118. Of this **fair river**; thou **my dearest Friend,**
119. **My dear, dear Friend**; and in thy voice I *catch*
120. **The language of my former heart**, and *read*
121. My **former pleasures** in the **shooting of lights**
122. Of thy **wild eyes**. Oh! yet a little while
123. May I *behold* in thee what I was once,
124. My dear, dear Sister ! and this prayer I *make*
125. Knowing that Nature never did *betray*
126. The heart that *loved* her; 'tis her privilege,
127. Through all the years of this our life, to *lead*
128. From joy to joy; for she can so *inform*
129. The mind that is within us, to *impress*
130. With quietness and beauty, and so *feed*
131. With **loftly thoughts**, that neither **evil tongues,**
132. **Rash judgements**, nor the **sneers of selfish men**,
133. Nor greetings where no kindness is, nor all
134. **The dreary intercourse of daily life**,
135. Shall e' er *prevail* against us, or *disturb.*
136. Our **cheerful faith**, that all which we *behold*
137. Is **full of blessings.** Therefore let the moon

138. *Shine* on thee in thy **solitary walk;**
139. And let the **misty mountain-winds** be **free**
140. To *blow* against thee; and, in after years,
141. When these **wild ecstasies** shall be *matured*
142. Into **a sober pleasure; when thy mind**
143. **Shall be a mansion for all lovely forms,**
144. **Thy memory be as a dwelling-place**
145. **For all sweet sounds and harmonies;** oh ! then,
146. If solitude, or fear, or pain, or grief,
147. Should be thy portion, with what **healing thoughts**
148. Of **tender joy** wilt thou *remember* me,
149. And these my exhortations ! Nor, perchance —
150. If I should be where I no more can *hear*
151. Thy voice, nor *catch* from thy **wild eyes** these **gleams**
152. **Of past existence** — wilt thou then *forget*
153. That on the banks of this **delightful stream**
154. We *stood* together; and that I, so long
155. A worshipper of Nature, hither *came*
156. **Unwearied** in that service; rather *say*
157. With **warmer love** — oh ! with **far deeper zeal**
158. **Of holier love**. Nor wilt thou then *forget,*
159. That after **many wanderings**, many years
160. Of absence, **these steep woods and lofty cliffs,**
161. And this **green pastoral landscape,** were to me
162. **More dear,** both for themselves and for thy sake!

Tintern Abbey
Table of Analysis - 2
List of attributes and events in the poem

Line	*Attributes*	*Events*
1-2	With the length of (five) long winter	past[1] hear[2]
3.		rolling[3]
4.	with a soft inland (murmur)	behold[4]
5.	these (steep), lofty (cliffs)	
6.	a wild secluded (scene)	impress[5]
7.	more deep (seclusion)	connect[6]
8.	the quiet of (the sky)	
9.		come[7], repose[8]
10.	this dark (sycamore)	view[9]
13.	one green (hue)	clad[10], lose[11]
14.		see[12]
15.	hardly (hedge-rows/little lines)	
16.	sportive (woods), wild there pastoral (forms)	run[13]
17.	green, wreath of (smoke)	
18.	silence	sent up[14]
19.	uncertain (notice)	seem[15]
19-20	as might seem of vagrant dwellers in the houseless woods;	
21.	Or of some Hermit's cave, whereby his fire	
22.	The Hermit sits alone	sits[16]
23.	These beauteous (forms)	
24.	a long (absence) —	been[17]

25.	As is a landscape to a blindman's eye	
26.	lonely (rooms)	
27.		owed[18]
28-30	In hours of weariness, sensations sweets, Felt in blood, and felt along the heart; And passing even into my purer mind.	felt[19] belt[20] passing[21]
31.	tranquil (restoration)	
32.	unremembered (pleasure)	
33-34	As have no slight or trivial influence on that best portion of a good man's life,	
35-36	little nameless, unremembered (acts of kindness and of love)	trust[22]
37.		owed[23]
38.	more (sublime), blessed (mood)	
39.	the burthen of the (mystery)	
40.	the heavy and the weary (weight)	
41.	of all this unintelligible (world),	
42.	that seen and blessed (mood)	lightened[24]
43.	gently	(gently) lead[25]
44.	this corporeal (frame)	
46.		suspended[26], laid[27]
47.	a living (soul)	become[28]
48-50	While with an eye made quiet by the power	made[29]

	Of harmony, and the deep power Of joy, We see into the life of the things.	see[30]
52.	a vain (belief)	be[31]
54.	joyless (daylight), the fretful (stir)	
55.	Unprofitable, fever of (the world)	
56.		hung upon[32]
57.		turned[33]
58.	wanderer (through the woods)	
59.		turned[34]
60.	with gleams of half-extinguished (thoughts)	
61.	dim, faint	
62.	a sad (perplexity)	
63.		revives[35]
64.		stand[36]
65.	present (pleasure) pleasing (thoughts)	
66.	life and food	
67.	For future years.	dare,[37] hope[38]
68.	changed	
69.	like a roe	came[39]
70.		bounded[40]
71.	the deep (rivers), the lonely (streams)	
72.	more like a man . . . than one	led,[41]
73.		flying[42] dreads[43]
74.	who sought the thing he loved	sought[44] loved[45]

75.	coarser (pleasures), boyish (days)	
76.	glad animal (movements)	gone by[46]
77.	all in all	paint[47]
78.	The sounding (cataract)	
79.	like (a passion) the tall (rock)	haunted[48]
80.	the deep and gloomy (wood)	
82.	An appetite; a feeling and love,	
83.	a remoter (charm),	
84.		supplied[49]
85.		unborrowed[50], past[51]
86.	aching (joy)	
87.	dizzy (raptures)	
88.		faint,[52] mourn,[53] murmur[54]
89.		followed,[55] believe[56]
90.	Abundant (recompence)	learned[57]
91.		look[58]
92.	thoughtless (youth)	bearing[59]
93.	The still and sad music of (humanity)	
94.	Nor harsh nor grating, ample power	
95.	And I have felt	chasten,[60] subdue[61] felt[62]
96.	A presence that disturbs me	disturbs[63]
97.	elevated (thoughts), (a sense) sublime	

98.	of something far more deeply interfused,	
99.	whose dwelling is the light of setting sun	
100.	And the round ocean and the living air,	
101.	And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;	
102.	A motion and spirit, that impels	impels[64]
103.	All thinking things, all objects of all thoughts,	
104.	And rolls through all things.	rolls[65]
105.		
106.		behold[66]
107.	green (earth), mighty (world)	
108.		create[67]
109.	well pleased	perceive,[68]
110.	language of the sense	recognise[69]
111.	anchor of my purest (thoughts), then nurse,	
112.	The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul	
113.	Of all my moral (being)	
114.		
115.		taught[70]
116.	genial (spirits)	suffer,[71] decay[72]
117.		
118.	fair river, my dearest Friend	
119.	My dear, dear Friend	catch[73]
120.	The language of my former(heart)	read[74]

121.	former (pleasures), the shooting (of lights)	
122.	wild (eyes)	
123.		behold[75]
124.	My dear, dear Sister	make[76]
125.	Nature never did betray	betray[77]
126.	The heart that loved her;	loved[78]
127.		lead[79]
128.		inform[80]
129.		impress[81]
130.		feed[82]
131.	lofty (thoughts) evil (tongues)	
132.	Rash (judgements), sneers of selfish (men)	
133.	dreary (intercourse), daily (life)	
135.		prevail[83], disturb[84]
136.	cheerful (faith)	behold[85]
137.	full of blessings	
138.	solitary (walk)	shine[86]
139.	misty (mountain-winds), free	be[87]
140.		blow[88]
141.	wild ecstasies	matured[89]
142.	sober (pleasure); when thy mind	
143.	shall be a mansion for all lonely forms	
144.	Thy memory be as a dwelling place	
145.	For all sweet sounds and harmonies;	
147.	healing (thought)	

148.	tender (joy)	remembers[90]
150.		hear[91]
151.	wild (eyes), gleams	catch[92]
152.	Of past existence	forget[93]
153.	delightful (stream)	
154.		stood[94]
155.		came[95]
156.	unwearied	say[96]
157.	warmer (love), far deeper (zeal)	
158.	of holier (love)	forget[97]
159.	many wanderings	
160.	These steep (woods), lofty (cliffs)	
161.	green pastoral (landscape)	
162.	More dear	

We may broadly categorise these events as physical and mental. Physical events are performed or known by our five sense-organs. The sixth sense-organ, the mind is associated with the cognitive acts. All these events are just felt either at the physical or mental level. Some experiences of these events reach the level of cognising mind (*kliṣṭa mana*) and are interpreted there in terms of the previous impressions or states of being. This interpretation and synthesis of experiences generate cognition which finally inheres in the *citta* or *ālaya* and there it leaves a permanent mark that reconstitutes and determines the kind of our being.

Similarly, all the attributes and various permutations and combinations are the properties of defiled marked mind (*kliṣṭa mana*). This again generates the cognition/experience as pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent on the basis of exposure to the objects. In this poem 'sportive moods' and other 'beauteous forms' bring pleasure and 'long winters', 'quiet of the sky', 'a wild secluded scene', — they

all cause glooming impressions in the *citta* of the poet and reconstitute his states of being accordingly.

EVENTS

The very first event 'past' is a cognitive event which is related to the mental perception. This generates a sense of loss of something valuable. The second event 'hear' is associated with the aural perception. The third event is perceived at the level of visual perception. The simple event of falling of the waters from the mountain-spring has been interpreted at the level of intellect (*kliṣṭa mana*) as 'rolling' and this further revives the past memories of the poet. These are pleasant impressions which cause earnest desire to behold these scenes once again.

Again the events 'clad' and 'lose' (events 10 and 11) are realised at the level of visual and mental perceptions respectively. The dark green leaves in abundance in the spring season (Wordsworth himself provides the date of composition of this poem 13 July 1879) have been interpreted as 'clad' as if the trees and plants all are dressed up in one green colour. The non-sequentiality or orderlessness of moods has been interpreted at the third level, i.e., intellect or defiled or marked mind as 'running wild'. All these are pleasant events and bring happy experiences.

Similarly the events 'lightened', and 'leads', then 'suspended' and 'laid' (24, 25, 26 and 27) are interpreted and yield pleasure and indifference to the poet's receptive self.

Then the event 47 (paint) has been reinterpreted at the level of intellection. Altering the physical for mental or mental for physical is specific poetic device of Wordsworth. The purpose is to increase the intensity of feelings. Even in this poem the deep and profound mental experiences have been presented as physical in these lines:

> . . . Sensations sweet
> Felt in blood and felt along the heart (Lines 28-29)

Similarly here also the cognitive event recalling or describing through memory has been altered as painting — as for real and

physical picture.

We may observe that in the whole poem, out of 97 events, 14 events (3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 24, 30, 58, 66, 75, 85 and 86) are related to visual perception, three are related to aural perception (2, 54, 91), and only one is associated with tactile perception (88). Rest of the 79 events occur at the mental level and out of them 16 have been interpreted at the level of intellect. This exemplifies the rich cognitive content of the poem. This characterises the poem and the poet both.

ATTRIBUTES

The poem is very rich at the third level, i.e., intellect, for abundance of attributes and synthesis of these attributes with the objects. The poet's intellect constitutes a number of pleasant syntheses such as 'soft inland murmur', 'lofty cliffs', 'little lines', 'sportive woods' 'beauteous forms', 'tranquil restoration', 'unremembered pleasure', 'pleasing thoughts', 'sounding cataracts', 'remoter charm' 'aching joy', 'dizzy rapture', 'elevated thoughts', 'lofty thoughts', 'green earth', 'cheerful tongues', 'wild ecstasies', 'sober pleasure', 'healing thoughts', 'tender joy' 'wild gleams', 'delightful streams', 'warmer love', 'of holier love', and 'green pastoral landscape', etc.

This long series of pleasant experiences have been contrasted with some unpleasant feelings like: 'with the length of five long winters', 'dark sycamore', 'deep and gloomy woods', 'lonely rooms', 'long absence', 'heavy and weary weight', 'thoughtless youth', 'dreary intercourse', and 'still and sad music of humanity'.

The third series of experience is also quite apparent in the poem as, 'secluded scene', 'deep seclusion', 'quiet of the sky', 'wreath of smoke', 'Hermit sits alone', 'lonely stream' and 'solitary walks'.

Out of these levels of experience as happy, unhappy and indifferent, the former is the dominant level. These levels are very intricately woven in the poem. First the poet observes the beautiful landscape of Wye then he returns to himself and reflects upon the other gloomy and indifferent experiences. But finally as his *citta* is

blessed with elevated thoughts and cognition, the *kliṣṭa mana* interprets them all in such a way that he overcomes all the inauspicious experiences.

These pleasant experiences result in profound vision of the reality. His self is now reconstituted with these pleasant experiences. He is now a more elevated being. This elevated self is now capable of acquiring profound cognition, as

> Nature never did betray
> The heart that loved her. [Lines 125-6]

The poet's heart is blessed with such noble feelings and thought. He develops more intimacy with the nature and the world:

> My dear, dear Friend; and in thy voice I ***catch***
> The language of my former heart. [Lines 119-20]

Whatever was stored in the form of impression is still there and it has been invoked by the external causal conditions as revisiting 'Tintern Abbey'.

As we have stated earlier, the attributes and their associations are not given in the external reality. This is mainly the function of the difiled marked mind which constitutes them taking support from both 'evolving' and 'store-house' consciousness. Things/nouns as river, sycamore, wood, scene are very much parts of objectively given external world but to perceive these given entities as 'fair river', 'dark sycamore', 'gloomy wood' and 'wild secluded scene' are the creations of the poet's intellect. Figural devices are the conceptual constructs of the domain of intellection. They all belong to the defiled mind,[29] such as:

Simile: when like a roe I bounded o'er the mountains. (Lines 69-70)

29. This theory of *ālaya-vijñāna* supports the view of Anand K. Coomaraswami that figures of speech are also figures of thoughts. (For ref. please see the bibliography)

Paradox:	aching joys (Lines 86)
Personification:	fair river (Lines 118)
Metaphor:	the still and sad music of humanity (Lines.93)

(Here two more attributes have been examined). Consider this expression:

"a soft inland murmur" (Line 4). The simple physical fact is shaking of leaves in the wind which causes murmuring sound. To interpret as 'soft' is the poet's own specific perception of the given reality.*

Now consider 'this dark sycamore' (Line 10). The sycamore with abundance of leaves and their deep green colour has been interpreted as dark at the level of defiled/marked mind.

Through this process cognition is structured. In verbal discourse like literature all these evidences are provided by the linguistic elements as it is obvious from the analysis above. [See Table of Analysis - 3, see from next page]

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* This is important to note that 'softness' is attribute of leaves which has been transferred to the 'murmuring sound.'

Table of Analysis 3
Wordsworth's Tintern Abbey & Ālaya-Vijñāna

PRAVṚTTI VIJÑĀNA MANAS=MIND						KLIṢṬA MANOVIJÑĀNA (BUDDHI = INTELLECT)	ĀLAYA-VIJÑĀNA CITTA = RECEPTIVE SELF
Visual	Auditory	Olfactory	Gustatory	Tactile	Mental (Manas)		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					past[1]	with the length of (five) long winter [L.1-2]	heavy and gloomy impressions; sense of loss.
rolling[3]	hear[2]					'rolling[3].	revival of the happy impressions of the past
						with a soft inland murmur [L.4]	already stored in *citta*
behold[4]							Tender feelings yields
						these (steep), lofty (cliffs) [L.5]	elevated mood where
					impress[5]	a wild secluded (scene) [L.6]	the sense of 'loneliness'
							changes into serene and calm mood.
					connect[6]	more deep (seclusion) [L.7]	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					come[7] repose[8]	the quiet of (the sky) [L. 8]	the calmness of sky =
view[9]						this dark (sycamore) [L. 10]	tranquillity and limitlessness.
clad[10]					lose[11]	'clad'[10], lose[11] one green (hue) [L. 13]	Dense and lush green = all gay colours.
						hardly (hedge-rows), little lines [L. 15]	These all are momentary
run[13]						run[13] wild; sportive woods these pastoral (forms) [L. 16]	but happy experiences
sent up[14]						green, wreath of (smoke) [L.17] silence [L.18] sent up[14]	mystery and recalling the
					seem[15]	as might seem[15] Of vagrant dwellers in the houseless woods [1.19]	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
						Or of some Hermit cave, where by his fire	more sublime images of the past. Sense of lonelines (a dissociated self,
					sits (16)	The Hermit sits alone [L.19-22]	
					been (17)	The beauteous (forms) [L.23] a long absence [L.24]	not necessarily unhappy) is implicit in the poem throughout.
					owed (18)	As a landscape to blindman's eye [L.25] lonely (rooms) [L.26]	
					felt (19)		
					felt (20)	In hour of weariness, sensation sweets. Felt[20] in blood,and felt along the heart	Recalling of the sad moments makes
					passing (21)	And passing[21] even into my purer mind [L.28.30]	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
						Tranquil (restoration) [L.31] unremembered (pleasure) [L.32]	the poet unhappy
						As I have no slight or trivial influence.	but very soon he recovers
						On a best portion of a good man's life [L.33-34]	and becomes more insightful.
					trust[22]	little nameless, unremembered (acts of kindness) [L.35-36]	
					owed[23]	more (sublime), blessed (mood) [L.38]	= Blessed mood which
							alters all the unhappy
						the burthen of mystery [L.39]	
						the heavy and weary (weight) [L.40]	circumstances into a pleasant thing.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
						of all this unintelligible world [L.41]	
lighten-ed[24]						lightened[24] that scene and blessed (mood) [L.42]	= Blessed mood
					leads[25]	(gently) leads[25] [L.43] this corporeal (frame) [L.44]	
					suspen-ded[26] laid[27]	suspended[26] laid[27]	
					become[28]	a living soul [L.47]	= Deeply felt experiences enable the poet to know/ search his self = 'kind-ness','gently', 'living soul' 'harmony' life of the things. These
					made[29]	While with an eye made quiet by the power of harmony . . . of joy. We see into the life of the things [L.48-50]	
see[30]							

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					be[31]	a vain (belief) [L.52]	all are the great boons of this elevated self.
						joyless (day light), the fretful (stir). [L.54]	= actual/felt
						Unpròfitable fever of the world [L.55]	experiences of
					hung		the world, heavy and weary.
					upon[32]		
					turned[33]	Wanderer (through the woods) [L.58]	
					turned[34]	with gleams of half extinguished (thoughts) [L.60]	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
						dim, faint [L.61]	= all sad impressions.
						sad (perplexity) [L.62]	
					revives[35]	present (pleasure) pleasing (thoughts) [L.65]	= again, the revival of the
					stand[36]	life and food [L.66-67] for future years.	the same happy impre-ssion which
					dare[37]	changed [L.68]	provides him strength and
					hope[38]	like a roe [L. 69]	reorders every thing in
					came[39]	the lonely (streams) [L.71]	such a way that it imparts him
					bounded[40]	more like a man . . . than one [L.72-74]	pleasure.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					led[41]		
					flying[42]	flying[42] [L.73]	
					dreads[43]	(the coarser pleasure boyish days)	
					sought[44]	and their glad animal (movements)	
					loved[45]	all gone by [L.75-76]	
					gone by[46]	all in all [L.77]	= harmony and integrity
					paint[47]	paint[47]	
						The sounding (cataract) [L.77-78]	achieved.
					haunted[48]	Like (a passion) the tall (rock) [L.79]	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					supplied[49]	the deep and gloomy (wood) [L.80]	= sense of loneliness
					unborrowed[50]	An appetite; a feeling and love, [L.82]	= all these impressions
					past[51]	a remoter (charm) [L.83]	are correlated by the
							intellect to the self
					faint[52]	aching (joy) [L.86]	in such a way
	murmur[54]				mourn[53]	dizzy (raptures) [L.87]	that they become integral sources of pleasure
					followed[55]		
look[58]						Abundant (recompence) [L.90]	for the poet
					believe[56]		

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					learned[57]	thoughtless (youth) [L.92]	
					bearing[59]		
					chasten[60]	The still and sad music of (humanity) - [L.93]	profound cognition of
					subdue[61]	Nor harsh, nor grating, ample power [L.94]	the self and the world.
					felt[62]	And I have felt . . . with joy	= elevated thoughts
					disturbs[63]	of elevated thought;	
					impels[64]	a sense sublime of something . . . interfused	= sublimity
rolls[65]					rolls[65]	while dwelling . . . in the mind of men; rolls	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
behold[66]					create[67]	A motion and a spirit . . . And rolls through all things [L. 95-104]	= Seer of the one
					perceive[68]	green (earth), mighty (world) [L. 107]	basic energy principle, which
					recognise[69]	well (pleased) [L. 109]	imparts life to all things and
						language of the sense [L. 110]	binds them all in one.
						anchor of my purest (thoughts) then nurse, [L. 111]	
						the Guide and guardian of my heart, and soul [L. 112]	
						Of all my moral (being) [L. 112]	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					taught[70]	genial (spirits) [L. 116]	
					suffer[71]	fair river, my dearest	= now he
					decay[72]	friend [L. 118]	feels every-
					catch[73]	My dear, dear friend [L. 119]	things with
							more intimacy,
					read[74]	The language of my former (heart) [L. 120]	as the reflection of
						former (pleasures), the shooting of (lights) [L. 121]	his own elevated self, The poet
							is now 'an altered
						Wild (eyes) [L. 122]	self'. He is more
behold[75]					make[76]	My dear, dear sister [L. 124]	elevated and sublime

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					betray[77]	Nature never did betray	= insight and
					loved[78]	The heart that loved her [L. 125-26]	is the gift of such spirited
					lead[79]	lofty (thoughts) evil (tongues) [L. 131]	moments. He develops a
					inform[80]	rash judgements, sneer of selfish (men) — [L. 132]	power to overcome all the
					impress[81]	dreary (intercourse), daily life [L. 133]	trivialities and rash judgements.
					feed[82]	cheerful (faith) [L. 136]	His intellect
behold[85]					prevail[83]	full of blessings [L. 137]	(*kliṣṭa mana*) correlates all
shine[86]					disturbs[84]	solitary (walk) L.138	these experiences in

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					be[87]	misty (mountain-winds) free [L. 140]	such a way that every
				blow[88]	nature[89]	wild ecstasies [L. 141]	thing after all
					rememb-ers[90]	sober (pleasure); when thy mind	turns congenial
	hear[91]				catch[92]	Thy memory be as a dwelling place, For . . . harmonies [L. 143-45]	to his sublime self
					forget[93]	healing (thoughts) tender (joy) [L. 147-48]	= all pleasant impressions.
					stood[94]	wild (eyes) gleams of past existence [L. 151-52]	
					come[95]	delightful (stream) [L. 153]	= happy experiences

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
					say[96]	unwearied [L. 156]	
						Warmer (love), far deeper (zeal) [L. 157]	
					forget[97]	of holier (love) [L. 158]	= holiness
						many wanderings [L. 159]	
						these steep (woods), and lofty (cliffs) [L. 160]	= elevated mood.
						green pastoral (landscape) [L. 161]	= everything changes now
						More dear [L. 162]	more intimate to his self

Reading of Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey' in Buddhist Epistemology

For long the West has debated over the validity of literature as a rational discourse. The debate originated in the work of the two great masters, Plato[30] and Aristotle[31] and has been maintained down the ages. It seems that in the West there has developed a rival relationship between philosophy and literature. A philosopher does not rely much on the poet's work for the validity of his statement and a poet claims 'Poetry is the most philosophic of all writings'[32] and 'Poets are the unacknowledged legislators or the world.'[33] In the Indian context such distinctions do not seem much pertinent because the classification has been done broadly in terms of *kāvya* and *śāstra*, i.e., the creative discourse and discourse of scientific exposition. In the latter, *poetics* is also included. So both the *kāvya* and *śāstra* function in harmony and mutual dependence. The statement of a poet is not less valued in comparison to that of the philosopher. In fact, both a poet endowed with creative power and a philosopher with divine vision co-exist in the single living substratum.[34]

We have stated above that a literary composition also posits cognition and experience and since literature is a discourse of knowledge, epistemology is always inherent in it. Like any other person, a poet also constitutes his cognition and experience relying on some means of knowledge. So a literary disourse is equally valid as any other rational discourse. As a text mirrors the author's experiences, the theory of cognition, applied by him, makes the reader aware of how he constitutes his experiences in language.

We may broadly classify the experience of the poet constituted in the text as:, (a) actual, (b) imagined, and (c) recollected.

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30. Plato, *The Republic*, Chapter X.
31. Aristotle, *The Poetics*.
32. Wordsworth, *Lyrical Ballads;* Preface (1805).
33. P.B. Shelley, *A Defence of Poetry* (1821).
34. *ĪśUp*. VIII — *kavirmanīṣī paribhūḥ svayaṁbhūḥ*.

The actual experience involves the poet's own observation of the world (external/internal) which is his direct perception at the present time. The imagined experience is also based upon the actual observations. The poet himself is not present there to observe the actual things and events. He imagines the sensory experiences. The past experiences of the poet dwell in his memory in the form of impressions and are revived by some causal element — like the similar or same stimulus.

Whatever be the kind of knowledge, epistemology is implicit in it. Poets differ in the selection of their means of knowledge. This characterises the poet and his poem both.

However, it is quite a daring task to carry out an epistemological study of a literary text, especially in the Buddhist epistemology after the grand refusal of all the means of knowledge by Ācarya Nāgārjuna in his anti-epistemological treatise, the *Vigraha-vyāvarttanī* and the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. But this rejection is made from the point of view of absolute reality. Nāgārjuna does not repudiate the importance of pragmatic aspect of the truth. So here in the Buddhist world of thought we have some scope and importance for the legendary *kāvya puruṣa* also.

Diṅnāga, in his celebrated text *Pramāṇasamuccaya* posited only two means of cognition and argued that there is no need to include any more instrument for acquiring knowledge.[35] Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika* also follows the master's consent by positing two knowables and two instruments of knowledge which can be presented as

knowable	*means of knowledge*
(i) unique particular	(i) sensation
(ii) universal	(ii) inference

SENSATION/PERCEPTION (*PRATYAKṢA*)

Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti have made detailed discussion on

35. *PS* chapters 1 and 2. *PSB* — *atra pramāṇam dvividhameva.*

sensation. They have classified sensation as follows:

(i) *Sense Perception*: that instrument of pure cognition which emerges with the sense-object contact. Diṅnāga asserts,[36] "a thing possessing many properties cannot be cognised in all its respects of the sense. The object of the sense is that form which is to be cognised as it is and which is inexpressible".

(ii) *Mental Perception*: that cognition which is perceived at the level of mind directly or through experiences grasped by the senses.[37]

(iii) *Self-perception*[38]: Diṅnāga defines, "even the conceptual construction, when it is brought to internal awareness, is awareness [as a type of perception]". However, with regard to external object, [the conceptual construction is not admissible as perception] because it conceptualises [the object]. The desire, sentiments, likes, anger, attachment and experiences like pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent — all these belong here. Mental perception is related to the knowledge of the object but here the experience is cognised — as pleasant, etc.

(iv) *Intuitive Perception*: This cognition results in the profound concentration and meditation upon any object. As in 'Tintern Abbey' Wordsworth states, . . .

To see into the life of the things [Line 50].

Two kinds of Inference have been posited in Buddhist epistemology:

(i) *Inference for self*: that kind of inference with which we constitute for our own cognition. As in the 'Tintern Abbey', the 'wreath of smoke' brings the cognition of some lonely Hermit into the poet's mind.

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36. This translation is from Hattori (ed.), *Dignāga On Perception*, see pp. 27-8.

37. *PV*, II.243.

38. *PS*, I.6 — *svasamvit nirvikalpaṁ*.

The Hermit sits alone. [Line 22]

(ii) *Inference for Other*[39]: When we communicate our cognition to other people, we structure our statement logically as major and minor premises which conclude in determining an object.

For the poet it is the direct experience of the object which finally constitutes in language. But for a reader it is only words/language through which he/she builds up his/her own cognition of the text. This poses some problems in the complete understanding of the text.

We have exhaustively analysed 'Tintern Abbey' in the rich Buddhist epistemological framework. [see the Table of Analysis 4] Here the propositions (total 31 propositions) represent complete semantic units. Then the types of the experience have been identified. In the final stage the concerned means of knowledge has been illustrated. In a few cases some types of experiences as well as some instruments of cognition are overlapping. But this poses no problem to our analysis. We have recorded both the alternatives. As in the statement:

Five years have past;

it is both the actual length of the time as well as a recollection of five years which have past. But certainly the actual is more dominant than the recollected one. Similarly in the case of

Or of some Hermit's cave . . . Hermit sits alone [Lines 21-22]

the 'wreaths of smoke' is the cause (*hetu)* of the 'inference of the self'. The deep concentration on the cause bring him the cognition of some lonely Hermit (his own *citta* is also involved which is endowed with such auspicious impressions). Now this is also a phenomenon of 'intuitive perception'.

At last we have posited the total number of experiences and means of knowledge. In our final analysis a clear characterisation

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39. Prof. Stcherbaksky has translated *parārthānumāna* as 'syllogism', see *BL* (1), p. 275.

of the poet's epistemology emerges. The dominant type of experience is 'imagined' and the poet's epistemology basically is the 'mental perception'. It is important to note that 'inference forself' is more frequent than the 'inference for other'. 'Mental Perception', 'constituting the cognition for the self' and 'imagination' (imagined experience) — these are such elements which are consistent with the credo of poetics of Romanticism also.

These two models will present a contrast when we analyse any 'neo-classical poet' or 'movement poet' in these two analytical frameworks and this will distinguish the very being of the poet and the content of his poetry. (See the Table of Analysis - 4)

(Table of Analysis 4)
An Epistemological Reading of Wordsworth's Tintern Abbey
Model Applied : Buddhist Epistemology

S. No.	Propostion	Type of Experience	Perception				Inference	
		A. Actual, B. Imagined, C. Recollected	Sense	Men-tal	Self-	Intui-tive	for Self 'Infer-ence'	for Others 'Syllogism'
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Five years have past;	actual / recollected		*				
	Five summers with the length of five winters !	imagined / actual		*				
	and again I hear . . . inland murmur [L.1-4]	actual	*					
2.	Once again do, I, behold these steep and lofty	actual	*					
	cliffs, That on a wild . . . the quiet of the sky [L. 4-8].	imagined		*				
3.	The day is come . . . dark sycamore,	actual	(*)		*			
	and view . . . . unripe fruits	actual	*					
	Are clad in . . . and lose . . . and copses [L. 9-14]	actual / imagined	*					

4.	Once again I see . . . run wild . . . the trees !	actual	*					
	With some uncertain notice . . . houseless woods,	Imagined					*	
	Or of some Hermit's cave . . . sits alone	Imagined				*	*	
	[L. 14-22]							
5.	These beauteous forms, . . . a blindman's eye	actual			*			
	But oft, in lonely rooms . . . sensation sweet	recollected		*				
	Felt in blood . . . with tranquil restoration:	imagined				*		
	feelings too . . .							
	Of unremembered pleasure . . .of love [L. 22-36]	recollected			*			
6.	Nor less trust . . . more sublime . . is lightened:	imagined				*		
	that scene and blessed mood,							
	In which the affections . . . life of the things.	imagined				*		
	[L. 36-50]							
7.	If this . . . the fever of the world							
	Have hung upon the beatings of my heart	imagined		(*)	*			
	[L. 51-56]							
8.	How often, in spirit . . . turned to thee ! [L. 57-59]	imagined		(*)	*			
9.	And now, with gleams of . . . revives again.	recollected		*				
	[L. 60-63]							
10.	While here I stand . . . for future years [L. 64.67]	imagined		*				

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
11.	And so I dare to hope . . . among these hills, when like a roe I bounded . . . whenever nature led: [L. 67-72]	recollected imagined & recollected		*				
12.	more like a man . . . he loved. [L. 72-74]	imagined			*			
13.	For nature then . . . . . was all in all. . . . what then I was [L. 74-78]	recollected		*				
14.	The sounding cataract . . . gloomy wood [L. 78-80]	imagined/ recollected		*				
15.	Their colours and their forms . . . from the eyes— [L. 81-85]	recollected	(*)	*				
16.	That time is past, . . . dizzy raptures [L. 85-87]	recollected		(*)	*			
17.	Not for this . . . abundant recompence. [L. 87-90]	recollected		(*)	*			
18.	For I have learned . . . chasten and subdue [L. 90-91]	imagined				*		
19.	And I have felt . . . of elevated thoughts	imagined		(*)	*			

	a sense sublime . . . rolls through all things [L. 95-104]	imagined		*			*	
20.	Therefore I am still . . . Of eye, and ear, — both what they half create . . . of all my moral being [L. 104-13]	actual imagined/ recollected	*	(*) *				
21.	Not perchance . . . spirits to decay [L. 114-16]	imagined			*			
22.	For thou art with me . . . My dear, dear Friend [L. 117-19]	actual	*	(*)				
23.	and in thy voice . . . of thy wild eyes [L. 119-22]	recollected		*	(*)			
24.	Oh ! yet a little while . . . I was once [L. 122-23]	recollected	*					
25.	My dear, dear Sister . . . that Nature never did betray The heart that loved her; [L. 124-6]	imagined				*		
26.	'tis her previlege, . . . from joy to joy, [L. 125-8]	imagined		*	(*)			
27.	for she can so inform . . . or disturb [L. 128-35]	imagined		*	(*)			
28.	Our cheerful faith . . . full of blessings [L. 136-7]	imagined		(*)		*	(*)	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
29.	Therefore let the moon . . . my exhortations ! [L. 137-49]	imagined		(*)		*	(*)	
30.	Not perchance . . . of holier love [L. 149-158]	imagined		*	(*)			
31.	Nor wilt thou then forget . . . for thy sake ! [L. 158-62]	imagined/ actual			*			
	Total	1. Actual = 11 (+1) 2. Imagined = 26 (+1) 3. Recollected = 11 +(3)	= 8 + (2)	=16 + (9)	=11+(4)	= 8	= 3+ (2)	

Notes:

1. The asterisks * show the occurrence of the types of experiences in the pertinent columns.
2. These asterisks which are in parenthesis refer to less dominant means of knowledge in comparsion to those which occur without parenthetical marks.
3. In the column 'Types of Experience' some types occur with oblique (/) marks. In this case the first type has been identified as more competent than the latter. In the Total these secondary types have been given in round brackets.

Constitution of Meaning in 'Tintern Abbey' An Example Analysis in Buddhist Theory of Meaning

In their reinterpretations of *apoha* theory of meaning Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti have modified the theory in a significant way. They made this theory functional and appropriate for discourse analysis by exploring two things already inherent in the theory:

(i) two types of negation — complete or absolute and relative or partial.[40]

(ii) its potential for discourse analysis.[41] We should keep two more points in view, that

(1) *apoha* does not deal with binary oppositions — like structuralism and deconstruction because here cow and non-cow are mutually complementary to each other and not in any dichotomical relation. Again a notion of objectivity is postulated even in the 'non-cow'.[42] So it does not involve *regressus ad infinitum* or clôture.

(2) *apoha* theory of meaning is associated with the stages in cognition through the words.

We have taken out a section of 'Tintern Abbey' for analysis in the framework of Buddhist Theory of Meaning. This section has been said 'to contain all the doctrinal juice of Romantic poetry'. However we shall examine how does a reader whose epistemology includes only language or words approach a text which is a linguistic 'reality' for him.

We have taken two parameters for this analysis — (1) lexical, and (2) sentential or discoursal — on which we shall be examining subsequently.

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40. *TS*, 1003-4.
41. *AS*, of Ratnakīrti.
42. *Ibid.*, 1004.

(1) Lexical

Word	*Types of Apoha*		*Absolute*	*Final Cognition of the object positive entity or concept*
	Primary Conceptual	*Secondary Objective*		
I	non-I	Other than 'I' (you, he, etc.)	not non-I	= I (an individual)
learn	non-learning	other than non-learning	not non-learning	= learning (as a distinct act)
nature	non-nature	other than nature	not non-nature	= nature
hour	non-hour	other than hour	not non-hour	= hour
thoughtless	non-thoughtless	other than thoughtless 'thoughtful'	not non-thoughtless	= thought lessness
youth	non-youth	other than youth (old, child)	not non-youth	= youth
still	non-still	other than still	not non-still	= still
sad	non-sad	other than sad (happy)	not non-sad	= sad
music	non-music	other than music (harsh)	not non-music	= music
humanity	non-humanity	other than humanity	not non-humanity	= humanity

* For theoretical details see chapters 3 "Buddhist Theory of Meaning" *Apohavāda*

Constitution of Meaning in 'Tintern Abbey'

Model applied: *Apoha* (Buddhist Theory of Meaning) Extract from the poem:

90 For *I* have *learned*
91 To look on *nature*, not as in the *hour*
92 Of *thoughtless youth*: but *hearing often times*
93 The *still* and *sad music* of *humanity,*
94 Nor *harsh* nor *grating*, though of *ample power*
To *chasten* and *subdue.*

These three types of *apoha* refer to the three successive stages in the verbal comprehension. At the level of 'conceptual' meaning a term is contained as pure concept without any positive meaning in it. As in Table of Lexical analysis 'I' is a purely conceputal construct which is its primary connotation. This is differential in nature. As the secondary meaning there are two levels as objective and absolute where the same conceptual construct occurs now with the notion of its existence in the objective/external world. So 'I' is now cognised as a physical-real entity. In the next stage, at the level of absolute it is established that this 'physical-real entity' is nothing but 'I' itself. Then in the final stage of cognition this conceptual construct becomes almost identical with the ontologically existing entity 'I' and hence its import becomes positive and real. All the other terms can be understood in the same cognitive process.

(2) Sentential/Discoursal

So far the sentential meaning is concerned Ratnakīrti states that in a sentence each and every word negates its counter-correlate and hence at last they all form a single meaningful linguistic unit, i.e., sentence. For instance consider this sentence:

And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with joy.
of elevated thought.

All the words like 'I', 'felt', 'presence', 'disturbs', they all convey their meaning by excluding non-I, non-felt, non-presence, non-disturbed, respectively and finally posit a positive sentential meaning. The same is applicable to any discourse analysis.

We have argued that three analytical models are integral in nature because they all are associated with the problem of cognition, especially the verbal cognition. We may summarise the structure of verbal comprehension in the following way:

The Three-fold Cognition of the Text

ālaya and other forms of consciousness related to the 'poet' only	Reader-Poet Interface	Reader's meaning
Consciousness (*vijñāna*)	Epistemology of the Poet and the Reader	*apoha*

5

Conclusion

BUDDHIST theory of meaning has acquired a very conspicuous position in the whole intellectual discussion of language and meaning. The theory has been in constant debate in the tradition for its unique theoretical position.

The various aspects of this theory have been studied and examined in the previous chapters.

The first chapter constitutes the background for the discussion on language and meaning taking support from the modern and traditional debates. It posits that the issue which are stated in the source — texts (non-contingent), they have been all the time pertinent in the philosophy of language. The next part of this chapter discusses the Indian theories of meaning by explicating their basic theoretical assumption from which they have emerged. There appear many notions of similarity and difference in the contentions of these theories of meaning. This gives the whole debate a perspective so that the Buddhist view on language and meaning can be understood.

The second chapter mainly deals with the evolution of linguistic sign in the Buddhist system of thought. It has been shown that this linguistic sign is a product of rich classification of the basic elements of the world (both physical and mental). This chapter also denies the claim that the theory of meaning (*apoha*) was originally expounded by Diṅnāga. After this discussion it seems difficult to deny the contribution of earlier Buddhist philsophers to the *apoha*

theory of meaning. Certainly this does not cause any discordance with the already established fact. Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti are all time great philosophers and logicians.

The third chapter is the very 'soul' of this work. It devotes itself to the study of Buddhist theory of meaning on the basis of primary source materials — like *Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pramāṇavārttika, Tattvasaṁgraha* and *Apohasiddhi*. It demystifies many false assumptions associated with the theory. Both the views related to that of the opponents and exponents have been presented. It has been argued there that this theory was not 'changed' under the constant attack from the Realist and other schools. Later scholars who reinterpreted the theory in the light of opponents' criticism were also consistent with the whole system.

The fourth chapter has set the objective to explore the applicational aspects of the theory. One of the masterpieces of Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey' has been analysed in the model emerging from our whole discussion on language and meaning.

And at last a glossary of conceptual Sanskrit terms has been appended to this work to provide a proper perspective to the whole discussion. Here most of the entries carrying the references from the primary texts of philosophy, linguistics and literature. In their original expositions of the theory the Buddhist theoreticians have used the language heavily loaded with technical terms. There has been a common tendency among the Buddhists to differ from the other schools and make their own standpoint even regarding the very common issues. All the time they are not relying much on Grammarian's work so far as the linguistic materials are concerned. They have meticulously searched for the new uncommon verb roots and have defined them very rigidly which appears deviant from the common usages and understanding. That was the reason to add a cross-referential working glossary supported by authentic sources. It is interesting to study how different philosophical systems take their respective philosophical positions in examining and defining the same concept. Indian philosophical system presents an integral taxonomy of thought. This glossary has been prepared for a better understanding of the Buddhists' positions regarding various issues

like language, world, reality, categories, etc. The glossary is not complete but it is expected that it will serve our present purpose.

Chapter four which is crucial from the analytical point of view should have been developed in a more specific way. Each and every word and line of the poem should have been analysed in detail in these conceptual frameworks for full exposition of the structures of cognition and meaning in the literary text. The three models suggested for literary analysis are basically cognitive in nature and work in integrity. It can be expected that this study will attract some bright research scholars in this area for further studies. Furthermore, two tremendous possibilities are still due for a serious and in-depth study of *apoha* and 'deconstruction'. The other area which is to be explored is the various dimensions of Saussurean linguistics in the context of Indian linguistic thought.

The parallel debate in language and meaning in the modern European philosophy has not been brought much in the present work. Though this was not a requisite, even then the seminal discussions in the European tradition might have thrown much light on these discussions.

In many respects the theory fulfils a researcher's expectations. It provides a very powerful model which could be applied for literary analysis and its epistemological explanation.

This study has been carried out under the constraint of time and space. There may be many shortcomings considering the scope of the work and they are almost inevitable at this stage of learning. Mistakes are solely due to my intellectual limitations. Here it is concluded with Śrī Kumārila's words:

āgamapravaṇaścāhaṁ nāpavadyaḥ skhalannapi
na hi sadvartmanā gacchan skhalite svapyuapodyate.

[Reverencing the scripture as I do, let none reproach me, should I err in exposition. He who goes by the *right path* need not be censured, even if he slips occasionally.]

[*ŚV*, I.7]

A Glossary of Conceptual Sanskrit Terms

ābhāsa: appearance, falsity; whatever is existential can be stated in language; involves knower, knowable and knowledge.

ābhāsavāda: theory of appearance: a theory in Advaita which posits that being is an illusory appearance of *Brahman*; a variation of *pratibimbavāda*. According to the Kāśmīr Śaivism, the universe consists of appearance which are all real because they all reflect the aspects of the ultimate Reality.

abhāva: absence, negation, non-existence; the seventh category of *padārtha* in the Vaiśeṣika system. In Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Dvaita schools — non-existence is an independent-category. Buddhism, Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā and Viśiṣṭādvaita schools refute this as a distinct category and include either with *arthāpatti*, or *anumāna*. Two main kinds: (a) *saṁsarga abhāva* — the non-presence of one entity in another, (b) *ananya abhāva* — reciprocal non-existence, i.e., one object is not identical with another.

abhāvātmaka: a kind of *dharma* in Jainism which suggests the distinction of one thing from another by means of negation or non-presence. *See padārtha.*

Abhidhamma Piṭaka: *See Piṭaka abhidharma* and *Tripiṭaka.*

abhidharma: (also *abhidhamma*), the third casket containing philosophical discourses of Lord Buddha; that which explains the different manifestations of the single *dharma;* that which refutes the opinion of the other philosophical systems; that which provides proper exposition of the

Buddhist principles or thoughts. [See *MSL,* XI.3]

abhidhāna: act of naming, denotation. [*PS*, V.9]

abhidheya: nameable; that which is expressed or made known through a verbal symbol. [*PS*, V.12, 15]

abhihitānvayavāda: a theory of the comprehension of sentential meaning proposed by Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka and some Naiyāyika: words independently signify their own separate word meanings and combine again to effect a single sentential meaning. Hence sentence is a later cognition emerging from the constitution of word meanings. One first recalls the isolated word meanings and then simultaneously collective memory gives rise to the same collective meaning. Three factors involve this cognition, i.e., mutual expectancy, logical compatability and spatio-temporal contiguity. [*Śābara Bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* I.1.25, *Tantravārttika,* p. 445, *SV*, *Śabda* section] *see anvitābhidhānavāda.*

abhimāna: conceit, attachment. the function of *ahaṁkāra*, a state of mind which associates experiences to the self and interprets them as one's own.

abhinava anyathākhyātivāda: neo-theory of otherwise apprehension; a theory of false cognition in the Dvaita system which explains that what is perceived in false cognition is unreal but it stems from the real substratum. a Dvaita theory of error which explains that what is seen in erroneous cognition is unreal but it is rooted in a substrate which is real.

Abhinavagupta: the famous most authentic philosopher of Śivādvaita system and author of *Tantrāloka* and *Abhinavabhāratī* (a commentary on *Nāṭyaśāstra*).

abhinnanimittopādāna: non-difference of efficient and material causes. The Advaitins holds that both of these causes are non-different because they have common substratum *Brahman*.

abhinnarūpa: non-different sign; a grammatical term for the words of same phonetic form which refer both to the universal as well as the particular. Names of some colours and adjectives are *abhinnarūpa*.

Ex.: *śukla* = the colour white in general = a white thing in particular. [*PS*, V.9]

acala: rejection, one of the prominent *asaṁskṛta dharma* in the classification of *padārtha* in the Yogācārya idealism; one attains this level of consciousness when there is complete rejection of all the feelings of grief and happiness; comparable to the conception of *sthitaprajñatā* [*See Gītā*, II. 54-72] However, *sthithprajñā* is a more positive concept.

ādhāra: container, it is asymetrically related to *ādheya*, i.e., that which is contained; *A* contains *B* but *B* does not contain *A*.

ādheya: contained, supported *See ādhāra*.

adhipati pratyaya: sense-organs; one of the four causes of cognition in the Buddhist philosophy. *See ālambana pratyaya*.

adhyāropa: superimposition; one of the elements of 'imposition-exclusion method' [*adhyāropa-apavādavidhi*] used in exposition of *Brahman*. The method has been accepted in both Vedānta and Buddhism. [*See VC*, 156-213 *MMK*, XXIV.10].

Genererally the term suggests false reality as in the metaphorical expressions. *See apavāda*.

adhyāsa: superimposition also; false attribution, two kinds: (1) *svarūpa adhyāsa:* superimposing illusory (*mithyā*) object or form on something real, i. e., superimposition of snake on rope. (2) *saṁsarga adhyāsa:* superimposition of attribute on an object — redness upon a crystal which is in fact appears as such due to proximity of a red object. Again two divisions on the basis of cognition: (1) *artha adhyāsa* superimposition of sign/word upon an object. (2) *jñāna adhyāsa*: superimposition of the cognition of one (previous) object on the other (latter).

Other two kinds of superimposition (*dharma*, *dharmi*) relate to objects and attributes. See *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*.

ādi: beyond known birth and death. *See nitya.*

ādiśānta: selfless; things are devoid of their own nature. *Mādhyamika*'s designation of wordly objects. [*MMK*, VII.16]

adṛṣṭa: unseen, unobserved; merit or demerit of an action as unseen, a Vaiśeṣika concept. *See apūrva*.

adṛṣṭi: non-observation; especially in context of overlooking an exception to a general rule. According to Diṅnāga a rule remains competent so far as no counter-example is observed. [*PS*, V.31, 34].

Advaita: a Vedāntic system of thought expounded by Ādi Śaṅkara which accounts for the non-difference between supreme Being and the self.

āgama: Scripture, scriptural truth, verbal means of knowledge; that which has come down by tradition, accepted means of knowledge in the philosophical systems of Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā (Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa), Vedānta and Paurāṇika. The Vedāntic epistemology accepts the Vedas as non-contingent source of knowledge. In the early Buddhist thought there is refutation of whole epistemology and a debate over the validity of the Buddhist Scripture (*Tripiṭaka*). But in the later development of Buddhist epistemology, the *Suttapiṭaka* becomes a valid source of knowledge for the Sautrāntika. Buddhism, being a *nāstika darśana* rejects the sole authority of the Veda. It is useful to maintain a distinction between 'Scriptural authority' (*āgama pramāṇa*) and 'verbal testimony' (*śabda pramāṇa*) in the context of Buddhist epistemology. *See Pramāṇa*

also; *āgama* is a common designation for *Sūtra* given by Sarvāstivādin. Thervāda *sūtras* are called *nikāya*.

ahaṁkāra: self-awareness, realisation of the self in a specific form; this is an illusory form which hides our true self; a Vedāntic

concept in which it is considered as a product of ignorance (*avidyā*). In the Sāṁkhya system the third element of creation, a conceit of individuality. In the works of Kāśmīr Śaivism, *ahaṁkāra* is equal to *ahaṁdhi*, i.e., awareness of the self, I- consciousness a more positive concept at the level of absolute being; also in the Vedānta — *ahaṁ brahmāsmi*, i.e., I am *Brahman*. In the context of Buddhism the term is very close to *kliṣṭa mano-vijñāna*. *See mano-vijñāna.*

aitihya: legendary account; it is considered as one of the *pramāṇas* in the Paurāṇika system along with perception, inference, scriptual authority, etc.

ajahallakṣaṇā: non-exclusive implication; where primary meaning is retained and added by the implied meaning. *See lakṣaṇā*.

ajātivāda: theory of non-origination; an Advaita theory often associated with Gauḍapāda It refutes any kind of causal change; nothing originates nothing destroys. The Mādhyamika school also holds the same thought.

ājīvaka: a philosophy of life proposed by Makhali Ghoṣāla contemporary of Lord Buddha; which tried to explain all the situations of life in terms of destiny and hardly leaves any scope for the utility of good actions.

ākāṅksana: anticipation, a term in grammar and semantics for the expectation created in the hearer's mind of an expression for further information, one of the three elements of syntactic unity discussed in the philosophy. Other two are logical compatibility and spatio-temporal contiguity, i.e., *yogyatā* and *āsatti* or sannidhi. [*See PS*, V.26]

ākāra: physical form; that which is perceived in terms of huge or small, a conceptual construct; though a debatable issue in the Sautrāntika system whether form is given or constructed mentally or constituted by both.

ākāśa: space, an *asaṁskṛta dharma* which neither conceals anything nor is concealed by anything; that which is

uncovered [*AK*, I.5], not void or empty. One of the nine *dravyas* (substances) recognised in the Vaiśeṣika system — a substratum of quality 'sound'.

akhaṇḍapakṣa: one of the two main approaches to the study of problems of meaning in the Indian linguistic tradition; this assumes the sentence as the basic/primary unit of meaning or cognition; chiefly the Grammarians conception of basic meaningful unit; close to the Gestalt view in psychology. [*See VP*, I.93-94; *SP*, V.19].

akhaṇḍavākyārtha: integral sentential meaning, identity statement; Grammarian's conception of sentential meaning; also a sentence where the subject and predicate refer to the same identity: 'Thou art that'. Here 'Thou' and 'That' are completely identical, metaphorically as well as literally.

akhyāti: non-perception, non-cognition, a theory of error in the Saṁkhya and the Prābhākara — Mīmāṁsā which is caused by the failure to realise the difference between the 'seen' and the 'remembered' objects etymologically similar to *anupalabdhi* but technically different. *See ākhyātivāda, anupalabdhi.*

akhyātivāda: also a theory of error in Nyāya the object of illusion is due to the non-perception. See *akhyāti*.

ākṛti: generic shape, configuration, appearance; that which is constituted by the components of entity and which is marked with class (*jāti*) and distinguishing features (*liṅgas*). In Buddhism, it is merely a conceptual construct, not real. [*See NS*, II.2.68-71] *See Jāti.*

akṛtatāvāda: a principle expounded by Prakruddha Kātyāyana; all *padārtha* (objects) are constituted of seven elements, i.e., earth, air, water, energy, grief, happiness and consciousness; nothing can be destroyed or altered. *See akriyāvāda*

akriyāvāda: a theory expounded by Pūrṇa Kaśyapa, contemporary of Lord Buddha which negates the effects of an action and also refutes the classification of actions as good and bad.

akṣara: non-transient, non-divisible, for the *Brahman* and syllable; when used in the neuter gender it means *māyā*, *prakṛti*, etc. *See māyā* and *prakrti*.

akuśala: one of the six *cittasamprayukta dharma* which causes inauspicious consequences. *See āśrava*, *caittadharma*.

ālambana pratyaya: substratum of cognition; an object of direct perception, first among the four determinants of perceptible knowledge; in cognition of pitcher, pitcher is substratum of cognition. *See pratyaya*.

alaya: indissoluble, imperishable; a Buddhist term that corresponds to *akṣara*; some Buddhists consider *alaya* as higher than *ālaya or ālayā-vijñāna*. *See akṣara* and *ālaya*.

ālaya: receptcle; also *ālaya-vijñāna* which means an 'abode of all cognitions'; the most powerful concept of Yogācāra idealism. All *dharmas* (essential elements) dwell here in the seed form. All *padārthas* originate from and submerge into it. It is always in flux, unlike the concept of *ātman* in the Vedānta philosophy. It has five *dharmas* of the receptive self (*citta*). *See dharma* and *citta*.

amūrta: Subtle, formless, incorporeal; not having a physical body, the property of incorporeality; which occurs in a sound; in Diṅnāga's stock example, a property that has the first two characteristics but lacks the third one of proper evidence. The subject of inference which also occurs in other objects such as action in the induction domain that possesses transitoriness which is the property to be conformed. However, since it is not always absent with the absence of the property of transitoriness, it cannot be used as evidence for transitoriness. [*PS*, II.7].

In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, *amūrta guṇa,* formlessness is a quality which is incorporeal such as *dharma*.

Ānanda: an intimate disciple of the Buddha who later on compiled the *Sutta Piṭaka*.

anantya: innumerability; the state of being infinite or uncountable. Diṅnāga argues that through the symbol no object is fully and definitinely known. [*PS* V.2]

anātma: selflessness; unlike the Vedāntic concept of *ātman*. *See nairātmyavāda*.

anekāntavāda: theory of variability; the doctrine that reality is a mode and all modes of perception are true; all relative truths are true and have their absoluteness; a positive concept. *See aniścitatāvāda* and *syādvāda* [*See PS*, V.11].

aṅga: limb or part; In Buddhism; the name of each member of the twelve links in the causal chain of existence. *See pratītyasamutpāda*.

anirvacanīya: inexplicable, in the Mādhyamika thought Absolute Being is *anirvacanīya* and can only be designated as *śūnya*. *See śūnya.*

anirvacanīya-khyāti-vāda: theory of non-manifestation; the principle that the object of illusion is inexplicable in terms of Being or non-Being, reality or unreality, truth or falsity; an Advaita Vedāntic concept which accounts that the ultimate reality cannot be expressed in terms of existence, non-existence or both.

aniscitatā-vāda: non-determinism; a principle advocated by Sanjaya Velṭhiputta, a contemporary of Lord Buddha. It differs from *anaikāntavāda* in negation of all the categories of reality and strongly propagates that the nature of an object cannot be fully determined. *See syādvāda.*

anitya: transient, momentary; a powerful concept in Buddhism, nothing is given forever and static, all the objects are in the constant flux, all complex things being successively comprised or created of smaller units are *anitya*.

antahkaraṇa: inner instrument, the inner self; consisting of intellect (*buddhi*), a specific form of the self (*ahaṁkāra*) and mind (*manas*), its function is to unite all the sensations and present them to the *ātman*. *See buddhi, ahaṁkāra* and

manas.

anumāna: inference; its object is universal (*sāmānya*). According to Diṅnāga, the term implies any cognitive act of which the domain is wholly or partly constituted of universals, names or synthetic judgement. In the Buddhist epistemology inference comes after perception (*pratyakṣa*). [*PS* II.5, V.1] *See pratyakṣa.*

anumeya: inferable object; an object which is determined/informed by means of inference. [*PS*, II.5]

anupalabdhi: non-presence negation; a valid means of knowledge in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. *See pramāṇa.*

anvitābhidhānavāda: a theory of comprehension of sentential meaning expounded by the Prābhākara School of Mīmāṁsā which asserts that words acquire their meaning from their mutual syntactic relations.

anyāpoha: counter-correlates; which is contextually negated in order to ascertain the meaning of a word, often associated with *apoha*. *See apoha.*

anyathākhyātivāda: a Nyāya theory of alternative cognition in which an object is cognized in the form of the other object; illusion in the perception of the object actually present as determined by the form (universal) of a remembered object.

apāna: *See prāṇa.*

aparā: one of the fundamental primordial matters/power of *Brahman*; i.e., transient nature, the other element is *parā*.

aparokṣa: direct (immediate) cognition; like the cognition of the existence of one's self, a Jain concept of reality.

apavāda: exclusion; opposite to *adhyāropa*, to exclude all those imposed elements which are not consistent with the object. This is the only method (method of imposition and exclusion) to describe the ultimate reality; equally acceptable in the Vedānta and Buddhist philsophical systems. *See adhyāropa.*

apoḍha: removed from (with ablative case); as in *kalpanāpoḍha* i.e. devoid of imagination. [*PS*, I.3; *PV*, II.123].

apodhara: a grammatical term for analytical process of reasoning by which the meanings of individual words are determined. [*PS*, V.46].

apoha: contextual exclusion or differentiation; the Buddhist theory of meaning/import of words, often associated with *anyāpoha* *See anyāpoha*.

apohanaṁ: reasoning faculty; exclusion by logical reasoning (of the facts/elements irrelevant to the context).

aprameya: unknowable, unmapable; that which falls outside the domain of epistemolgy. Being unmapable is the example of a property that does not serve as an inferential sign becaue it cannot be observed is a subject or in an object in the induction domain and thus fails to satisfy any of the three characteristics of proper evidence. [*PS*, II:7].

apratisaṁkhyānirodha: abstinence even without any role of intellect; that abstinence which emerges naturally, one of the *asaṁskr̥ta dharma* acceptable to Sarvavastivādin, Vaibhāṣika and Vijñānvādin. *See* under *asaṁskr̥ta dharma*.

apr̥thak-siddhi: a doctrine in Viśiṣṭādvaita. *See samānādhikaraṇya*.

āpta: a credible person; statement of such a person, one of the valid means of knowledge; but reliability of statements depends upon and is relative to the reliability of those who transmit and interpret it. [*PS*, II.5]. *See pramāṇa*.

apūrva: the extraordinary merit; another name for *adr̥ṣṭa*; a concept in the Mīmāṁsā philosophy. *See avijñapti*.

āropa: imposition, juxtaposition; as in the metaphorical expressions which are mental constructs and not parts of reality. In poetics, imposition is made on the basis of shared attributes of form, colour, effect, etc.

artha: meaning, means; an object denoted by a sign, a sign's meaning [*PS*, V.9]; also means instrument or purpose in the

context of four goals of life, i.e., merit, means, desire, and liberation through knowledge.

arthajñāna: cognition of the object/meaning of a word; meaning is cognition of the object, denotation or import of words.

arthakriyā: significant act; only a real entity can do a significant act, as an object pitcher can contain water and not the word 'pitcher'. One of the characteristics of a 'thing-in-self' in the Buddhist philosophy. *See svalakṣaṇa.*

arthākṣepa: disjunctive syllogism; particular method of reasoning in which first a general set of alternatives is established such that at least one alternative of the set is true and then one of the alternatives is affirmed by denying all others [*PS*, V.11]; also — transference of meaning; as in the secondary and the suggested meanings.

arthāpatti: postulation; a valid means of knowledge in the Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta philosophy. Ex.: 'Devadutta does not eat by day, yet he is fat' implies he eats by night; in other philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Buddhism — it is a form of inference.

arthavāda: eulogistic meaning; a Mīmāṁsā conception of meaning (of sentence) referring to corroborative sentence or supplementary texts which explains the injunctive texts.

arūpa: non-material, mental; a conception of world (*dhātu*) which is constituted of the basic mental elements (*dharma* and *manovijñāna dhātu*). *See dhātu* and *dharma*.

arūpa-dhātu: non-formal physical elements. *See dhātu.*

asaṁskr̥ta: unoriginated; one of the two *dharma* in the classification of the Buddhist ontology which is not born of any cause; without known origin, accepted as given (*nitya*); the other *dharma* is *saṁskr̥ta* (originated).

Six kinds of *asaṁskr̥ta dharma*s are distinguished: See the diagram no. 5 of chapter 2 of this work. (on p. 73)

asamavāyī kāraṇa: non-inherent cause, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are three causes of any effect/work:

(i) *samavāyī* inherent; as threads for cloth.

(ii) *asamavāyī* non-inherent; as association (weaving) of these threads.

(iii) *nimitta* efficient; as weaver and his instrument.

See kāraṇa, nimitta kāraṇa, upādāna kāraṇa.

asat: unreal; that which is contradicted in all the time, as rabbit's horn.

asatkhyātivāda: a theory of non-real imposition; it asserts that the object of illusion is unreal; generally attributed by the rivals to Nāgārjuna. Imposition is unreal in the Buddhist thought; but Śaṅkara holds that it is only illusory.

āśrava: impure, originated; influx of matters/element caused by law of causality. In Buddhism, this is a kind of *dharma* which causes inauspicious consequences. *See akuśala, drvyāśrava* and *saṁskr̥ta dharma.*

asvatantra: dependent; Diṅnāga uses this term for grammatical subordination or phrasal agreement in a sentence. [*PS*, V.4]

ātmākhyāti: In Yogācāra idealism, the sense of illusion is one's own form of cognition (*vijñāna*). *See khyātivāda.*

avācya: non-expressible; linguistic expressions cannot denote the ultimate reality. Objects of sensation are also held inexpressible as no symbol can be applied uniquely to a sensedatum. syntactic relations are considered inexplicable as there is no word in a sentence that names a relation directly; relations are indicated by case inflections and other bound morphemes. [*PS*, II.10].

avidyā: nescience, ignorance; that which hides the real self; root cause of suffering in the view of the Buddhist and Vedāntic philosophical systems in which the 'world' continues to

exist due to ignorance, and *prajñā* (wisdom) obstructs this continuity and leads to tranquillity and peace.

avijñapti: non-manifest effect; one of the two types of action — another one is *vijñapti*. The consequences of some actions surface in cource of time; equal to *adṛṣṭa* and *apūrva*. *See* under these entries. [*See AK*, I.11, IV.13-25]

avasthāpariṇāma: transformation in state of being; *See pariṇāma*.

avinābhāva: inherent character; equal to *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance); [*See PV*, I.33 and its autocommentary, [*SDS: Baudha darśanaṁ*]

avisaṁvāda: non-deceptive; an essential criterion of true knowledge. [*PS*, 2.5]. According to Dharmakīrti, *asvisaṁvāda* is the name of process of communication of true/desired knowledge [*see PV*, I.3].

avyabhicāra: being inerrant; restricting a term or property only to that in which the given property is present. [*See PS*, II.8, 11, V.9].

āyatana: support; the way to get into; (*ayaṁ praveśaṁ tanotīti āyatanaṁ*). For sense-organs and the objects, *āyatana* is the common name.

Bhartṛhari: the celebrated philosopher-grammarian whose renowned work is the *Vākyapadīya*.

bhava: birth, being, existence; that action which causes next birth. [See *BHT*, II.2.19]

bhāva: that which is or brought about; (*bhavati iti bhāvaḥ*), that which passes through action; other meanings — purpose, psychological state, meaning, etc.

bhavapratyaya: cognition of the world; a kind and stage of meditation where the ability to submerge into primordial element (*prakṛti laya*) is achieved but there is no use of absolute cognition. This results in reincarnation. [*See YS*, I.19]

bhautika-vāda: materialism; the theory which only accepts the

existence of matter (*bhūta*) and refutes any independent existence of mind or *ātman*. *See ucchedvāda*.

bheda: difference; our intellect constructs difference or similarity in the given reality.

bhūta: matter, external objects; a set of atoms. *See citta*.

bhūta koṭi: category of absolute beings; termination of all constructed truths by our intellect, absolute truth. Its other synonyms are *śūnyatā* (voidness), *tathatā* (suchness), *dharma dhātu* (integrity of objects) etc.

bodhārtha: conceptual meaning; the import or word is the idea/ mental image of the object.

Bodhisattva: the person who has desire of knowledge; the Buddha. who deserves pure cognition (*prajñā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*). A Mahāyāna conception of an enlightened person who has capability to emancipate other people also; in opposition to the Hīnayāna conception of *arhata* who can emancipate himself only. *See prajñā* and *karuṇā*.

Buddha: the enlightened one.

buddhi: intellect; that power of mind which processes/rearranges the given or perceived things in terms of similarity or difference and constructs a new order of cognition.

Brahman: the Absolute, the Real, the ultimate Reality.

caitta dharma: of the receptive self; also called *caittasika* and *cittasamprayukta*; Sthaviravādī and Vijñānavādī differ in their classification of *caitta dharma*. These *dharma*s are intimately associated with *citta*. [*See BDM*, pp. 170-3].

Cārvāka: founder of materialist school of philosophy.

cetanā: sense, mental act; one of the kinds of action (*karma*). *See cetanājanya*.

cetanājanya: born of sense or mind; it results in physical act which is of two kinds — *vijñapti* and *avijñapti*. *See vijñapati*.

citta: the receptive self; that which gathers (*cinoti*) the experiences and integrates all knowledge and constitutes the appreciative mind; in Advaita Vedānta, *citta* is the appreciative function of the inner self; that which makes a thing conscious (*cetyati*); in Sāṁkhya-Yoga, *citta* is a synonym for *buddhi, vijñāna* and *sattva*; in Buddhism, *citta* is synonym for *jīva*, *mana, vijñapti* and *vijñāna*; *citta* is a single *dharma* but on basis of different substrata it manifests itself in seven forms, i.e., five sense-organs, mind and intellect (*khiṣtamana*); *citta* is a means of direct cognition of an object in the Buddhist thought, its existence is relative to the sense-organs and other related objects. [*See LS*, Gāthā, 145].

citta mahābhūmika: A kind of *caitta dharma*; mental/internal *dharmas*; which are always present in the cognition of an object as feeling, naming, awareness, desire for the object, touch, discriminatory faculty of mind, recollection, intentness (*avadhāna*); substratum of the object and concentration — in all 10. Vijñānavādin's classification of these *dharma* is more logical and systematic. [*See BDM*, p. 171].

citta viprayukta: dissociated from the receptive self; those *dharmas* which cannot be classified under physical or mental *dharma*; *dharma* like birth, continuance, decay, etc., are difficult to classify in terms of physical or mental. One of the elements/ kinds of these *dharmas* is *nikāya-saṁagata* which constitutes similarity among different objects; similar to the Vaiśeṣika conception of *sāmānya*. *See sāmānya*.

citta vr̥tti: disposition or state of mind; modes of the receptive self (*citta*); these modes are cognitions of the objects based on the seven strata, the *citta* itself takes manifold cognitive forms [*YS*, I.6-11] and is expressed in language [*VP*; I.112].

darśana: vision, instrument of vision (*dr̥śyate anena iti darśanaṁ*); immediate and intuitive realisation of the Real Self (*ātmā*

vā are dr̥ṣṭavyaḥ Br̥Up, I.4.7) direct cognition, a system of thought. This denotation of *darśana* as a vision can also be observed in the ordering of valid means of knowledge in the Indian epistemology where *pratyakṣa* (perception) precedes the others.

dharma: the basic elements of existence; a common name of *padārtha* in the Buddhist thought, *dharmas* are born of causes (*hetu prabhava*) and tend to decay themselves [*see MV*, I. 23]. They are independent indivisible and momentary. An object is composed more than one *dharmas*. The classification of *dharma* varies with the different Buddhist systems, but two broad categories are: originated (*samkr̥ta*) and unoriginated (*asaṁskr̥ta*), *see saṁskr̥ta*, *asaṁskr̥ta* and *hetu prabhava*, also; that which is named by a predicate term in a proposition. [*See PS*, II.8, 9, 11]

dharma-dhātu: a Buddhist term for Absolute (*paramārtha satya*): its other synonyms are: voidness (*śūnyatā*) suchness (*tathatā*) of essential element, self or (*bhūta koṭi*).

dharma-kāya: the absolute reality in the Mahāyāna sect, sheath of essential element (*dharma*), the void. It refers to both the worldly beings and to the essences of all Buddhas. In the former it means the reality or suchness (*tathatā*) or emptiness and in the latter the Buddha nature. All the Buddha have in common the *dharma-kāya*. It is non-measurable, non-explicable and all-pervasive. It is the base of other two *kāyas* — *sambhoga-kāya* and *nirmāṇa-kāya*.
[*See MSL*; IX.62 *VMS*, Triṁśikā 30]. *See trikāya*.

Dharmakīrti: one of the greatest Buddhist philosophers and logicians; author of *Pramāṇavārttika*.

dharma pariṇāma: change inquality. *See pariṇāma*.

dhātu: basic element, constituent; that which unites in the production of one stream (*santāna*) of events; components of such events. These are six sense-organs, six sense-

objects and the six kinds of resulting consciousness or (*vijñāna*); *dhātu* also means *gotra* [*see AK*, I.20]; other equivalents for *dhātu* are: component, 'element' or 'elements'. [*see CCB*, pp. 8 ft.] In Sāṁkhya and Cārvāka systems it refers to six elements, viz. — earth, air, fire, water, ether, consciousness (*cetanā*) which is also called *puruṣa*.

dhvani: sound, poetic suggestion; a highly loaded term with various interpretations in grammar (speech sound = phoneme), poetics (suggested meaning = *pratīyamāna artha,* quality of poetry *dhvani kāvya*, sound symbolism) philosophy (creative force = *nāda*, a quality of *ākāśa-tattva*), music (musical/harmonious notes) and in *tantra* correct articulation of *mantra* to bring about desired effects, etc.

dik: spatial direction, space; the Vaiśeṣika system considers it as a substance (*dravya*) by means of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, up, down, etc., all-pervasive, and constituted of eternal atoms.

Diṅnāga: a disciple of Vasubandhu, founded the Buddhist logic and epistemology in the fifth century. His most celebrated work is *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, a treatise on epistemology.

dharmatā: the existence of basic elements; the other implied meanings are selflessness (*anātma)* and non-self *nairātmya*.

doṣa: defect; in Buddhism one of the afflictions (*kleśa*), in the context of poetics it means demerits of poetry [*See KL*, 4th chapter]

dravya: substance; a category in Vaiśeṣika system that includes all animate and inanimate entities; a substrate of attributes and actions and as inherent cause of a product. Its nine types are — earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space individuals and mind. Śāntarakṣita refutes this category posited by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school because it is solely based on the strength of verbal authority and totally devoid of reason. [*see TS*: Chapter X]. But substance is a valid and

powerful category also in Jainism (sixth real and independent category) and Viśiṣṭādvaita (one of the fundamental categories — six kinds of substances) and Dvaita: (10 kinds of substances).

Substance has also been discussed as the denotation of word (*padārtha*) along with universal (*jāti/sāmānya*) [*See VP*, III.1.2]

dravyārthika naya: object as substance. In Janisim, three viewpoints are: universal/particular (*naigam*), class (*samgraha*) and individual (*vyavahāra*).

dravya paramāṇu: substance atoms; Buddhism views it as subtlest form of the matter, a unit possessing four-fold substratum of colour, smell, taste, contact though it is invisible, inaudible, untastable and untangible; seven simple atoms constitute one *aṇu* and in the unified form they become perceptible. Both sense-objects as well as sense-organs are the amalgamation of such atoms. [*see AK*, Ist Chapter]

dravyatva: substanceness, thingness; the characteristic of a substance, as universal of the matrix of attributes.

dṛṣṭa: perceived likeness, seen; related to perception (*pratyakṣa*). In Nyāya school of thought it refers to a class of interference in which a previously known case and the inferred case are exactly the same according to Gautama; also a kind of verbal discourse. In grammar, Pāṇini shifted the paradigm from heard (*śruta*) or that which has come down in the tradition to be seen (*dṛṣṭa*) or the actual perception; it is equally valid in the Buddhist epistemology as it comes under perception.

dṛṣṭānta: illustration; the third member of syllogism, e.g., wherever there is smoke there is fire such as in the 'hearth'; one of the sixteen categories in Nyāya system; In Vaiśeṣika *refers to* it is known as *nidarśana;* both of these terms are included in inference (*anumāna*) in epistemology and also discussed in poetics. [*See KL*, III.33, V.26, 27, 55-59]

dṛṣṭārthāpatti: postulation from perceived; a type of *arthāpatti*, a valid means of knowledge in Mīmāṁsa, Vedānta and Paurāṇika systems.

dṛṣṭi-śṛṣṭivāda: perception as creation; a concept in Advaita system that asserts the world is a creation of one's intellect. The world is created by an seer who imagines it. The objects of experience are held to be non-existent before their actual peception.

duḥkha-samudāya: the cause and origin of suffering; a key concept in Buddhism; the second noble truth.

ekārthatā: one meaning; when more than one expressions have the common reference. [*PS*, V. 26]

ekajīvavāda: the theory of one self ; the Advaita system holds there is one *jīva* (self) and one material body, i.e., *Brahman*.

ekavākyatā: one sentenceness, syntactic unity, one meaning; it has two-fold relationship that of a word to sentence (*padaika vākyatā*) and that of a sentence to another sentence as in the continuous text (*vākyaika vākyatā*). Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* ideally exemplifies both kinds of one sentenceness.

gauṇa: implied or secondary (meaning). See *lakṣāṇā*.

Gautama: founder of the Nyāya system of philosophy. His work is *Nyāya Sūtra*.

guṇa: quality, attribute, characteristics; *guṇa* is constituted of three aspects — *sattva* (essence, nature), *raja*s (material substance), and *tamas* (darkness or ignorance); the Nyāya system defines it as that which has substance from its substratum, has no further qualities, and is not the cause of or concerned with conjunction or disjunction. Dvaita asserts 'quality' as the first product of *prakṛti* which always resides in substance. Sāṁkhya explain 'quality' with a metaphor of rope where the three constituents of *Prakṛti* are combined with the individual's self. They provide enjoyment for the individuals and also serve to liberate

them. Roles of quality are — to differentiate one object from others, to determine the thing, to express the degree though the object itself is devoid of any such degree. [*See VP*, III.5.1-9., *PS*, V. 2, 4, 40].

guṇavṛtti secondary meaning on the basis of similarity. *See lakṣaṇā.*

hetu: reason, middle term; the reason or sign on the strength of which something is inferred; in Buddhism it has often been discussed with *pratyaya*. Sarvāstivādin and Vijñānavādin hold that *hetu* is the main cause whereas *pratyaya* is the secondary cause and both are required to produce an effect. *Hetu* has been widely discussed in Indian poetics also. According to some poeticians, it helps to constitute and determine the meaning in poetry. [*See KL*, V. 47-60]

Hīnayāna: lower vehicle; an orthodox sect of Buddhism. *See Mahāsāṁghika.*

iti: thus, to denote a conclusion, this. *See neti neti.*

jaḍa: inert, unconscious; In the kinds Viśiṣṭādvaita system, *jaḍa* is a substance devoid of pure *sattva*; it is of two types — *prakṛti* and *ākāśa*, i.e., 'nature' and 'ether' respectively. Diṅnāga claims that words are *jaḍa* with respect to individual to which they apply, i.e., words relate only to the general properties of the thing but not the features of an individual that specifically occur in it. [*PS*, V. 14]. *See Sattva.*

jagat: the world; Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems hold that the world originates from the primordial matters which are simple and atomic. Sāṁkhya-Yoga derive it from a single substance which is assumed to be complex and all-pervasive. However, Buddhism differs from both of these views and posits that everything is in constant flux. The ultimate thing about the world is *dharma*, the essential elements but even these are not static. They undergo various kinds of permutations and combinations and constitute our empirical or mental world.

jahadajahallakṣaṇā: exclusive non-exclusive-implication a secondary, meaning where part of the primary meaning is excluded and part of it is retained. Ex.: 'This is that Devadutta'. 'This' means Devadutta as qualified by present time, place, etc., and the sense of word 'that' is the same person Devadutta qualified by past time, place, etc. This is also a method often used by Advaitin to obtain the meaning of identity-statements, grand-sentences, etc. Ex.: 'Thou art that'. *See mahāvākya.*

jahallakṣaṇā: exclusive implication; here primary meaning is given up completely, as — 'the village on the Ganges'. Here the primary meaning as indicated by words, has been discarded and then new meaning emerges — 'the village on the bank of the Ganges'. *See lakṣaṇā.*

Jaimini: founder of the Mīmāṁsā system of philosophy, his seminal work is *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra.*

jalpa: wrangling discussion; one of the sixteen categories in Nyāya here one argues to establish one's own Theory and to refute that of the others. [*NS*, I.2.2]

Jarā maraṇa: old age, decay and death; the 12th link (*nidāna*) in Buddhism. See *pratītyāsamutpāda.*

jāti: genus, class, class-notions, generality, universal;

One of the links (*nidāna*) in the wheel of worldly existence in Buddhism, closely associated with theory of causation (*pratītyasamutpāda*). 'Class' is formed on the basis of mutual exclusion of those entities which are not consistent with the particular object. Buddhist philosophy does not accept class as real category and as import of words. [*PS*, V.4, 11, 36 *TS*, XIII.1] *See sāmānya.*

In Nyāya, meanings of words is class-notions. Class has been defined as that which produces the likeness. *Jāti* has been confused with *sāmānya* in this system which is supposed to fulfil three conditions:

(a) given or eternal, (b) present in many individuals, and (c) relation of inherence. Class has its own independent existence. This is one of the 16 categories (*padārthas*). [*NS*, II.2.66-7]

Mīmāṁsā school holds that class-character has no independent existence apart from individuals.

Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vedānta and Grammar they all agree that a word primarily refers to class (= universal).

The highest genus is Being (*sattā*) according to Nyāya; known as *parājāti* or the highest universal and *aparājāti* or the lower universal. *See samavāya.*

jātidharma: class — notions; there are three characteristics of a universal:

(i) unity (*ekatva*)

(ii) constancy (*nityatva*)

(iii) residence in a plurality of substratum (*pratyekaparisampati*) [*PS*, *V.36*, *VP*, III.1.2]

jāti śabda: name of the class; a term that names a class. [*PS*, V.4] *See jāti.*

jīva: individual self; *jīva* = to continue breathing. In Jainism, individual self is marked with by consciousness, life and extension in space. In Buddhism, no individual self apart from a combination of five elements (*skandha*). Buddhists, are known in the tradition as *avayavavādins*. According to this theory whole exists in relation to its parts. Besides the parts whole does not exist. The subtle basic elements of the world are called *dharma*. Hence, apart from these *dharma*s there is no individual soul. Other synonyms of *jīva* in the context of Buddhist thought are — *pudgala*, *ātmā*, *sattā* (being). *Pudgala nairātmya nairātmya dharmatā*, *anātmā* all these have the same theoretical assumptions. Soul has only pragmatic truth. [*AK see* last chapter].

In Nyāya-Vaiśesika, an eternal, imperceptible, all-

pervading eternal substance, infinite number of individual self.

In Sāṁkhya, *puruṣa* is an eternal, immutable, conscious entity, inactive; only the phenomenal self (a blending of *puruṣa* and mind) changes.

In *Advaita*, a blend of self and non-self with a false cognition of one as another.

jñāna: knowledge, wisdom, cognition:

In Jainism, knowledge of the basic elements.

In Advaita, a blend of *vṛtti*, The *vṛtti* element is mundane and the element of awarenesss is eternal. Two kinds — *sākṣī-jñāna* and *vṛtti-jñāna* (intuitive and empirical knowledge); the ultimate means of liberation, opposed to ignorance (*avidyā*); two types of knowledge — mediate and immediate. In the mediate knowledge 'that' of an object is known whereas in 'immediate' knowledge it needs, (a) the object must be directly knowable (*jñeya*), (b) the object must be present at the time, (c) these should be established as a certain relation between the subject and object.

In Mīmāṁsā, a mode of self, an act or process (*vyāpāra*), supersensible but knowable through inference and not directly through introspection as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita, knowledge is able to manifest itself but this manifestation is only to enlighten the other objects-like the 'light'. It relates to individual self or God.

Yogācāra idealism, however, maintains thaṭ *citta* itself is the only source of knowledge and takes various forms in all kinds of cognitions. There does not exist any triology like the knower, means of knowledge and knowable object. This standpoint is close to the conception of knowledge in Advaita and Mīmāṁsā systems of thought.

jñānendriya: sense-organs; Sāṁkhya, Baudha, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika include mind also with the five cognitive orgnas. These six

organs of knowledge are also referred as 'internal senses' (*adhyātma*) as they import knowledge from inside.

jñeyāvaraṇa: hidden, concealment of knowledge; it obstructs the access of knowledge of the knowable object. The other kind of concealment is *kleśāvaraṇa* which checks emancipation from suffering. [*See Triṁśikā Bhāṣya* by Sthirmati]

kāla: time; In Jainism, a non-individual category (*ajīva dravya*), immaterial, without beginning, real and secondary cause of change. Two kinds: absolute time (*dravya kāla*) and relative time (*vyavahāra kāla*).

In Buddhism, a much debated issue in its different philosophical systems: (a) Sautrāntika — only present time is real. Future is imaginary because their effects are not manifest. Similarly the effects of the past events are no more existent, so past is also unreal. This school of thought is known as *vibhajya vādin* because it believes in the division of time. (b) Sarvāstivādin — present, past and future — all are real. [*AK*, V.25; also in *Saṁyuktāgama* III.14]. Four main conceptions regarding time have been recorded by Vasubandhu in the Vaibhāṣika school. [*see AK*, V.26]; also an acronym: See the title page.

In Sāṁkhya, no real time, time as duration (*avadhi*) taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space.

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all-pervading, integral, substance which exists only by itself; it appears as many because of its association with the changes which are related to it.

In Dvaita, a substance, subject to decay, with a beginning and end.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita an inert substance, devoid of all the three qualities (*sattva, rajas* and *tamas*) divided into present, past and future; simultaneous, immediate and co-ordinate of *prakṛti*.

kalpanā: imagination, mental constructs; association of name,

class, quality, substance, universal, permanence to object, also called *abhilāpa*. Cow, white, dewlap, etc., all are imagination. [*PS*, I.3, *PV*, III.123]

Kaṇāda: founder of Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy, author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.

Kapila: author of the *Sāṁkhyasūtra*, the basic treatise of Sāṁkhya philosophy.

kāraṇa/*karaṇa*: instrument, cause; the unique specific cause through the action of which a particular effect is produced. The theory of *satkārṇa* states that the cause alone exists and all effects are illusory appearances of the cause. Broadly speaking, there are two basic causes — material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) as a lump of clay, water, wheel etc., and efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) as the potter himself. Sāṁkhya system holds the view that the effect is inherent in the cause itself though it remains non-manifest. This is known as *satkārya-vāda*.

karma: action; a correlation between cause and consequence and the effect is conditional upon circumstances. According to Lord Buddha, one of the three factors, viz., external stimuli, conscious motives and unconscious motives — determines *karma*. Buddhist doctrine of *karma* is based on the theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*).

karmendriya: organs of action; there are five conative sense organs: organs of (a) speech, (b) prehension, (c) movement, (d) excretion, (e) generation.

Kātyāyana: author of the famous commentary *Vārttika* on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

Katyāyaniputra: author of *Jñānaprasthāna*, the basic text of Vaibhāṣika school.

khaṇḍa-pakṣa: word as the basic semantic unit, close to the association theory in psychology.

khyāti-vāda: theory of error; three types of theories of error and

their respective schools:

(i) object of error is real (*satkhyātivāda*): Yogācāra — *ātmākhyāti*, Nyāya — *anyathā khyāti*, Sāṁkhya/ Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā — *viparītakhyāti*, Rāmānuja — *satkhyāti*

(ii) object of error is unreal (*asatkhyāti-vāda*); Mādhyamika — *asatkhyāti*; Mādhva — *abhinava anyathākhyāti.*

(iii) object of error is neither real nor unreal (*anirvacanīya khyātivāda*); Advaita — *anirvacaniya khyāti.*

kliṣṭa: marked, defiled afflicted; when states of mind are associated with passion or satisfaction, the *citta* is called afflicted.

kliṣṭamana: afflicted, devient, defiled or marked mind; (a) it is sheath of all the seeds of thoughts, (b) first expression of ignorance (*avidyā*), (c) the subject-object dichotomy is born, (d) awareness towards the storehouse (*ālaya*) activities; a powerful concept in Yogācāra Idealism.

kṣaṇika-vāda: Buddhist theory of momentariness; the basic elements (*dharma*) of the world are born of causes and they constantly advance toward destruction. *See pratītya-samutpāda.*

kṛt: first derived nominal (substantive = *prātipadika*, *AST*, III.1.93) a grammatical term applied to all suffixes that, when attached to verbal roots, yield non-finite verbal form. [*PS*, V.9]. also; term for literature in Indian typology of discourse given by Pāṇini.

kṛtakatva: the property of being created; in Diṅnāga's logic it is the example of a property whose presence at a stage in the development of arguments, serves as an inferential sign of a further property.

laksaṇā: secondary or implied meaning. *See jahadahallakṣaṇā* and *jahallakṣaṇā.*

lakṣaṇa: a characteristic mark; an identifying property which establishes the relationship of an individual to its respective class [*PS*, V.36]

liṅga: a sign; especially an inferential sign; that which provides/ yields more information about further attributes ina locus. [*PS*, II.8, 9, 10, 20]

Madhvācārya: fouder of the Dvaita philosophy.

Mādhyamika: a school of thought in Buddhism which holds that truth/reality is neither positive nor negative but somewhere in between (*madhyama pratipadā*) and things are devoid of their nature, so *śūnya* is the ultimate Reality. The Mādhyamika system excludes all conceivable predicates to reality, i.e., of existence, of non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence. (*MMK*, I.7). The Mādhyamika system originates from the Prajñāpāramitā literature of Mahāyāna sect and has been theorised systematically by Nāgārjuna in the second century AD.

mahābhūta: Five given elements; i.e.

	Elements	*qualities*
1.	ether	sound (*śabda*)
2.	air	touch (*sparśa*)
3.	fire	colour (*rūpa*) < *varṇa* / *ākṛti*
4.	water	taste (*rasa*)
5.	earth	odour (*gandha*)

mahāsāṁghika: the great community; in the Second Buddhist Council, the Buddhist community split between two, viz., *thervādin* and *mahāsāṁghika*. Later on they developed as Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, respectively. *Mahāsāṁghika* were more liberal and they wanted a more progressive interpretation of the doctrine.

mahāvākya: grand sentences; great statements of Upaniṣads. Traditionally they are believed to be four only:

(i) *prajñānaṁ brahman — Aitareya Upaniṣad* (III.1.3)

"that *prajñānaṁ* is *Brahman*" of *Ṛgveda*.

(ii) *tat tvaṁ asi* — *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VI.8.7) "thou art that" of *Sāmaveda*.

(iii) *ahaṁ brahmāsmi* — *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (II.5. 19) "I am *Brahman*" of *Yajurveda*.

(iv) *ayaṁ ātmā brahman* — *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad* (second *mantra*) (This soul is *Brahman*) of *Atharvaveda*. Advaita system asserts that it posits the essential identity between the individual and the Absolute.

mahāyāna: great vehicle; later on developed into two prominent philosophical schools, i.e., Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. *See* Mādhyamika and Yogācāra [cf. Diagram 2 of chapter 2, p. 51.]

Māheśvara sūtra: *See pratyāhāra sūtra*.

Makhali Ghoṣāla: a contemporary of Lord Buddha who expounded the theory of destiny.

mana: mind; one of the aspects of internal sense-organs. Mind emerges from the *sattva* aspect of self-awareness (*ahaṁkāra*). It is an organ of cognition and action. Its specific function is to explicate [*VC*, 95-96].

In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, mind is atomic and eternal. It has double functions:

(a) it is an instrument to acquire knowledge.

(b) it limits the domain of knowledge (determinate = *savikalpa*)

In Jaininsm, not a sense-organ, but the organ of cognition which are the objects of senses.

In Mīmāṁsā, the mind alone brings about knowledge and efforts (physical, lingual, etc.) but in itself it is without qualities like colour, smell, etc. In cognition of the qualities it depends on other sense-organs.

In Buddhism, mind, *citta, vijñāna, vijñāpti* all are synonym terms. The single receptive self (*citta*) performs various functions and is designated accordingly. When *citta* involves thinking it is called *mana* (√*ma* = to map out; to determine). In the Yogācāra idealism *mana* / *citta* or *vijñāna* is the only real entity.

manomaya kośa: perceptual domain; a part of the subtle body (*sūkṣma sarīra*). [*see Tai*, II.2-5; *VC*, 156-213].

mano-vijñāna: mental perception; In Yogācāra Buddhism, mental perception possesses actual discrimination as present, past and future; it receives the experiences/impressions from the sense-organs and generates pure sensation. This sensation goes down further to the *kliṣṭa mano-vijñāna* which reprocesses, reinterprets and reorders and generates the pleasant and unpleasant cognitions which leave a permanent trace in the *ālaya-vijñāna*; the store-house consciousness. Mind has been called *samāntara āśraya* because it dwells behind the senses [*see YS*, II.10].

Mīmāṁsā: logical explication, analysis; a name of philosophical system expounded by Jaimini.

mithyā: illusory; Advaita provides a special status to *mithyā* which is both real and unreal.

Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā: a philosophical treatise in Mahāyāna by Nāgārjuna (second century).

nāda: sound; the first movement of *śabda-tattva* is called *nāda*; the inherent permanent sound in the creation. *Nāda* is *Brahman*.

Nāgārjuna: the most celebrated philosopher in Buddhism (second century AD), founder of Mādhyamika system.

nairātmya-vāda: (also *anātmavāda*) the theory of selflessness; a cardinal concept of Buddhism which explicates that there is no self in any object, hence everything is void. The negative prefix in this term is that of relative/partial

negation (*paryudāsa*) which negates *ātma* on the one hand and posits *dharma* on the other. *See anātma* and *dharmatā*.

nāma: name, mind; the word has been taken from the old Upaniṣad [*see BṛUp*, I.4.7] and interpreted in different ways by different schools of thought. In Buddhism, the empirical world is *nāma rūpātmaka* that is constituted of name and form. Buddha has slightly altered the meaning of these two terms. Name refers to the various functions of mind and 'form' is a common denotation of matter. For other interpretations of these terms *see BSSV*, II.2.19 and *BHT*, II.2.19. *See skandha* also; in Yāska's classification of words (Parts of speech) *nāma* is nouns/nominal terms which also includes pronouns.

nāmadheya: nameable; that which is real can be named, a Nyāya concept — reality is nameable and knowable.

nāma-rūpa: name and form; a well established concept in old Upaniṣads, used in the sense of determinate forms (*rūpa*) and names as distinguished from indeterminate definable reality, in Buddhism, one of the earliest classification of the basic elements (*dharma*).

nāstika: a classification of Indian philosophical schools on the basis of the Vedic authority. Those schools which do not accept the Vedas as authority, have been designated as *nāstika*s in the tradition, i.e., Cārvāka, Jainism, Buddhism. *See* the chart: Taxonomy of Indian philosophical system. Chapter 1, p. 39-a.

naya: to carry towords, multiple standpoints, opinion; In Jainism, a particular opinion which accords with the other viewpoints is called *naya*. Each statement is a partial truth about an entity. We know an object in a particular context or relationship with the other objects. Complete knowability is impossible.

neti neti: not this, not this, (not such . . .) ; ultimate reality cannot be described positively because conceptualisation of any

object always posits limits. Yājñavalkya says, "The *ātman* is not this, not this" (*BṛUp*, IV.5.15).

nididhyāsana: contemplation; a continuous undisturbed flow of ideas focused at singular *Brahman*, it eradicates the contrary tendencies of mind.

nidrā: sleep; Yoga system explains sleep as the modification of *citta* which is the substratum of the knowledge of the absence of anything. Ex.: 'I slept very well last night' [*YS*, I.10].

nirmāṇa-kāya: *See trikāya.*

nirodha: abstinence, cessation. Sāṁkhya asserts that immediately before emancipation there occurs the mind (*citta*) in a state of cessation. [also *see YS*, I.2]

nirvāṇa: emancipation from suffering; in Buddhism; a goal of life; Thervāda school accepts it as an unoriginated *dharma* (*asamskṛta dharma*);Hīnayāna interprets it as cessation of the craving that brings about rebirth; in Mahāyāna, it is becoming conscious of one's self, i.e., suchness (*tathatā*) a state of being at peace and according to Buddha it is unknown, unique and uncreated. It is of two kinds: (i) *sopādhiśeṣa* — where some impressions remain due to rebirth, (ii) *nirupādhiśeṣa* — complete extinction of all impressions; in Yoga, it is the cessation of all activities of mind (*utta*).

nirvikalpa: indeterminate; a kind of perception in Nyāya and Buddhism. *See nirvikalpa pratyakṣa.*

nirvikalpa pratyakṣa: indeterminate perception; initial cognition of the object for the first time. In Nyāya-Vaiśesika, a perception of an object isolated from individuality and qualification. In Buddhism, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's position of indeterminate perception is equally valid, but here its name is *vijñāna skandha*. [*See BHT*, II.2.18; *BDM*, pp. 72-3.] This kind of cognition is completely unqualified and there are no distinctions such as knower, means of knowledge and object of knowledge; a state of contemplation.

In Buddhism, indeterminate perception is the only valid perception; an entity is perceived here in its complete unique momentary form (*svalakṣaṇa*). Conceptions of class, name, universal, etc., are merely fictions created and postulated about the object by mind. [*PV*, II.123]

In Advaita, not necessarily a primary cognition but any perception which does not apprehend any relatedness of substantive and its qualifying attributes.

niṣedha: negation; In Buddhism, it is of two kinds — complete (*prasajya pratiṣedha*) and partial (*paryudāsa*); In Mīmāṁsā, a negative injunctive sentence.

nisvabhāvatā: devoid of self-nature, selflessness, *dharma* is devoid of its own nature.

nitya: given, unchanging, established; as in the *Vārttikākārā* Kātyāyana expounds, "The relationship between word and meaning is given". [Quoted in *MBh*. Ist Āhnika].

nityaśānta: *See ādi śānta* [*MMK*, VII.16].

nivṛtti: negation, involution; in opposition to the concept of *pravṛtti*, i.e., involvement in the worldly things.

nyāyaprasthāna: *See prasthānatrayī*.

padārtha: category, objects, meaning of a word; a very prominent conception in all the philosophical system; *padārtha* refers to the categories of reality, as Sāṁkhya system posits two basic categories, i.e., *puruṣa* (eternal, inactive) and *prakṛti* (matter, changing). [*see SK*, III]; In language, *padārtha* refers to the meaning of a word. [for detailed analysis *see* "The Concept of *Padārtha* in Philosophy and Language" by Prof. Kapil Kapoor in *The 200 years William Jones Memorial Volume*, Deccan College, Pune, 1997.

padaikyavākyatā: *See vakyaika-Vākyatā*.

paramāṇu: atom; In Buddhism, it consists of the four-fold substratum of colour, smell, taste, and contact; minutest form of *rūpa* (matter); it is indivisible, imperceptible, impermanent but

mere momentary flash into being. [*See AKB*. 43-44]

parinispanna: *See sattā*.

pāramārthika: absolute, ultimate; one of the two kinds of truth (the other one is *samvr̥tti* or phenomenal) in the Mādhyamika system which asserts that *śūnya* is absolute; since every object has only casual existence, it is devoid of its nature.

Pārmārthika is non-explicable, non-originated, unknowable and not an object of language and intellect. It has been designated by different names in the different names in the different philosophical systems:

Mahāyāna		Advaita	
Mādhyamika	*Vijñānavāda*	*Śabdādvaita*	*Vivartavāda*
(Nāgārjuna)	(Asaṅga)	(Bhartr̥hari)	(Śaṅkara)
pārmārthika	*parinispanna*	*samprati*	*pārmārthika*
[*MMK*, XXIV.8]	[*MSL*, VI.1, XI.41]	[*VP*, III.39]	[*BSSB*]

pāramitā: the ultimate ideal of spiritual perfection; (Pāli = *params*), an important conception in Mahāyāna Bhuddhism; which refers to those virtues which guide and assist the aspirants on the path to perfection. These virtues are six in number: granting, disposition, forbearance, valour, concentration, and wisdom.

parārthānumāna: syllogism; inference for other. For convincing other in a debate, one of the two kinds of inference in Buddhist logic—the other one is *svārthānumāna* (inference for self). [*See PS*, Chapter 3; *PV*, Chapter 4].

parataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda: doctrine of invalidity due to the other cognitions; validity of knowledge is not self-evident by its mere cognitions. *See savataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda*.

paratantra: dependent, externally valid, a kind of existence according to Ācārya Asaṅga. *See sattā*.

parā vidyā: knowledge of consciousness; higher knowledge of the self; one of the natures/powers of *Brahman*, the other one

is *aparā*, i.e., concerning matter or the changing object. *Brahman* is the only substraum of these two powers/forces. [*See BS*, III.2.28, II.1.22, III.2.31]

parikalpa: to conceive, to imagine; it refers to mental process in the cognition of an object.

parikalpita: imagined, mentally constructed; In Yogācāra Idealism a kind of knowledge/existence; *See sattā*.

pariṇāma: evolution, transformation, consequence, effect, result; a central conception in Buddhism and Sāṁkhya philosophy; when an existent substance passes from one condition stage to another, then this action is known as *pariṇāma* or evolution. Sāṁkhya system asserts that elements of Nature are in the constant process of evolution, i.e., a cause becomes an effect. In the process of evolution the substance changes qualitatively and it cannot achieve its previous stage again, *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* of Vijñānavāda posits nine kinds of transformation.

(1) the transformation of forms;

(2) the transformation of characteristics;

(3) the transformation of cause;

(4) the transformation of concordance;

(5) the transformation of view;

(6) the transformation of origin;

(7) the transformation of nature;

(8) the transformation of manifest conditions; and

(9) the transformation of manifest work.

LS further explains that these nine views of transformation are founded upon the dualism of being and non-being. [*See* Chapter three of *LS*, pp. 137-8 in Suzuki's translation of the text.] *Pariṇāma* has been fused with *vivarta*, i.e., illusory perceptive forms like waves in the sea, as in *VP*, I.1 and I.120. But the grammarian tradition prefers *vivarta* (hence called *vivarta-vādins*) because it originates from the

Vedāntic philosophy of Non-dualism. On the contrary, Buddhists and Sāṁkhyas restrict to the term *pariṇāma* (hence called *pariṇā mavādins*). [*see SDS* Chapters 13 and 14]. *See vivarta.*

pariṇāmavāda: the transformation theory;

(i) the theory which asserts that cause continuously transforms itself into its effects.

(ii) *Brahmapariṇāma-vāda*, a Vedāntic theory, expounds that world is a transformation of *Brahman*.

(iii) In Sāṁkhya, effect is the manifestation of what is inherent in the cause. The effect already exists in the cause. This is also designated as *satkārya-vāda.*

parinispanna: the perfect knowledge, the congnition of absolute reality or existence; a category of knowledge and reality in Yogācāra Idealism. *See sattā.*

paryāya: mode, change; In Jainism, the term pertain to the changes which takes place in the attributes of substances. Mode is of two kinds:

Mode (*paryāya*)

- Substantial (*dravya paryāya*)
  - homogeneous class (*samāna jātīya dravya paryāya)*
  - heterogeneous class (*asamāna jātiya dravya paryāya*)
- individual (*jīva paryāya*)

In Jain theory of signification *paryāya* has been classified as *svaparyāya* (the object in itself) and *paraparyāya* (The object other than itself).

pauruṣeya: contingent, individual; one of the two kinds of literature in the classification of Indian verbal discourse which includes *smṛti* (recollected text), *kāvya* (poetry), *purāṇa* (historical mythical accounts), *darśana* (philosophy), etc., it also refers to the texts with known authorship where

knowledge is related to or revealed by an individual. *See apauruṣeya.*

prajñā: intuitive wisdom; in the context of Buddhist philosophy it means knowledge of selflessness (*śūnyatā*). [*See Prajñopāya-Viniścaya-Siddhi*,V.16]; In Mahāyāna Buddhism it is the sixth and most important *pāramitā*. *See pāramitā, prajñā-pāramitā.*

prajñā-pāramita: perfect cognition; the sixth kind of *pāramitā*; this kind of cognition reveals the selflessness of all the *dharma* and finally leads to the blissful domains (*śūnyatā*). [*See PPMS*, 16-17]

prakṛti: primal nature, base or root; Sāṁkhya system broadly classifies its categories as *puruṣa* (soul/consciousness) and *prakṛti* (nature); *prakṛti* is the original source of the material world consisting of three essential qualities *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. This primal nature is said to be without any kind of modification (*vikṛti*). [*SK*, III]. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the three *guṇa* (like *sattva* etc.) are qualities of *prakṛti* and not its constituents; it is related to God and ultimately dependent upon Him. In Advaita, principle of illusion; not fundamentally real, a phenomenon. The Dvaita, system posits *prakṛti* as a material cause of the world and one of the twenty substances (*dravya*). In Grammar, the radical or the root form of a word to which case-suffixes and other affixes are applied.

Prakruddha Kātyāyana: a contemporary thinker of the Buddha who tried to explicate the doctrine of non-doership. Man is not an agent of any action which he performs. *See akṛtatāvāda.*

pramā: valid knowledge; In Nyāya, real experience true knowledge which is representational in nature. Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika accept the identity between cognition and cognitum; a realist view which asserts that object determines the validity of cognition. In Advaita, uncontradicted knowledge; In Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā primary

and original knowledge; In Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā, immediate experience (*anubhūti*); In Vaiśeṣika, immediate presentational knowledge and mediative knowledge; In Jainism, the unique operative cause of both true presentational character and memory; In Viśiṣṭādvaita, knowledge of the real; In Sāṁkhya, knowledge not held previously (*anadhigata*), similar to the conception of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, this knowledge is beyond errors and doubts.

pramāṇa: means of valid knowledge; this constitutes the domain of epistemology. Indian philosophy has a very rich tradition of epistemology. Debate and requirement of the valid means of knowledge are the distinctive features of Indian philosophical systems. Major systems and their *pramāṇa*s are:

System	**Means of knowledge**
1. Cārvāka	perception.
2-3. Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika	perception and inference.
4-5. Sāṁkhya-Yoga	perception, inference and verbal testimony.
6. Nyāya	perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy.
7. Mīmāṁsā (Prābhākara)	perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy and postulation (*arthāpatti*).
8-9. Mīmāṁsā (Bhāṭṭa and Vedānta)	perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, postulation and negation (*anupalabdhi*).
10. Paurāṇika	perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, postulation, negation and mythical/traditional accounts (*aitihya*).

(*Source*: *Indian Theories of Knowlege* by C.D. Bijalwan; p.

60. *See* the Bibliography)

However, Jaina classification of valid forms of knowledge is not unanimous, but according to Umāswāmī they are five: opinion, verbal testimony, limited knowledge, knowledge of other minds and the direct knowledge by the *ātman*.

Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvarttanī* questions the validity of all the means of knowledge and refutes the whole epistemology because it fails to cognize the ultimate Reality (*paramārtha*) that is void (*śūnya*). *See pramā, prameya*, and *pramātā*.

prāmāṇyavāda: doctrine of validity of knowledge answering the question, whether cognition is valid by itself or made valid by something else.

prameya: objects of cognition; this constitutes the domain of ontology; Buddhism posits only two objects of knowledge: unique particular or the thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) and 'universal' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) which is associated with the phenomenal truth (*saṃvṛtti*). *See svalakṣaṇa, sāmānya lakṣaṇa, paramārtha* and *saṃvṛtti*.

pramātā: the cognizer, the subject/knower who cognizes/knows.

pramiti: *See pramā, tripuṭi*.

prāṇa: vital air, life breath, vitality. Five kinds of *prāṇa*: *prāṇa* (vital air), *apāna* (exhale, breathing out), *vyāna* (that which is diffused through the whole body), *udāna* (breathing upwards) and *samāna* (vital air in nasal cavity). [*See VC*, 97]

prāṇamaya kośa: the sheath of vital air, the second sheath, the sensory domain; it includes the five organs of action such as feet, hands, tongue, etc. [*Tai*, III.3; *VC*, 167].

prasthānatrayī: three points of departure; the triple canon of Vedānta, i.e.,

(i) *Upaniṣad* known as *śrutiprasthāna*,

(ii) *Bhagavad Gītā* known as *smṛti-prasthāna* and

(iii) *Brahma Sūtra* known as *nyāyaprasthāna*.

pratibhā: intuition, intuitive flash of understanding; a powerful concept expounded by Bhartṛhari for grasping the meaning of, particularly, sentences; *pratibhā* is different from perceptual and inferential ways of knowing; the understanding of the sentential meaning as one integral whole becomes possible through this; sometimes identified with *śabda bhāvanā* (linguistic latency), not explicable and knowable; the content of a cognitive act in an understanding of a state of affairs. [*See VP*, II.146, *PS*, V.46].

prātibhāsika: illusory, apparent; one of the three kinds of being or existence (the other two are *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika*); the classic example of this kind of being is that of mirage.

pratibimbavāda: reflection theory; a theory expounded by the *vivaraṇa* school of Advaita Vedānta — which asserts that individual is manifestation of *Brahman*. The theory is similar to the *ābhāsavāda* of Kaśmir Śaivism. In both analogy of mirror-reflection/image is brought forth. *See ābhāsa-vāda*.

pratijñā: enunciation, assumption; the thesis to be proved, the first member of syllogistic (five membered) reasoning in the Nyāya system which follows:

1. *pratijñā* (this assumption): The mountain has fire.
2. *hetu* (reason): Because of smoke.
3. *sādhya* (Major term with example): whenever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.
4. *upanaya* (application): The mountain also has smoke accompanied by fire, like the kitchen.
5. *nigamana* (conclusion): Hence, the mountain has fire.

The Buddhist maintains that only two parts, i.e., the major term with example and the minor term in its relation to the major term are sufficient for syllogistic reasoning. The

process will then follow: whenever there is smoke, there is fire, (as in kitchen). This mountain has smoke necessarily related to fire. *See anumāna.*

pratisaṃkhyā: perfect cognition; equivalent term to *nirvāṇa*. *See prajña* [*AK Ṭīkā*, p. 3, *Sphuṭārtha*, p. 18]

pratisaṃkhyā nirodha: negation by means of perfect cognition, suppression due to sapience; disjunction from impure *dharma*s (causal or originated) is called *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* [*See AKB*, I.6]; a kind of unoriginated *dharma* in Vaibhāṣika and Vijñānavāda systems, a term for *nirvāṇa*. *See apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* and *nirvāṇa*.

pratītya-samutpāda: dependent origination; nothing is born of itself or in isolation; the fundamental doctrine which explains the cause of suffering consitituted of twelve links (*nidāna*) that sets the wheel of causation in motion.

These are:

1. *avidyā* (nescience)	due to one's
2. *saṃskāra* (impressions/predisposition)	past life
3. *vijñāna:* (consciousness)	
4. *nāma-rūpa* (mind-matter)	due to
5. *ṣaḍāyatana* (sense-organs, including mind and their objects)	present
6. *sparśa* (sense-object contact)	
7. *vedanā* (feeling)	life
8. *tṛṣṇā* (craving)	
9. *upādāna* (attachment)	
10. *bhāva* (bringing about)	future
11. *jāti* (rebirth)	life
12. *jarā-maraṇa* (decline and death)	

pratyabhijñā: re-cognition; the re-cognition of the identity of being and the supreme Being that leads to *nirvāṇa* according to the Kāśmir Śaivism.

pratyāhāra: 'gathering towards oneself'; abstinence of senses from their objects, retreat, in the Yoga System.

pratyāhāra sūtra: (*Māheśvara Sūtra, Śiva Sūtra*): a technical term in grammar, especially in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī;* fourteen groups of Sanskrit speech sounds [*Aṣṭ*, I.1.79, I.3.2., I.3.3], it is referred to as (*pratyāhara sūtra*) because of their capacity to generate *pratyāhāra* or sigla representing groups of phonemes which enter into any particular garmmatical operation, the whole object is to effect the economy of statement.

pratyakṣa: perception; the first amongst the valid means of knowledge in every Indian philosophical system, it comprises of five sense-organs and mind; Nyāya: knowledge generated by subject-object, contact, the only immediate means of knowledge, which is of two kinds:

(i) *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa*, i.e., indeterminate and determinate.

(ii) Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā also posit these two kinds but define with some difference.

(iii) In Buddhism, that which is free from the postulation of mental constructs like (*kalpanā*) name, class, universal, etc. [*see PS*, I.3, *PV*, II.1.23] *See nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa pratyakṣa*.

pratyaya: causal conditions, cognition, an affix, suffix, a bound morpheme that which brings the object in our cognition, root/bases word when attached with an affix becomes actual (referring to reality) and operational syntactically. [*Aṣṭ*, III.1.1, III.1.2 and onwards upto the end of 5th book] *See prakṛti*.

pratyayavāda: conceptualism; *see vijñāna* and *vijñānavāda*.

pravicaya buddhi: that intellect which perceives the real form of the object. *See buddhi*.

pravṛtti: action, effort; the path of active involvement in the world and actions reinforced by them; In Buddhist logic it is a synonym for *vṛtti* which refers to the occurrence of a property in a locus. The applicability of an expression or a symbol to an object. [*See PS*, II.20; V.50].

pravṛtti vijñāna: evolving consciousness, sense experience; The Yogācāra Buddhism maintains that this is a product of store-house consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*). It involves the cognitions through the active role of five sense-organs and mind. [*See VMS*]

Pūrṇa Kaśyapa: see *akriyāvāda*.

puruṣa: the individual soul; pure consciousness; one of the two basic elements/forces of creation as *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, *puruṣa* is neither primordial nature nor any sorts of modification (*vikṛti*), neither productive nor a production, inactive. [*See SK*, 3, 21, 57, 58]. In grammar *puruṣa* refers to the three participants in a speech act — the speaker, the person spoken to, the person/thing spoken about. *See prakṛti*.

pūrva-pakṣa: the point of view being contested. The opponent's view; one of the two (the other one is *siddhāntin* or exponent) elements of dialectics involved in structuring the Indian intellectual texts especially the commentary literature; the author records the counterviews of his opponents (sometimes more faithfully and sincerely than the one he upholds, as is the case with Kumārila and Vācaspati Miśra) in this part and answers or refutes them explaining his own system of thought in the Siddhāntin's section. The ideal examples are Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, Śaṅkara's *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, Vācaspati's *Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya Ṭīkā*.

rajas: energy, activity, desire; one of the three qualities of *prakṛti* along with *sattva* and *tamas* of *prakṛti* and *guṇa*.

Rāmānuja: founder of Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda. *See* under this entry.

rasa: aesthetic experience, essence of a thing; that supreme delight produced in the mind of an appreciator of a work of art whose content is *bhāva* or an emotion, a state of being [*Tai*, 7th section, *See Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata, 6 and 7th Chapters].

ṛta: equipoise, the course of things; an eternal order cosmic as well as moral.

ruḍhi: conventional sense of the word. [*PS*, V.9]

rūpa: matter, form, colour; a subtle essence of the elements, one of the five aggregates (*skandha*) in the Vaibhāṣika classification of *dharma*. *See skandha*.

śabda: articulate sound, verbal testimony, word, language; a valid means of knowledge, a subtle element (*tanmātra*), testimony of a credible person; one who knows truth and is qualified to communicate it correctly. In Advaita, word is identical with *Brahman*. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, śabda (the articulated sound) is non-eternal; a property of ether. In Grammarian's school, 'that which when articulated brings the cognition of the object into the hearer's mind is *śabda*. *See MBh* Paspaśahānika; *PS*, V.2, 12, 34].

śabda bhāvanā: the linguistic potency inherent in the conscious being.

śabdādhyāsa vāda: the theory of superimposition of word on the concept (of an object); grammarian's doctrine of verbal import which stems from Advaita system of Vedānta philosophy. This theory has been put forth to defend the identity of *sabda* and *artha*. *See upacāra*.

śabdādvaitavāda: theory of *śabda* as the ultimate reality, in the Grammarian's tradition *śabda* is identical (*advaita*) with *Brahman* which is the substratum of the world of appearance (*vivarta*/*pariṇāma*) and mutual identity of *śabda* and *artha*. *See śabdadhyāsavāda*, *śabda*, *artha*.

śabda pariṇāmavāda: the theory that the world is an evolution/

transformation of *Śabda Brahman*, Grammarian's view of language and reality.

śabdavivartavāda: the theory of the evolution of the Word-essence (*śabda*); Grammarian's assert the world to be a *vivarta* (transformation) of *Śabda Brahman*. The external world is an illusory form of that single power principle as waves in the sea. Naiyāyika and Mīmāmsaka criticise this theory *See pariṇāma, vivarta, śabdapariṇāmavāda.*

ṣaḍāyatana: six-sense organs; In Buddhism, a link (*nidāna*) in the causal chain of existence, it includes six internal sense-organs along with their corresponding objects, as

(i) eye — form,

(ii) ear — sound,

(iii) nostrils — smell

(iv) tongue — taste

(v) skin — touch

(vi) mind — rest of the objects.

Mahānidāna Sutta of *Dīgha Nikāya*, II.15, *Saṁyutta Nikāya* 16]. *See nidāna.*

sādhana: self effort, means; In Jainism, it refers to right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (*triratna*); In Buddhism, the means to overcome suffering, i.e., eight-fold path expounded by Buddha. In Sāṁkhya, the means to discriminate between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. In Yoga, the eight-fold forms of meditation. [*YS*, II.28-55, III.3].

sahṛdaya: 'of similar heart', a qualified spectator/appreciator of a work of art, connoisseur; In Indian aesthetics, an appreciator who himself is an artist at heart, recreates/reconstructs in his mind the idea implicit in the work of art. [*See Kāvya Prakāśa* of Mammaṭa Chapter 1].

sākṣī / *sākṣin*: observer, witness; self; an intuitive faculty; In Vedānta, *ātman* as the detached observer of the actions performed by

the sense-organs. The *Mun* presents a beautiful metaphor of the supreme soul and the being. [*See Mun*, III.1.1]

sākṣī-jñāna: knowledge of the observer who does not get afflicted by the knowledge/experience which comes to him.

samāna: *See prāṇa*.

samānādhikaraṇya: the theory of grammatical co-ordination which states that object words for the same individual object referred to by their own meaning, take the same case-inflection.

Rāmānuja used it to explain his key concept of *apṛthak siddhi*, i.e., exposition of non-difference — Grammar of language is grammar of reality. Two terms like 'blue' and 'lotus' (*nīlotpal*) though have distinct meaning but refers to the same substance.

Advaita uses the same concept to show the 'non-difference' or identity between *Brahman* and *ātman*.

In Buddhist logic, the term signifies (a) the residence of a plurality of properties in the same substratum, and (b) the application of a plurality of words to the same object or set of objects. [*PS*, V.2.4].

sāmānya: universal, — (class) in Vaiśeṣika and Dvaita, a category, generic feature that resides in all the members of a class; It is one, eternal and resides in many, by virtue of which an individual becomes the member of a class; It is said to reside in qualities, activities, etc. The relation between universal and individual is that of inherence (*samavāya*).

The term causes so much theoretical obscurity when it is loosely taken as equivalent of *jāti* and both of these terms are rendered in English very popularly as universal. Again there is a need to distinguish these two terms from *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* and *samavāya*. However, Buddhists rejects *sāmānya* (universal) as a real category but do not deny its pragmatic value and role in the world and language. According to them this category along with name, class,

inherence, substance, quality is merely a fiction created and postualted by our intellect to the objects which hides their real self (*svalakṣaṇa*). [*See PS*, II.5, V.10. 25, 26; *PV*, II.4-55; *TS* Chapter 13 or VV. 708-812] *See jāti, sāmānya lakṣaṇa* and *samavāya*.

sāmānya lakṣaṇa: relation by class-nature; In Nyāya, supernatural mode of perception, perception of a general feature among a number of particulars which binds them in one and constitutes a class; to see a cow is to see 'cowness' which is present in all cows. In Buddhism, a conceptual construct added by intellect in an act of perception; to the bare particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is the object of actual perception, a subjective determination added by the mind. It is of following types: class or generality (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), name (*nāma*), substance (*dravya*) [ref. as given in *sāmānya*].

samavāya: subsistence, inherence; In Nyāya, a kind of relationship between an individual and its class; In Vaiśeṣika, the intimate relationship between inseparables, an eternal/given relationship inherent in the objects related which exists between five kinds of inseparables:

(i) substance and quality

(ii) substance and activity

(iii) particular and general

(iv) eternal substance and particularity and

(v) whole and part

In Buddhism, Śāntarakṣita first records and explains the category of 'Inherence'. Inherence is apprehended on the basis of the notion of 'this subsists in that', — such as is found in the expressions 'the cloth consists of these yarns' . . . [*TS*, XVI.1 or v. 823]. Śāntarakṣita raises a series of objections in the subsequent verses [*see* chapter XV of *TS* or vv. 823-66] Pandita Asoka's

Sāmānyadūṣana dik prasārita, pub. in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts* (pp. 94-102), *see* Bibliography.

samavāyī (*kāraṇa*): inherent cause. *See asamavāyī kāraṇa; kāraṇa.*

saṁketa: symbol; convention of language/linguistic convention. *See vikalpa.*

Sāṁkhya: the philosophical school expounded by Kapila, it means both discriminative knowledge and enumeration; the system enumerates the ultimate objects of knowledge; known as dualistic realism because it posits *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Text — *SK* and *Sāṁkhya Sūtra.*

saṁskāra: impressions, predisposition, purificatory rites; trace of the past impressions; In Buddhism, one of the members of five aggregates (*pañca skandha*) along with *rūpa, vedanā, samjñā* and *vijñāna*; a link (*nidāna*) in the causal chain of existence (*pratītya-samutpāda*).

samskṛta: coming together, orginated, cultured or modified.

samskṛta dharma: ephemeral, impermanent originated basic elements; In Buddhism, a classification of *dharma* in Vaibhāṣika school on the basis of sense-objects, also acceptable to Yogācāra school. These are four in number: *rūpa, citta, caitta* (*citta samprayukta*) and *citta viprayukta*. These are made of subtle element — physical as well as mental — whose action and reaction cause the creation of the universe; *rūpa* includes five external sense-organs and their five corresponding objects, and *avijñapti* according to Vaibhāṣika. *Citta* is born out of the interaction of the senses with their objects. All impressions (*saṁskāra*) inhere into *citta* and it is this which transmigrates world to world causing the rebirth. *Caitta* or *citta samprayukta*: mental processes related to *citta* — 46 types. *Citta viprayukta:* that which cannot be classified either as *rūpa* or *citta*, — 14 types [for details *see ABK* first chapter, *BDM*, pp. 164-77]. *See citta.*

samudāya: a complex entity, an individual or a group of individual

existing as a collection of components or multiplicity of properties. [*PS*, V.15]

samvṛtti satya: empirical or phenomenal truth; in opposition to absolute truth (*paramārtha satya*), born of nescience (*avidyā*). Mādhyamika and Yogācāra both accept its pragmatic value for exposition of *dharma* but refute this category of truth or existence from the point of view of *paramārtha*. [*See MMK*, XXIV.8, *Triṁśikā Bhāṣya* in *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhiḥ* by Vasubandhu, *MSL*, XI.39-41].

Sanjaya Vẹltthiputta: *See aniścitatavāda*.

sannidhi (= *āsatti*): proximity, spatio-temporal continguity; one of the causes along with mutual expectancy and logical compatibility which binds a sentence as single entity and brings about a valid cognition from a proposition; Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa is of the opinion that absence of continguity can only delay the comprehension.

saṁsarga: association; *see adhyāsa*.

śānta: selfless, without self [*MMK*, VII. 16.]. *See* under *ādiśānta*.

svarūpa: the form of a word; that phonetic attribute of a word which says it as belonging to a specific word class. [*PS*, V.4]

Sarvāstivāda: the theory that everything exists; early realistic school of Buddhism associated with Sthaviravāda and Vaibhāṣika school of Hīnayāna.

śāstra: a text of scientific exposition of the subject, scripture; in opposition to *kāvya* in the Indian verbal discourse.

satkāraṇavāda: the theory which asserts that cause alone exists, an Advaita theory of causation; it holds that the effects/ phenomena are unreal.

satkāryavāda: the theory of causation, a Sāṁkhya theory of causation which explicates that the effect exists in the latent form in the cause itself. The theory is in opposition to *vivartavāda* of the Vedāntin and Grammarians. Its other name is *pariṇāmavāda*. [*see SDS*, chapters 13, 14, 16]. *See vivarta*

and *pariṇāma*.

satkāya dṛṣṭi: illusory vision; In Buddhism, self is eternal and unreal. Self is the name given to an aggregate of five elements. *See skandha.*

satkhyāti: cognition of the Real; the theory that the subject-matter of error is, some how real; except Mādhyamika, Advaita and Dvaita all other systems accept this theory.

sattā: Being, existence; In Vaiśeṣika, Being is the highest universal. Advaita asserts Being is the Reality. Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta accept the following classification of existence:

Buddhism		Vedānta (Advaita)	
Mādhyamika	Yogācāra	Bhartṛhari	Śaṅkara
paramārtha	*pariniṣpanna*	*samprati*	*paramārtha*
samvṛtti	*(i) parikalpita / vyāvahārika* *(ii) paratantra*	*aupacārika* [*VP*, III.3.39]	(i) *vyāvahārika* (ii) *prātibhāsika*

satya: truth, existence. *See sattā.*

sattva: pure; essence; a kind of quality, the nature of which is pleasure. *See guṇa.*

Śiva Sūtra: *See Pratyāhāra Sūtra.*

skandha: an aggregate, group; In Buddhism, the name of classification of the basic elements (*dharma*) of the world which are five in number: *rūpa*, *nāma*, *vedanā*, *saṁskāra* and *vijñāna*; pragmatic name of these five elements (*skandha*) is *ātman*. Here *rūpa* stands for matter and *nāma* (including the rest) is the word for mental aspects of the self.

smṛti prasthāna: *See prasthānatrayī.*

sphoṭa: to burst, manifest; that underlying power behind individual letters of a word which manifests the meaning of the word. *Sphoṭa* has two levels — sound and meaning. In the Grammarian's view, eternal essence of the word which is manifested by the letters (sounds) and itself brings about

the meaning; single, meaningful linguistic unit or symbol. Bhartṛhari is the most celebrated exponent of this conception/theory [*see VP,* I.93-106]; In *Yoga*, in the meditation the awakening of serpent power manifests the all-pervading sound. In Śaivism Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa continues the Grammarian's tradition of *sphoṭa* and further exposes it in accordance with Śaiva philosophy. Abhinavagupta also belongs to this school of thought. [*See Sphoṭa-Vāda* of Nageśa Bhaṭṭa.]

śrutārthāpatti: a kind of postulation for deriving meaning from what is heard. *See dṛṣṭārthāpatti.*

Śruti: that which is heard; non-contingent texts like the Veda and Upaniṣad, in the oral tradition. Indian verbal discourse has been classified as *śruti-smṛti-kāvya. See* under these entries, and *vāṅamaya.*

śruti prasthāna: *See prasthānatrayī* and *śruti.*

Sthavira: an orthodox. *See Mahāsāṁghika.*

sthitaprajña: established in the unperturbed consciousness. [*See* the *Gītā*, II.54-73].

śūnya: selflessness'; a pivotal concept in Māhāyāna Buddhism, Mādhyamika's conception of ultimate Reality (*paramārtha*), that which is absolute, non-determinate, inexplicable, and beyond the four categories of linguistic/existential statements like:

(i) it exists
(ii) it does not exist
(iii) it exists as well as does not exist.
(iv) it neither exists nor it does not exist [*MMK*, I.7, XVIII.5, XVIII.9].

The theory of void has been rigidly developed and expounded by Nāgārjuna on the Buddha's doctrine of the Middle Path. The truth is neither positive nor negative but somewhere in between which cannot be explicated in the dichotomical and relational categories. It is useful to preserve the original

term *śūnya* because all of its equivalents are misleading.

suṣupti: deep sleep consciousness; ignorance of the self. [*BSSB*, I.4, 3]

Sūtrapiṭaka: (*Suttapiṭaka*): casket of Aphorisms; the Buddhist scripture, compiled by Ānand which includes the sermons and parables of Buddha. There are five sections in it: — *Dīgha*, *Majjihima*, *Saṁayutta*, *Aṅgutara*, and *Khuddaka*. The Sautrāntrika system accepts the validity of this text rests in the fact that it contains the original sermons/words of Buddha.

svabhāva: one's own nature, essential nature; In Buddhism, no object of the world exists by its own absolute nature; everything is devoid of its own nature; all have only relative nature conditioned by the law of causality. *See pratītya-samutpāda, ādiśānta,* and *śūnya.*

svalakṣaṇa: one's own characteristics, 'the thing-in-itself;' In Buddhism, this is an object of knowledge (*prameya*); that which performs significant act, an absolute object which can be perceived in the indeterminate direct perception.

svarūpa: own form; *see adhyāsa*.

svataḥprāmāṇyavāda: the theory of self validity of knowledge; In Sāṁkhya, truth and falsity are integral to knowledge itself; In Mīmāṁsā and Advaita falsity is not integral to knowledge.

syādvāda: theory of conditioned proposition; a Jaina doctrine of manifestation/representation of Reality which asserts that no single proposition can express the complex nature of reality; The prefix *syād* is attached to all the seven propositions; suggests a conditional point of view. All knowledge is conditioned and relative.

tathatā: suchness; In Buddhism, the object in its own form, without the postulation of mental constructs; a Yogācāra term for the ultimate Reality, an unoriginated or non-causal (*asaṁskr̥ta*) *dharma*, its other synonyms are *bhūta koṭi, animitta*, *paramārtha* and *dharma-dhātu*. *See asaṁskr̥ta dharma*.

tattva: the basic element, true principles; Sāṁkhya system enumerates twenty-five ontological categories in which the last one is *puruṣa,* while the rest of them belong to *prakṛti*;

Advaita holds no distinction between the two, i.e., the supreme being and self, hence *tat tvam asi*; In Buddhism, its equivalent term is *dharma*.

trikāya: the three sheaths/or bodies of Buddhas, a Mahāyāna conception of the Buddha and Boddhisattvas;

(1) *dharmakāya*: the sheath made of basic essential element; the Reality, Void, or Absolute. This is universal and transcendent Buddha.

(2) *sambhoga kāya*: subtle body or sheath; subtler than the *nirmāṇa-kāya,* the body or sheath obtained by the Buddha Boddhisattvas. According to *LS* and *VMS* this is of two kinds:

(i) *svasambhoga-kāya*: subtle sheath of the self (also known as *niṣyanda* Buddha in *LS*): this is the body of lord Buddha himself.

(ii) *parasambhoga kāya* or the subtle body/sheath of others, or the body of Boddhisattvas.

(3) *nirmāṇa-kāya*: sheath of transformation, sheath of historical Buddha; empirically manifest, through gaining this body the Buddha took birth and achieved the highest blisseful state of knowledge. [*see MSL*, IX.64].

Tripiṭaka: three caskets of early Buddhist cannon in Pāli language;

(i) *Sutta Piṭaka:* a record of the uttered words of the Buddha.

(ii) *Vinaya Piṭaka*: rules of discipline in the monastery.

(iii) *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*: philosophical discourses of Buddha. *See Sutta* and *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*.

tripuṭi: three-fold forms;

(i) knower

(ii) knowable and

(iii) means of knowledge; a Vedāntic conception of the structure of knowledge.

triputilaya: submersion of the three-fold forms; Vedānta and Yogācāra Buddhism both agree that at the stage of heightened consciousness there is no distinction as such between knower, knowable and knowledge; perfect, direct and inderterminate cognition of an object.

udāna: *See prāṇa.*

uha: conjecture, logical reasoning, In Jainism an inductive statement. *See apoha.*

upacāra: imposition, there are two bases for imposition:

(i) on the basis of cause-effect relationship; as fire and heat/ light.

(ii) on the basis of identity — relationship (*tādātmya*) — where one's nature is the essential nature of the other. *Example*: The Aśoka and the treeness. Treeness is the essential nature of the tree called Aśoka. It has been argued in Yogācāra school that impositions related to *ātman* and *dharma* can be explained in terms of *vijñāna*. The one integral *vijñāna* manifests itself in manifold forms. There are merely the transformations of our own 'cognising self'. [*See VMS Triṁśikā* I, commentary under in by Sthiramati.]

upacāra sattā: metaphorical existence. [*see KP*:X, II.14]

upādāna: material cause; in Vedānta the causes (*kāraṇa*) are categories such as efficient (*nimitta*) and material (*upādāna*) causes. In case of the production of a pitcher the clay, water, potters, wheel and stick, etc., are material causes. *See nimitta* and *kāraṇa.*

Upaniṣad: literally means to sit near (the teacher) in loneliness; the

last section of the Veda dealing with the philosophical issue in dialectical mode. Vedānta system originated from Upaniṣad.

vāc (= *vāk*): word (especially the spoken word), language, speech, sound; a major concern in philosophy of language and *tantra* (*śaiva*). [*see* *R̥V*, I. 164.24, 41-45; X.71.1-2] "She is the Divine Mother (sound) who becomes all the words."

vācaka-vācya: signifier-signified; it refers to the word/linguistic expression and its meaning/semantic content.

Vaibhāṣika: related to great commentary; a philosophical system in Buddhism which developed from the text *Mahāvibhāṣā*, i.e., the great commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna* of Ārya Kātyāyanīputra. Its philosophical doctrine is known as Sarvāstivāda that everything whether internal or external, exists.

Vaiśeṣika: doctrine of particularity or atom; a philosophical system propounded by Kaṇāda.

Vaiyākaraṇa: Grammarian's school/system of thought; a school of philosophy of language which holds that *śabda* is the ultimate reality (*Śabda Brahman*). It develops along with the line of thought on language available in the Veda and Upaniṣads. [*See SDS* chapter 13, 'Paṇinī Darṣana'].

vākyaika-vākyatā: syntactic/semantic unity in a number of sentences; which constitute a text. In a text one sentence depends on the other for its reference and meaning. In this case sentences enter in a relationship of principal and subordinate and hence syntactic unity is formed. *See padaikya-vākyatā* and *ekavākyatā*.

vākyārtha: sentential meaning, primary meaning; it is of two kinds:

(1) relation of difference or duality (*bheda saṁgraha*) — mainly in the Buddhist theory of meaning; meaning of sentence is understood through the words conveying mutual difference; Vyāḍi, a pre-Pāṇinian grammarian, holds that

sentential meaning is the exclusion (*bheda*) of its word meanings. Ratnakīrti puts forth an example: 'This road leads to Srughna'. (de Saussure's own linguistic theory is much indebted to this theory. (*See* Course pp. 167-75).

(2) relation of non-difference (*abheda saṁgraha*): chiefly the grammarian's theory of sentential meaning; non-difference or one-ness is known through the principle of grammatical coordination (*samānādhikaraṇya*) in which two words connote different things but denote the same thing. *Example*: 'blue lotus'. In Advaita, *abheda saṁgraha* is of two kinds:

(a) *saṁgraha abheda*, i.e., oneness with relation (at the conceptual level) — 'blue lotus':

(b) *sārūpya abheda*, i.e., an identity statement like — thou art that. *See apoha* and *samānādhikaraṇya*.

Vasubandhu: known as second Buddha in the tradition whose renowned work is *Abhidharmakośa* (*Bhāṣya*).

vedanā: sense-experience, feeling, sensation; a *namaskandha;* a link (*nidāna*) in causal condition (*pratītya-samutpāda*); caused by sense-contact and consists of pain, pleasure and indifference. *See nāma skandha, nidāna* and *prātītya-samutpāda*.

Vedānta: concluding sections of the Veda, Upaniṣad; name of a philosophical system which stems from the Aupaniṣadic literature. *See prasthānatrayī* and Upaniṣad.

vibhāṣā: alternative, option. In *Aṣṭādhyāyī* some rules are optionally functional; In Buddhism, commentaries on *jñāna-prasthāna* such as *mahāvibhāṣā*.

Vigrahavyāvarttanī: a logical-philosophical treatise of Mahāyāna school composed by Nāgārjuna to repudiate the objections raised by the opponent schools related to truth, existence and epistemology. The text posits *śūnya* as ultimate Reality.

vyāna: *See prāṇa*.

vijñāna: cognition, intellect, consciousness;

(1) a kind of link (*nidāna*),

(2) a kind of *nāmaskandha*.

(3) a theory of subjective idealism of the Yogācāra school which propounds that only consciousness (*citta*) is real.

(4) the conceptual domain of intellection, i.e., *vijñānamaya kośa* which rearranges, reorders and interprets the experiences gained through sense-organs and finally relates them to the self or *ālaya*.

vijñānamaya kośa: *See vijñāna* (4).

vijñānavāda: *See vijñāna* (3).

vikalpa: alternative, symbol, mental constructs, abstraction, words;

(i) In Sāṁkhya systems, functions of mind.

(ii) In Yoga, a state or modification of *citta* which emerges with the verbal cognition but which lacks the objective truth. *See vṛtti* and *viparyaya*.

Vinaya Piṭaka: *See Tripiṭaka*.

viparīta ākhyāti: contrary apprehension; Mīmāṁsā theory of cognition which asserts that the object of illusion is a remembered individual object. Error/illusion arises when an object appears different from what it actually is. Here the identity of appearance of the object and the object as it is considered as unreal. *See khayātivāda, anyathākhyativāda.*

viparyaya: false cognition; a kind of the modification of self (*vṛtti*) where an object is perceived otherwise; as perception of silver in the shell. [*YS*, I.8] *see anyathākhyāti, khyātivāda, viparītakhyāti.*


Visisṭādvaita: qualified non-dualism; a philosophical system propounded by Rāmānuja. The system posits three categories as soul (*citta*), world/universe (*acitta*) and God

(*Īśvara*) who is the subject, object and controller respectively. These three categories are bound in organic unity.

vitaṇḍā: destructive criticism or argument; a category in Nyaya system — when an argument is only aimed at destructing the opponent's view. [*NS,* I.2.3., I.2.1.]

vivarta: transfiguration; apparent change like sea-wave. *See parināma.*

vivarta-vāda: theory of phenomenal appearance; in philosophy (especially in Advaita Vedānta) the world is supposed to be an illusory appearance superimposed by nescience on *Brahman*. The philosophical speculation mark a distinct opposition between *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*. But in grammar this distinction weakened in an attempt to achieve a resolution. [*VP*, I.1., I.120]. We may classify the philosophical systems on the basis of *vivartta*:



See pariṇāma.

vṛtti: mode of cognition (of *citta*); a modification of the *citta*, *Citta* is said to have five modes of cognition; these are — means of knowledge, false cognition, conceptual constructs, cognition of non-presence (*nidrā*) and recollection. Cessation of these *vṛtti* leads to perfect unification of the self with the supreme Reality. [*YS*, I.5-11]. In Buddhism, the acceptability of an expression/symbol to an object [*PS*, II.20]; also means commentary on the basic treatises or on the earlier commentaries along with the basic text.

vṛtti-jñāna: empirical knowledge; In Advaita, a blend of modification

of mind (citta) and the awareness of that.

vyaṅgyārtha: suggested meaning; this meaning originates from the primary and secondary meaning of a word. The stock example in poetics is 'an abode on the Ganges'. Which suggests the abode where tranquility, purity and piousness prevail.

vyāpti: concomittance, invariable; in the absence of one object the inference that other one is also absent or *vice versa*; major premise; concomittance of the major and middle terms in the structure of syllogistic reasoning. *Example*: Whenever there is smoke there is fire. There is smoke. Therefore, there is fire. Its other synonyms are *sāhacarya* and *avinābhāva* (Dharmakīrti prefers the term *avinābhāva*). See *avinābhāva*.

vyāvahārika: pragmatic, relative viewpoint; a kind of existence in Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta. *See Sattā*.

vyatireka: negation, exclusion, exception. In Buddhism a mode of syllogistic reasoning to determine the object of knowledge.

vyāvṛtti: differentiation; to differentiate; In Buddhist logic, *sāmānya* is posited by means of differentiation of the counter-correlates. Word is included under inference and words have natural capacity to exclude what is not relevant to them. [*PV*, 2,3. chapters]

yathārthākhyāti: apprehension of real; the theory propounded by Viśiṣṭādvaita. All that is experienced/presented by experience is real. See *khyātivāda*.

Yoga: union; the union of being with the supreme Being; a philosophical system expounded by sage Patañjali; the cessation of the modifications of *citta*. [*YS*, I.2].

Yogācāra: a philosophical system of Buddhism which asserts that only *citta* / *vijñāna* is real. *See* Vijñānavāda.

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अनादिनिधनो बुद्ध आदिबुद्धो निरन्वयः ।
करुणाशून्यता-मूर्तिः कालः संवृतिरुपिणी।
शून्यता चक्रमित्युक्तं काल चक्रोऽद्वयोऽक्षरः।।

anādinidhano buddha ādibuddho niranvayaḥ ।
karuṇāśūnyatā-mūrtiḥ kālaḥ saṁvṛtirūpiṇī ।
śūnyatā cakramityuktaṁ kāla cakro 'dvayo 'kṣaraḥ ।।

Buddha, without a beginning and an end, the source of all knowledge, dissociated from the causal relationship (the first Buddha), the embodiment of compassion and *śūnyatā* (designated as *kāla*) manifested as the phenomenal world (the wheel), being two (*kāla* and *cakra*) is yet one and non-transient.

काकारात् कारणे शान्ते लकाराल्लयोऽत्र च ।
चकाराच्चलचित्तस्य क्रकारात् क्रमबन्धनैः ।।

kākārāt kāraṇe śānte lakārāllayo 'tra ca ।
cakāràccalacittasya krakārāt kramabandhanaiḥ ।।

Kā stands for the cessation of cause, ***la*** for its dissolution in That, ***ca*** for restless mind, and ***kra*** for the bondage of order (in this world).

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